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Aprodicio A. Laquian 
Résumé 
Après avoir essayé pendant près de trente ans de faire disparaître les bidonvilles, la 
plupart des gouvernements des pays du Tiers-Monde ont maintenant adopté une attitude 
plus conciliante. Ce changement s'est accompagné d'une créativité remarquable dans l'action 
entreprise par les pouvoirs publics en vue d'améliorer les conditions de logement des 
populations urbaines défavorisées. 
Cette monographie expose des résultats de recherche (données, aperçus, idées) sur la 
planification et l'exécution de programmes de logement. Elle s'adresse aux décisionnaires et 
aux administrateurs qui ont à mettre en œuvre des programmes de ce type. Elle se fonde 
principalement sur des études effectuées aux Philippines, au Salvador, au Sénégal et en 
Zambie, mais aussi sur des travaux réalisés dans d'autres pays. Les questions examinées 
comprennent le revenu familial, l'emploi, la santé, l'aménagement, l'éducation et la 
participation de la collectivité. 
Resumen 
Luego de casi Ires decenios de estar tratando de erradicar los tugurios y las âreas de 
invasiôn, la mayorîa de los gobiernos en los paîses en desarrollo han adoptado ahora una 
actitud mâs conciliadora y pertinente. Este cambio ha producido una notoria creatividad en 
los esfuerzos oficiales por proveer vivienda y servicios urbanos bâsicos a los pobres de las 
ciudades. 
Esta monografîa presenta investigaciones, anâlisis e ideas relacionadas con la planificaciôn 
y ejecuciôn de programas de vivienda bâsica. Y ofrece estos resultados desde la perspectiva 
del formulador de polîticas o el administrador a quien se asigna la tarea de manejar tales 
programas. Aunque el trabajo se fundamenta, en su mayor parte, en cuatro estudios de paîses 
(El Salvador, Filipinas, Senegal y Zambia), también apela a la experiencia y el estudio realizado 
en otras naciones. Entre los tôpicos discutidos que afectan la vivienda bâsica estân: cambios 
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Foreword 
Since people started living in towns some 8000 years aga, the city has 
been the symbol of development in commerce, industry, and the arts. 
At present, however, there are fears that cities may not be able to continue 
their developmental raies. Cities have become tao large, it is sa id, they are 
choked by pollution and waste, scarred by siums and squatter shantytowns. 
lndeed, it is staggering to realize that the world's population has increased 
to 4.5 billion and that 42% of the people now live in cities. By the year 2000, 
the global population might reach 6.4 billion, more than half of that urban. 
Unlike in the past, urban growth will be fastest in less developed countries, 
where the proportion of people living in cities will almost triple between 
now and the turn of the century. Such massive urban growth will be 
occurring in cities already critically short of space, housing, and basic 
urban services. 
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has devoted 
considerable resources to urban research, and the developmental implica-
tion of rapid urban growth has been a lively tapie in the Centre's programs. 
Urban studies supported by IDRC have focused on policy implications of 
rural-urban migration, informai sector employment, low-cost housing, 
and providing basic services to the urban poor. 
This study on basic housing, involving the evaluation of community-
upgrading and sites-and-services programs in four countries, continues 
IDRC's interest in the problems of urbanization. lt was launched in 1975 
and has taken more than 5 years to complete. Like many IDRC-supported 
studies, the project involved the combined efforts of researchers from 
several countries. Research teams in El Salvador, the Philippines, Senegal, 
and Zambia collaborated in bringing this project to a successful conclusion. 
Information was also exchanged with other research teams doing similar 
studies in lndonesia, Jamaica, and Kenya. 
An important aspect of this project was the joint support by IDRC and 
the World Bank. This collaboration, between two international agencies, 
was not confined to funding. Research professionals from IDRC and the 
World Bank helped in designing and implementing the research program 
and worked side by side with their colleagues in the four countries. 
Researchers at the World Bank were particularly helpful with data analysis 
and drawing out the policy implications of the research results. Although 
the main concern of country researchers focused on policies for their 
countries, IDRC and the World Bank sought to generalize from the specific 
research findings in an attempt to determine how basic housing projects 
can be replicated in other settings. Comparative studies were supported 
by IDRC and the World Bank, of which this present work is one. 
A valuable element in this project was the opportunity for researchers 
and project managers to meet periodically to compare research results. 
Because the meetings were held in all of the participating countries, as 
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well as in Ottawa and Washington, DC, the researchers had an opportunity 
to observe directly conditions in other countries. They were also able to 
present research findings to policymakers and administrators and obtain 
the reactions of people to the ideas and insights emanating from the 
studies. At the same time, feedback from policymakers and practitioners 
encouraged researchers to examine a number of policy areas that needed 
further attention. 
IDRC and the World Bank are publishing additional reports on this 
collaborative project in the near future. ln particular, volumes on method-
ological aspects of evaluating projects are forthcoming. This particular 
work, on policy aspects of basic housing, is being released at this time 
because of the interest of government officiais and administrators to learn 
from the research results. lt is IDRC's hope that this work will respond 
adequately to that policy need. 
David W. Steedman 
Director 
Social Sciences Division 
1 nternational Development Research Centre 
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Prologue 
Basic housing for the urban poor in developing countries might not be a 
ho use at all: it cou Id be a piece of ground with a faucet and a pit latrine; 
it could be a basic house core with four walls and a roof; there could even 
be one room attached to a privy and a wet kitchen. 
Basic housing, however, is rarely a house, almost never a finished house. 
A finished house is something the urban poor can no longer afford unless 
they build it themselves. When they do so, it may not be counted as part 
of the housing stock. lt would most likely be classified as nonacceptable 
sium or squatter housing, illegal, and, therefore, nonexistent. The irony, 
of course, is that one-third to one-half of urban households in developing 
countries now live in such dwellings. 
Of humanity's basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter, the latter has 
been one of the most difficult to provide. Housing is expensive. Even for 
the very rich, it is usually a family's largest investment. Of late, even the 
most optimistic planners admit that the cheapest shelter that can be 
formally designed would be beyond the capacity to pay of about one-third 
of the urban households in developing countries. Already, there are 
millions of families who will never know the comforts of a home of their 
own or have access to such basic necessities as clean water, a sanitary toilet, 
electric lighting, or garbage collection. 
Since the end of World War Il, cities in the Third World have been 
inundated with millions of squatters and sium dwellers. At first, these were 
mostly migrants from the villages, but lately the growth in their numbers 
has been due to natural birthrates exceeding death rates. The urban poor 
have shown a tremendous capacity to survive. With only rudimentary skills, 
they have built their own houses. They have used old lumber, flattened oil 
drums, rusty galvanized iron sheets, cardboard, plastics, and other discarded 
materials in their urban environment. Against the forces of government, 
they have availed themselves of basic services. 
After almost three decades of trying to eradicate sium and squatter 
areas, most governments in developing countries have now adopted a 
more conciliatory and accommodating attitude. This change has brought 
about remarkable creativity in official efforts to provide housing and 
basic urban services to the urban poor. ln a form of poetic justice, the 
basic principles and approaches of new housing policies borrow heavily 
from the literature on siums and squatters. The pioneering studies of 
Abrams, Turner, the Leeds, Mangin, and others chronicled the ways in 
which the urban poor provided themselves with sites, shelter, and services. 
The ideas of mutual aid, self-help, community action, core housing, and 
progressive development were derived from the actual practices of 
squatters and sium dwellers. These are, at present, the main ingredients of 
a basic housing policy. 
Basic housing is the process by which even the poorest of families is able 
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to have access to affordable shelter and services. The main principle 
behind basic housing is progressive development. This is the idea that 
shelter and services can be initially provided in the simplest and cheapest 
way. The housing package can then be gradually improved upon in stages, 
using the combined resources of the people, community, government, 
and other institutions. ln the process, the shelter and services that evolve 
are in response to the basic needs of the people and their inherent 
capabilities to achieve those needs, with governmental programs assisting 
and augmenting persona! and community resources and unlocking 
popular energies rather than forcing people to conform to preconceived 
monolithic programs. 
The two most common forms of basic housing at present are community 
upgrading and sites and services. 1 n the past two decades, these have 
become the two most important low-cost housing approaches followed 
throughout the world. Housing programs in more than 100 countries now 
feature upgrading, sites and services, or variants of these approaches. 
The World Bank has, to date, some 90 projects in about 50 countries using 
this basic housing strategy. The US Agency for International Development 
has pursued upgrading and sites and services in its Housing Guarantee 
Loans Program. Other international and bilateral agencies, such as the 
European Development Fund, Canadian International Development 
Agency, and Asian Development Bank, have also supported basic housing 
programs. 
This monograph is about actual experiences in the formulation and 
implementation of basic housing policies to improve the living conditions 
of the urban poor. lt is aimed primarily at policymakers and administrators, 
although it may interest researchers and others as well. Although the work 
is based, for the most part, on the four country studies supported by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the World Bank, 
it also draws upon experiences and studies from other countries. ln par-
ticular, the work has profited from the author's involvement in basic 
housing projects in the Philippines, Kenya, lndonesia, and Jamaica. 
Specific data sources from these countries and elsewhere are cited in the 
text and the bibliography. 
The initial idea of launching a monitoring and evaluation study of 
sites-and-services and community-upgrading programs was discussed at a 
meeting held in San Salvador, El Salvador, in July 1975. The meeting was 
jointly supported by IDRC and the World Bank and involved researchers 
and administrators from El Salvador, Jamaica, Senegal, and Zambia, as well 
as officers from the funding agencies. At that meeting, the objectives of 
the study, a tentative research design, and the participation of local and 
expatriate researchers were discussed. 
The project, when finally approved by IDRC and the World Bank, had 
the following objectives: 
(1) To determine the extent to which the goals of the projects are being 
achieved. This would involve, in addition to an assessment of the projects 
in light of their goals, an examination of the appropriateness of the sites-
and-services and squatter-upgrading approaches in tackling the urban 
shelter problems. 
(2) To assess the impact of the projects on the people living in the 
project areas, on the neighbouring communities affected by them, on the 
urban service structure, and on the city as a whole. 
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(3) To develop information that would help in the efficient execution 
of the prajects, enable the formulation of intelligent informed policies 
within the cities and the countries, and facilitate the international 
comparison of the impact of similar urban shelter strategies in different 
economic, political, and administrative enviranments. 
ln due time, contracts were signed by IDRC and the World Bank with 
institutions in El Salvador, Senegal, and Zambia (negotiations with a 
research graup in Jamaica fell thraugh). Research teams were formed at 
the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarallo y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM), the 
Office des Habitations à Loyer Modéré (OHLM), and the Housing Praject 
Unit of the Lusaka City Council. The following year, another team was 
organized in the Philippines at the National Housing Authority to monitor 
and evaluate the Tondo foreshore praject in Manila. 
The researchers involved in the study decided to use a number of 
methodologies, the most important being the quasi-experimental design. 
ln this appraach, families participating in the upgrading and sites-and-
services prajects were seen as the "experimental graup," whereas a 
sample of families living in existing sium/squatter areas not directly affected 
by the action prajects was the "contrai graup." Panel studies were con-
ducted of families in bath graups, starting with a baseline survey in 1976 
and followed by repeated annual surveys of the same families until 1980. lt 
was hypothesized that the differences in socioeconomic changes thraugh 
time between the experimental and contrai graups would be indicators of 
the effects and impact of the basic housing prajects. Special interest was 
focused on such factors as changes in family incarne, employment and 
unemployment, health, housing consolidation, education, and community 
participation. 
Aside fram the social surveys, a number of innovative methods were 
also used in the study. To overcome difficulties in obtaining accurate 
information on family incarne, for example, researchers in the Philippines 
conducted an incarne and expenditure study that requested a sample of 
families to note on a daily basis, for a period of at least 1 year, all types of 
incarne in cash and in kind that they received, as well as all expenditures 
(for what and how much). ln another study, a photographie record was 
made of a sample of houses, with a snapshot each month marking the 
extent, if any, to which the structure had been impraved. ln Zambia, 
intensive case studies were written on praject events in which the com-
munity actively participated. ln El Salvador, extensive studies on the value 
of housing in three types of low-income communities (mesones or inner-
city sium housing, colonias ilegales or uncontralled settlements, and 
tugurios or squatter communities) were conducted and compared with 
the community-upgrading and sites-and-services prajects sponsored 
by FSDVM. 
If the success of a research praject can be measured by the number of 
reports praduced (or the volume of such reports), this study of community 
upgrading and sites and services can be considered to be a great success. 
Fortunately, the research reports were qualitatively strang as well. Sorne 
of the reports from the study are listed in the bibliography. IDRC has 
published an annotated bibliography of the reports (IDRC-TS41e). Publica-
tion of a technical volume on methodologies for evaluating housing prajects 
and a series of ma nuais on evaluation methods are also planned. lt is hoped 
that country studies depicting the experiences in El Salvador, the Philippines, 
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Senegal, and Zambia will be published in these countries. 
This current work is an attempt to present research facts, insights, and 
ideas related to the planning and implementation of basic housing 
programs. lt views these research findings from the perspective of the 
policymaker or administrator given the task of managing such programs. 
With this in mind, this work has avoided the detailed analytical schema or 
complex methods that seem to be in vogue in the social sciences at present. 
lt has also refrained from citing the highly technical dissertations on urban 
design and building materials so often cited by architects and planners. 
Despite the approach taken, it is hoped that focusing on the policy 
issues and program aspects of basic housing has not resulted in compro-
mising the factual basis and analytical reasoning behind this study. Simplicity 
in the style of presenting the research findings does not reduce the 
complexity of the issues covered. As most designers know, it is often more 
difficult to corne up with a basic house than to build a baroque mansion. 
So it is with this work. 
Although 1 was involved in this study from the outset, other concerns 
prevented me from participating actively during the final years of the 
project. lt was with gratitude, therefore, that 1 accepted an invitation by 
Ors David W. Steedman and Yue-man Yeung of IDRC to prepare this mono-
graph. After so many years, it was not easy to gather all of the materials 
produced in this project. 1 am grateful to Ors Douglas H. Keare and Michael 
Bamberger of the Urban and Regional Economies Division, Development 
Economies Department of the World Bank, for sharing their papers with 
me. 1 am particularly indebted to Doug and Mike for commenting on the 
first draft of this monograph in great detail - they may not agree with 
some of my conclusions but we share the common belief that upgrading 
and sites-and-services programs are generalized approaches that are 
considerably better than the other competing housing models currently 
available. My special thanks also go to Dr Emmanuel Jimenez of the 
Department of Economies, University of Western Ontario, for permission 
to quote from some of his papers. 
The main responsibility for carrying out the research fell upon the 
research teams in the participating countries. 1 am grateful for the assistance 
of Mila A. Reforma and Annie Molina from the Philippines, Mathias Banda 
and Richard Singini from Zambia, Edgardo Gonzalez-Polio and Alberto 
Harth-Deneke from El Salvador, and Aly Bathily and Ousmane Blondin 
Diop from Senegal. My gratitude is also extended to the project managers 
who administered the basic housing programs, especially to General 
Gaudencio V. Tobias and Rolando Fadul of the National Housing Authority 
in Manila, M. Oumar Ba of OHLM in Dakar, A. Adamson and P. Muyangwa 
in Lusaka, and Mauricio Silva in San Salvador. Finally, 1 thank Gayle Steven 
for typing the final draft of the manuscript. 
Without the assistance and support of the people mentioned above, it 
would have been extremely difficult to have finished this study. Although 
1 acknowledge their support, however, 1 am primarily responsible for any 
errors of fact, interpretation, and judgment. 
Aprodicio A. Laquian 
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INTRODUCTION 
Typical pueb/o jovenes site in Lima, Peru. (Many /essons on basic housing came from 
experiences in Latin America.) 
Late in 1974, officiais of the Philippine government began discussions 
with officers of the World Bank about a housing loan. The discussions 
covered a number of issues, the most important of which was: why borrow 
World Bank funds for housing? 
An official in the nation's economic planning agency argued that, even 
at the concessional interest rate of 8% per year, the World Bank funds 
would be expensive because they would have to be paid back in US dollars. 
Devaluation of the Philippine peso within the next 25 years would raise 
repayment costs further. 
Expensive funds, said the official, should not be invested in housing, 
which has a very low capital/output ratio and does not create that 
many multipliers in the economy. lt would be better to invest World Bank 
funds in an integrated steel mill or a petrochemical plant. 
"What you are proposing," said the official, "is to import expensive 
Australian steak only to grind it into hamburger. lt does not make economic 
sense." 
"The people want hamburger," responded a housing agency executive. 
"Besides, the government needs a low-cost housing program. The decision 
has been made - ours is not to question why." 
A couple of years earlier, in Senegal, low-cost housing for the bidonvilles 
(shantytowns) was the tapie of discussion. ln previous years, the Government 
of Senegal had experimented with a basic housing approach called parcelles 
assainies (literally "sanitary plot"), which involved opening up new 
lands in the city's periphery; extending water, sanitation, drainage, and 
sewerage services to these plots; and assisting people in building houses. 
Officers of the World Bank agreed to lend funds for this project, which was 
called "sites and services." This was the first basic housing project supported 
by the World Bank. 
At the other end of the African continent, in Lusaka, Zambia, the main 
issue with respect to housing was "minimum standards." World Bank 
officiais favoured the construction of "core houses" on 200 m2 lots, whereas 
Zambian officiais wanted a finished house on 330 m 2. A member of the 
Lusaka City Council argued angrily that the low standards were against the 
principles of Zambian humanism: 
Under colonial rule, only white people lived in town, whereas Africans 
lived in their huts in the native quarters outside the city limits. Africans 
were separated from their families who remained in the villages. Jobless 
Africans were not allowed in the city. We are independent now. We 
should live in good houses with our families. 
World Bank officiais sympathized with the Zambian council member; 
however, they raised the crucial question of affordability. How much can 
the average family living in a Lusaka squatter area afford for housing and to 
what extent is the City Council willing to subsidize housing programs? 
The policy discussions cited above reflected some of the main concerns 
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of officiais in developing countries in the early 1970s. Rapid rates of 
urbanization had flooded their cities with migrants, most of whom had 
found their way into teeming siums and dilapidated shantytowns. Urban 
services were strained to the limit. Even civic discipline was breaking down 
as hordes of people invaded public and private land and set up their own 
communities overnight. Worst of ail, traditional housing policies did not 
seem to work. 
Public Housing Programs 
The main housing programs prevalent before the 1970s were urban 
renewal, low-cost housing, and housing finance. They were based on the 
assumption that if enough housing units were built there would be no 
housing shortage. Solutions to the housing problem involved providing 
enough capital for housing, introducing modern technologies in housing 
construction, finding better and cheaper building materials, and designing 
more efficient dwellings. A prerequisite for the success of these solutions 
was contrai over land use, illegal squatting, population movements, and 
substandard structures. Housing was a rational, predictable, and regularized 
activity; it should have been responsive to efficient and effective 
management. lt was not, however, and, one by one, housing policies and 
programs fai led in developi ng cou nt ries. 
Urban renewal was borrowed from North American and European 
programs designed to rejuvenate decaying city centres. Developers, with 
the support of government, assembled land in depressed areas, moved 
people out, demolished old structures, and then built new housing. Because 
this approach was subjected to modification in many developing countries, 
however, it rarely went beyond moving the people out and dumping them 
into "temporary" resettlement sites outside of the city limits. lnstead of 
building new housing, authorities constructed expensive prestige projects 
such as cultural centres, convention halls, government offices, and transport 
terminais. ln some countries, the cleared land was allocated to shopping 
plazas, high-rise condominiums, and parking lots. 
Urban renewal became a euphemism for squatter eradication. Thus, 
when the City of Manila decided to rid the old walled city of Intramuros of 
squatters, families were simply rounded up by the army and police, placed 
on trucks with what remained of their shanties, and told to build their 
own homes at a new site 30 km away. The City Council then passed an 
ordinance requiring that any building constructed within Intramuros 
should feature Spanish architecture to preserve the historical character of 
the city. More than 30 years later, much of the cleared land within Intramuros 
is still vacant. Building in accordance with Spanish architecture was tao 
expensive, even for private developers. Building a low-cost housing project 
using colonial Spanish architecture was beyond the creativity of even 
the best Filipino architects. 
lnstead of solving the housing problem, squatter eradication only made 
it worse. Destroying existing shanties meant a reduction in the housing 
stock. lt also entailed a large loss to poor families who had invested 
considerable su ms of money in their dwellings. lt was estimated that when 
almost 39 000 people were evicted from the Eastleigh area of Nairobi in 
1970, for example, the 6733 dwellings demolished represented a capital 
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loss of US$285 000 on the part of the people (Haldane 1971). Another 
eviction of squatters along the Nairobi River several years later resulted 
in a sharp reduction in informai sector jobs because the destroyed structures 
were also the workplaces of bicycle repairmen, automotive mechanics, 
and handicraft manufacturers. 
The failure of squatter eradication programs is evident from the fact that 
squatters and sium dwellers are the fastest growing segments of urban 
populations. Suppressing them in some parts of the city only meant that 
they reappeared in other parts. Relocating them to city peripheries or back 
to the villages has not worked; they simply filter back to squat once more. 
There are very few housing authorities using urban renewal or squatter 
eradication programs now. The common policy is to delay resettlement 
until an acceptable area is ready to receive the people to be moved. Most 
governments now attempt to preserve even substandard housing, counting 
even squatter shanties as part of the housing stock. These policies are 
apparent from such slogans as "maximum retention of structures," and 
"minimum dislocation of dwellings." lt has taken several decades, but the 
futility of eradication programs is now known. 
Subsidized housing has been the most common response of governments 
to the housing problem. Housing projects, for rent or for sale, have 
appeared in almost ail cities in developing countries, often through foreign 
loans and assistance. Often, such projects were earmarked for specific 
groups, such as civil servants, war veterans, labour union members, or 
subscribers to government pension systems. Sometimes, they are allocated 
to former squatters or sium dwellers, particularly those removed from areas 
needed by the government for other purposes. 
lt is now realized that, even with minimum standards, subsidized housing 
programs are just tao expensive to adequately house ail the people 
needing housing. There are a few examples, such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong, where public housing programs have been successful (Yeh and 
Laquian 1979). ln most countries, however, subsidized housing has been 
beset with problems. 
One of the most serious problems with subsidized housing programs is 
the fact that they have benefited, for the most part, households that cou Id 
have acquired housing on the open market. The people needing subsidized 
housing the most, on the other hand, were unable to attain access to public 
housing. Even when housing authorities planned such housing for them, 
higher incarne groups eventually took over through such means as "buying 
rights" from original allocatees, bribing housing administrators, or renting 
units to "dummy" families. 
Repayment rates in public housing projects are notoriously low, with 
delinquency rates often reaching 100% in a number of projects. Many 
reasons are cited for this: refusai of tenants to pay because units are poorly 
maintained or serviced; lack of willingness on the part of administrators to 
collect payments; or simply the attitude that because the projects belong 
to the government there is no need to pay for them. Sorne housing units 
have even been vandalized; others have remained unoccupied for years 
because of structural defects, poor design, or the fact that people do not 
want to live in them. 
The main issue with subsidized public housing is equity. lt does not 
benefit the "target group" most in need of housing, i.e., the poor (Van 
Huyck 1971). 
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The poorest people of the country usually make substantial contri-
butions to the overall tax revenues through various forms of indirect 
taxation such as the sales tax. If part of this money is used to provide 
housing subsidies for a small portion of the urban households, it means 
that the poorest people are being taxed to allow others, many of whom 
will be better off in any case, to live better. 
At present, despite criticisms such as those mentioned above, most 
developing countries have subsidized public housing programs. Often, 
they are justified in terms of the need to provide adequate housing to 
households that can assure their cost recovery because of their regular 
incarnes. Because people living in sium/squatter areas are not uniformly 
poor, public housing is sometimes justified as a "decongestion" method, 
giving those families that can afford it a chance to move out of the poor 
areas. ln a form of "trickle down," the shanties vacated by upwardly 
mobile families become available to others. 
Politically, some governments use public housing mainly to reward 
special groups. ln most cases, such groups are not the most needy. As long 
as acceptable housing is scarce, however, this inequality and lack of social 
justice will be a feature of subsidized housing in many developing 
countries. 
Fiscal policies to provide housing in developing countries have taken 
the form of low-interest loans, organization of mortgage institutions, 
setting up savings and loans associations and trust companies, and even 
the formation of housing cooperatives. Ali of these approaches, however, 
have assumed that the households involved have some form of regular 
incarne to invest in housing. Fixed assets that can be used as collateral to 
backup loans, such as land, are also required. Most important, managerial 
expertise in running the financial institutions is assumed to be available 
(or, at least, that there are people who could be adequately trained in a 
short period of time). 
Experiences with housing institutions have been mixed: failure rates 
have been high; complaints about the complex administrative procedures 
before one can get a housing loan are many; common banking practices, 
such as requiring collateral, are often not met by low-income households; 
and affordability levels for formai housing programs are set tao high for 
most squatters and sium dwellers. 
Experiences with housing finance institutions have been similar to those 
of subsidized housing projects - they have generally benefited the wrong 
target group. Those with the means received the loans; those who needed 
it most did not. As many housing bank officiais have said, "we are a bank, 
not a charitable institution." Use of modern banking principles does not 
assist the families in the most need of basic housing. 
Lessons from Squatters/Sium Dwellers 
Even as housing authorities were encountering difficulties in making 
housing programs work, social science researchers were publishing studies 
shedding some light on why their policies were failing. ln Peru, Turner 
(1967) and Mangin (1970) observed the organizational capabilities of 
squatters and proposed that these cou Id be harnessed for development of 
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their communities rather than being turned against the authorities. 
ln lndia, Van Huyck (1971) and Rosser (1971) noticed the adequacy of even 
the worst sium dwellings and cautioned against policies that would destroy 
existing housing stock. ln Venezuela, Peattie (1968) witnessed mutual 
assistance patterns in low-income neighbourhoods that were found to be 
useful in housing and services provision. Studies in Brazil disproved the 
notion that squatters are dangerous radicals and noticed that the organized 
behaviour of low-income people was used mainly to attain basic housing 
and services. 
Based on studies of siums/squatter communities, a number of generaliza-
tions with relevance to basic housing were put forward. Among the most 
important of these were: 
(1) Squatters and sium dwellers have the resources, skills, and persona! 
motivations to provide adequate shelter for themselves. 
(2) When given security of tenure and resources, squatters and sium 
dwellers can build their own houses and improve them as their life 
situation improves. 
(3) Squatters and sium dwellers develop their own market mechanisms 
and can provide themselves with building materials appropriate 
to their needs. 
(4) Squatters and sium dwellers are well organized and use mutual aid 
and self-help in building their own houses and community facilities. 
(5) There are valid reasons for the locations chosen by squatters and 
sium dwellers and these usually dictate their choice of housing sites. 
The early literature on siums and squatter areas was condemnatory and 
almost alarmist. Fears were expressed about the breakdown of marais, 
disorganization of family and community life, and the revolutionary threat 
of an expanding proletariat in the siums. Invasion and capture of public 
land were seen as violations of law and order. Authorities feared that 
repeated legal transgressions would become habituai and that the rules of 
society would no longer be enforced. 
After some time, more realistic descriptions of life in sium/squatter 
areas were written. Urban sociologists were particularly active in these 
studies, which revealed that the urban poor were primarily interested in 
leading a normal life under abnormal historical conditions. Before long, 
the literature started developing a more idealistic and romantic tone. 
Squatters and sium dwellers were the true transitional people, breaking 
from tradition to attain a modern urban lifestyle. Left to themselves, they 
could salve their own housing problems. Squatters and sium dwellers were 
not the problem but the solution to urban ills. 
This glorification of the siums coincided with a number of housing 
experiments that attempted to adjust to the real living conditions of the 
urban poor. ln the 1960s, squatter eradication and resettlement programs 
gave way to programs that respected the existence of squatter communities, 
albeit grudgingly. Existing sium/squatter areas were even improved in 
Chile, lndia, and Iraq by extending basic services to such places. A review 
of "sites-and-services" projects (Grindley and Merrill 1971) revealed that 
such projects were being used in some 32 countries. A number of the 
projects were more than 10 years old and were fairly successful in improving 
the living conditions of the urban poor. The review defined sites and 
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services as "a method of preparing land to facilitate the construction of 
individual houses and a method of upgrading residential areas that are 
already settled." Sites and services consisted of one or more of the 
following elements: 
(1) Site: the residential building plot described by its size, location, 
and project density. 
(2) Public utilities: basic amenities, such as water and sanitation, and 
desirable services, such as electric lighting, sidewalks, and paved roads. 
(3) Neighbourhood facilities: such as schools, markets, police and fire 
protection, parks, community centres, and religious or cultural centres. 
(4) Contractual arrangements: legal relationships between the govern-
ment and the residents, such as land tenure, repayment of developmental 
costs, responsibility for basic services, and land-use regulations. 
Until the late 1970s, little distinction was made between sites and services 
and community upgrading. Later, it was recognized that, although these 
approaches went together, each one required different interventions; 
thus, two basic housing approaches evolved. 
Basic Housing Options 
Learning from the various housing activities in developing countries 
and heeding lessons from the literature on low-income communities, 
planners evolved two basic housing approaches: community upgrading 
and sites and services. Bath approaches were intended to help the urban poor. 
They also focused on land and services rather than shelter. Bath depended 
upon the resources and capabilities of the people themselves and saw the 
government's raie mainly as supportive (much later, this became known as 
"aided self-help"). Despite the similarities, however, it is useful to describe 
the two approaches more distinctly. 
Community Upgrading 
ln community upgrading, basic services are introduced in situ or in the 
sium and squatter communities themselves. Typically, potable water, 
toilets, surface drainage, garbage collection and disposai, electricity, 
schools, streets and footpaths, and community centres are provided. Where 
some of these services already exist, they are improved. 
Because houses and other structures are often built without a plan in 
sium/squatter areas, community upgrading attempts to "rationalize" the 
location and alignment of these structures, usually following a grid pattern 
of streets and footpaths. ln the Philippines, this process is called "reblocking" 
and involves dislocations to as many as 50% of structures. ln El Salvador, 
experiments have been conducted in which old. rentai housing in the 
mesones was improved, basic services were provided, and the units were 
sold to the people in a form of condominium ownership. 
A primary ingredient of community upgrading is assuring security of 
tenure to project participants. There have been attempts to use long-term 
leases but in almost ail countries people have expressed a preference for 
outright sale. Not just legal status but formai definitions of the boundaries 
of residential plots have been found to be important to tenure. This is 
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why surveying and documenting of properties were such key ingredients 
in the Philippine reblocking program. 
Security of tenure, in turn, has been found to be most important in 
house improvement (also known as "housing consolidation"). When 
people are not sure whether they own a property or not, they are not likely 
to improve it. Although housing consolidation is influenced by other 
factors (availability of resources, construction skills, possibility of mutual 
aid), it is security of tenure that is often the main element in housing 
consolidation. 
Frequently in community upgrading, the introduction of services and the 
rationalization of land use requires reducing the density of the community. 
ln such instances, households are relocated to other areas where sites and 
services are provided. ln Lusaka, planners exerted great efforts to ensure 
that the relocated households were not moved tao far from the original 
communities so as not to disrupt employment, access to services, and 
community life. Sites and services in "overspill" areas were found and 
people were moved there in groups. ln the Philippines, families that could 
not be accommodated in the Tondo project were resettled in a site called 
Dagat-Dagatan, about 3 km away. 
Sites and Services 
The sites-and-services approach involves the opening up of new land 
and its subdivision into serviced residential plots. Service standards vary. 
Sorne projects might have water piped directly into each house, whereas 
others provide only a common water faucet shared by about five families. 
Sanitation arrangements range from pit latrines to flush toilets for each 
house. The sites provided varied also, with the average plot size in Tondo 
being only 45 m 2, whereas in Lusaka it was about 300 m 2• 
Earlier sites-and-services projects, like the Pikine scheme in Dakar, 
Senegal, were often located in peripheral areas of the city. Land was 
cheaper in such areas. Planners also hoped that the introduction of services 
in these areas would influence the direction and pace of the city's growth. 
These early projects met with severe difficulties because people's lives 
were disrupted by being moved so far away from their places of work. 
ln many countries, projects were abandoned after the initial resettlement; 
in others, the projects were not settled at all. 
The shelter component in sites-and-services projects may vary. A few 
projects do not have any shelter at all - families have to build on the 
serviced site, sometimes using the remnants of their destroyed shanties 
as building materials. Most projects, however, have a variety of "core 
units," which might include a wall and a toilet, a kitchen, or even a room. 
The Dandora project in Nairobi, Kenya, for example, offered the following 
types of units: type A: sanitary core only (a toilet and washroom), built on 
a plot ranging in size from 100 - 140 m 2; type B: sanitary core and one 
room used as a kitchen, built dn plots ranging in size from 100 - 140 m 2; 
and type C: sanitary core and two rooms, built on plots 160 m 2 in size. 
As in community upgrading, families are expected to use mutual aid 
and self-help in sites-and-services projects. ln El Salvador, participation in 
mutual aid is a prerequisite to joining a project. ln Zambia, people were 
expected to help in community projects and to build community halls and 
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other public buildings, although this requirement of mutual aid was later 
downplayed. ln the Philippines, neighbours assist each other in moving 
the houses affected by reblocking. The government may offer technical 
assistance in the performance of mutual aid but the community has 
primary responsibility for the mutual-aid projects. 
Examples of Projects 
To gain a better idea of the nature of community-upgrading and 
sites-and-services projects, it might be useful to describe in greater detail 
the four projects evaluated in the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) - World Bank supported study. The Senegal project is 
typical of early sites-and-services efforts. Sites-and-services projects were 
evaluated in El Salvador. Community upgrading and sites and services 
were combined in the projects in the Philippines and Zambia. Because the 
four country projects were launched at different times, they show a process 
of learning by doing. This is seen not only in the main approaches used but 
also in such details as types of services provided, levels of services, and 
management structures used. 
Senegal 
The Senegal project, approved in 1972, was the first sites-and-services 
project supported by the World Bank. lt involved loans of about US$8.3 
million to provide some 14 000 serviced plots in Dakar and 1600 plots 
in Thies. 
The bulk of the funds was allocated to land preparation because the site 
chosen, in an area called Pikine on the outskirts of Dakar, consisted 
mainly of undulating sand dunes. The land was graded, roads were built, 
and drainage facilities were constructed. Two types of water and sanitation 
systems were provided: public faucets and pit privies for 85% of the plots 
and private water connections and septic tanks for the remainder. Electricity 
was also included in the project, mainly for street lighting. 
The neighbourhood facilities included 12 primary schools, 4 secondary 
schools, and 4 health centres in Dakar, whereas 2 primary schools and 
1 health centre were allocated for Thies. Plots were also provided for the 
construction of other community and recreational centres, religious 
buildings, small-scale industries, and commercial establishments. 
As designed, capital charges on a typical plot were about US$290 in 
Dakar and US$120 in Thies over 15 years. This would buy a 150 m2 lot with a 
pit latrine, access to a public faucet, and very little else. Building materials 
could be purchased with a loan, originally set at CFAF100 000 and payable 
at 7% interest per year. 1 Households with incarnes ranging from US$57-
145 per month in Dakar (US$40-145 in Thies) were eligible for the project. 
Although infrastructure construction began in 1973, the Senegal project 
suffered from delays. Even when the roads, water, sewerage, and other 
services were finished, people did not move to the site immediately. 
1Currency: CFA Franc BCEAO; responsible authority Banque Centrale des États 
de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. 
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ln February 1978, only four families had moved into the project. Most 
families allocated a plot said the building materials loans were only enough 
to build a foundation for a dwelling. Loan amounts were raised to 
CFAF275 000 in 1978 and to CFAF415 000 in 1980. This accelerated move-
ment to the area so that by July 1980 more than 3000 families were living 
in the project. Before the end of 1980, some 5000 families had moved to 
the site and another 12 557 had been selected. Applications for the project 
had also increased so that about 35 000 families had expressed interest in 
a plot. At the time of writing, so many people had moved into the area that 
the housing agency was having problems with services. 
El Salvador 
The agreement for the US$8.5 million loan for the El Salvador project 
was signed in October 1974. The project was designed to provide urban 
services to about 7000 lots in the capital city of San Salvador and in other 
urban areas (Santa Ana, San Miguel, Sonsonate, and Usulutan). The project 
offered a number of options: (1) a residential plot ranging in size from 
60-90 m 2, with access to water, sewerage, electricity, and other 
services; (2) a completed sanitary core composed of a toilet, sink, and an 
enclosed bathroom area, connected to all basic services; (3) a completed 
sanitary core with a roofed core house with a living area of about 18 m2, 
connected to all basic services; and (4) a completed sanitary core with a 
roofed house with a living area of about 36 m2, connected to all basic 
services. 
The El Salvador project was the first (and only so far) that was administered 
by a private nonprofit organization, the Salvadorean Foundation for 
Development and Minimal Housing (FSDVM). The average plot cost 
US$1500 and was designed for families with monthly incarnes ranging from 
C140-240 per month. A 10% down payment for the plot was required. lt 
was also mandatory for families to participate in mutual-aid work during 
weekends for periods ranging from 3-6 months. lt was expected that each 
family would use self-help in the construction and improvement of its 
dwelling. 
ln June 1980, an evaluation of the El Salvador project showed that about 
4348 dwelling units had been completed and another 2246 were in progress. 
ln addition, most infrastructures and community services were installed. 
Sorne services, which were the responsibility of other government agencies, 
were being delayed but, in general, participants residing in the projects 
were happy. This satisfaction can be gauged by the fact that only 2.3% of 
the total loan portfolio were in arrears in July 1980. 
Zambia 
The Lusaka project was designed to upgrade conditions in four low-
income communities (George, Chawama, Chaisa, and Chipata), where 
about 60% of the city's squatters lived. The project cost US$41.2 million, 
US$20 million of which came from a World Bank loan. Sorne 17 000 
dwellings were to be improved and 7600 new serviced sites provided in 
adjacent "overspill" areas. Services provided in bath upgrading and 
overspill areas included water (one public faucet for every 25 families), 
roads, and electric street lighting. 
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About 4400 sites-and-services plots were also included in the Zambia 
project. Of these, 1200 plots were to have only "basic" services (pit latrines 
and access to public faucets). Another 3200 plots were to have "normal" 
services, which had piped water to every dwelling and a toilet connection 
to a waterborne sewerage system. Like the upgrading projects, the sites-
and-services schemes had roads, surface water drainage, and electric 
street lighting. 
To assist families in building or improving their homes, building materials 
loans of up to K100 were made available initially. Repayment was to be 
made over a period of 15 years, at 7.5% interest per year. ln the overspill 
areas, a family could borrow up to K250, whereas a family in a normal 
sites-and-services project could borrow up to K525. Community facilities 
were included in the project. These entailed building and equipping 
18 primary schools, 17 multipurpose centres, 3 health centres, 17 markets, 
and 11 demonstration houses. The demonstration houses were built to 
show people various options for building and consolidating their houses. 
These were later sold to families at cost. 
An evaluation in May 1981 (Sanyal et al. 1981) indicated that the Lusaka 
project had extended services to almost 20 000 dwellings and provided 
new services to more than 7000 families in adjacent overspill areas. About 
3600 serviced plots were also offered in the sites-and-services schemes. 
The original standards for the project were quite high; demand for the 
units was also very high. To make more units available, therefore, some 
design requirements had to be introduced. Thus, instead of 325 m2 per 
plot, the overspill area projects averaged only 210 m2• Satisfaction with the 
plot size was very high, however, and families even found enough space 
for gardening within the project. 
The most important problem faced in Lusaka was the extremely high 
default rate. ln March 1980, service charges for 99% of the families in the 
upgrading project in Chawama were in arrears of more than 1 month. 
ln the community of George, 62% were in arrears. With respect to loan 
repayments, the situation was even worse, with 63% of families in Chawama 
and 38% in George in arrears of more than 1 year. Even in sites-and-services 
projects, loan repayment was not good, as about 40% of the families were 
in arrears. 
The evaluation found that the high default rates did not seem to be due 
to the inability of the families to pay. Families with high incarnes were 
equally represented among those that defaulted. lt was concluded that the 
high default rates were due mainly to the absence of an efficient collection 
procedure as well as a lack of "political will" on the part of project manage-
ment to collect the charges. This situation was, in turn, due to complaints 
from project participants that the services promised in the projects were 
not adequately provided and to political pressures from the people that 
expectations should first be met before collections are made. 
Despite its problems, the Lusaka project has been deemed a success 
by Zambian authorities. By producing 11 500 new housing units and 
improving services to 20 000 families, it has been estimated tht the project 
improved the living conditions of more than 31 000 families. Furthermore, 




The Philippine project focused on the community of Tondo, Manila, 
where some 27 500 families lived on 137 ha of reclaimed land. The project, 
which began in 1976, was estimated to have cost US$65 million, about 
US$32 million of which came from a World Bank loan. 
The main approach in the project was the upgrading of conditions in 
the old Tondo foreshore lands (Fig. 1). This involved the construction of 
roads and pathways, relocation of houses to their proper places in 
"reblocked" areas, introduction of piped water and waterborne sewerage 
systems, and building of community centres and schools. About 12 000 
houses were to be upgraded in the old community. Another 4000 families 
were to be moved to a sites-and-services project in Dagat-Dagatan, 
located 3 km away. The same level of services was to be provided in 
Dagat-Dagatan and, in addition, families were given a number of options 
on "core houses" that could be built. These ranged from a sanitary core 
and a shared fire wall to a sanitary core with shared fire wall, posts, roof, 
and sidings (a basic house that a family could move into immediately). 
Housing materials loans of P500 (raised to P3500 in 1978) were made 
available to families but could be obtained only in materials, not in cash. 
Loans were processed by the Development Bank of the Philippines, 
although the executing agency for the project was the National Housing 
Authority (NHA). lnvestment loans were also extended to entrepreneurs. 
ln addition, an industrial estate was set up where factory sites and buildings 
were offered to investors to help create jobs within the community. 
Serviced sites were also offered for sale in a "commercial strip" and the 
economic rates charged there were designed to cross-subsidize the 
cheaper lots in the project proper. 
ln upgrading the old community, the NHA followed the principles of 
(1) maximum retention of structures; (2) minimum displacement of families; 
and (3) maximum community participation. Efforts were also exerted to 
incur minimum costs in service provision so that the project would be 
within the capacity to pay of participants. 
An evaluation made in June 1981 revealed that about 97.5% of the 
households surveyed in Tondo had improved their dwellings, with 12.5% 
building entirely new structures. Land ownership in the project has 
become more equitable because the reduction in average lot sizes from 
65.2 to 53.9 m1 allowed more families to gain access to land in the area. 
With houses being enlarged and improved, more rentai space was created 
(an average increment of 10.5 m1 per structure). The number of families 
offering space for rent has increased by 10%. 
One of the most notable accomplishments in Tondo, however, was 
the active role played by the community in all aspects of decision-making 
pertaining to the project. Organized community groups played an active 
role in setting standards for the project, selecting participants, formulating 
procedures, and implementing project activities. This participatory style 
has been extended to two nationwide community-upgrading and sites-
and-services programs called the Zonal lmprovement Project (ZIP) and 
Sium lmprovement and Renewal (SIR) Project, which are both supported 
by the World Bank. ZIP projects are concentrated on about 200 sium/ 
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intermediate cities and towns such as Cebu, Cagayan de Oro, and Davao in 
the southern Philippines. 
The Tondo project relied heavily upon self-help but the construction 
activities in the area created jobs for about 500 residents. Small entrepreneurs 
were also encouraged as shown by the fact that 230 loans have been 
granted. Sorne problems are being encountered in the industrial estates 
because the lack of services (mainly water) is discouraging entrepreneurs 
from setting up operations within the area. Collection of service charges 
for water and sanitation is also being delayed because the NHA fears 
that until service delivery is up to standard, people will be reluctant to 
pay such charges. 
Key Policy Issues 
Basic housing programs, as exemplified by community upgrading and 
sites and services, have become the most important policy interventions 
in assisting the urban poor in developing countries. Based as these programs 
are on attaining a greater understanding of life in sium/squatter areas, 
they have generated great expectations about their effectiveness. The 
careful evaluations covered in this monograph attempt to assess whether 
or not the promise of upgrading and sites and services has been kept. 
ln this assessment, the following policy issues are of the utmost importance. 
Affordability 
One of the most important questions posed in upgrading and sites and 
services is whether or not the majority of the urban poor can afford them. 
If affordability levels are set tao high, basic hou si ng projects would cater to 
the relatively more prosperous fa mi lies in sium/squatter areas. The result 
would be a "creaming off" process, in which those in the most need of 
assistance would be left to fend for themselves while the lot of the better-
off families would be improved further. 
Setting affordability levels tao low, however, would mean greater 
subsidies, which may limit the capacity of governments to replicate projects. 
Cast recovery is a policy adhered to by national and international funding 
agencies, but projects designed for the poorest families have tended to 
have low cost-recovery records. To what extent has affordability been 
influenced by this "banker's view" and what have been the effects of 
affordability levels on the effectiveness of past projects? 
Affordability has been the main element in deciding what "target 
groups" are benefited by basic housing. lt is also closely related to the 
issue of "accessibility," as higher affordability levels would make projects 
inaccessible to poorer families. lt is important to find out, therefore, 
if existing housing programs have reached the right target groups. lt is also 
important to determine the programs' impacts on other groups, especially 
those excluded because of the affordability levels set by project designers. 
Mutual Aid and Self-Help 
Mutual aid and self-help are closely related to affordability because it is 
believed that they eut project costs. What has been the experience with 
24 
these approaches in reducing costs? ln relation to costs, it has been 
observed that managing mutual-aid and self-help programs entails heavy 
administrative costs. What are the trade-offs between these costs and the 
accomplishments of mutual aid and self-help? 
ln the El Salvador project, participation in mutual aid and self-help is 
a prerequisite to participation in the project. How successful has this been 
and to what extent has it affected the accessibility of the project to 
disadvantaged groups such as households headed by females and those 
employed in the informai sector? 
Housing Consolidation 
Ali basic housing programs are based on the assumption that people will 
improve and consolidate their dwellings when they are assured of tenure 
and provided with the means and time to do so. Housing consolidation, 
however, may also be influenced by other factors. For example, have the 
expectations that squatters and sium dwellers will have the skills needed 
to build their own houses been met? What have been the effects of 
building materials loans, skills training programs, and technical assistance 
on the nature and pace of housing consolidation? 
Housing consolidation is heavily influenced by project design. If designers 
want aesthetically pleasing houses, they may provide a higher level of core 
house development and impose time limits on consolidation. These, of 
course, will raise costs and would then affect project accessibility. One of 
the major criticisms of upgrading and sites and services has been that 
they create "planned siums." To what extent has fear of this criticism 
influenced the nature of basic housing projects? 
Building Codes and Standards 
Basic housing programs are usually considered substandard when 
traditional building code provisions are used. To what extent has adherence 
to such standards affected the affordability and accessibility of projects? 
What have been the effects of building code standards on such elements 
of basic housing as house and subdivision design, construction processes, 
choice of building materials, and technology used with respect to the 
success or failure of programs? Many designers have called for "appropriate" 
codes and standards to caver upgrading and sites and services. What is the 
nature of these standards and how effective have they been in low-income 
projects? 
lncome Generation and Employment 
lt has been argued that shelter and services are not the main problems 
in sium/squatter communities, that if people could obtain employment 
and earn some money they would salve their housing problems. Many 
basic housing programs now include incarne generation and employment 
components. How successful have these approaches been? To what extent 
have such project elements as low interest loans, skills training, formation 
of cooperatives, and providing business or commercial sites been success-
ful in enhancing employment and incarne generation? 
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Cost Recovery 
Policies on cost recovery directly affect project affordability and 
accessibility. They also influence project selection because levels and rates 
of repayment determine who can participate in a project. Housing author-
ities have formulated collection procedures. The effectiveness of such 
procedures is highly dependent upon their rationality as well as on the 
raie played by the community itself. To what extent are positive or negative 
community reactions related to cost recovery? What has been the experi-
ence with using incentives and sanctions on actual cost recovery? 
Community Development 
The participation of the community in all aspects of basic housing has 
been seen as bath an end and a means for achieving basic housing goals. 
What has been the experience with commu nity participation and to what 
extent has it accomplished such goals as lowering project costs, formulating 
more appropriate designs and standards, and assuring project maintenance? 
Like mutual aid and self-help, community development has proven to be 
quite expensive to administer. Have these additional costs been made up 
for by greater project accomplishments? 
Project Impact 
Basic housing programs have been designed not only to improve the 
living conditions of the project participants but also, because they exist 
within an urban and national context, to have a direct or indirect impact 
on conditions in adjacent areas. Impacts are also expected on national 
housing policies, housing institutions, and housing finance. 
Most important of all, it is important to indicate what kind of impact 
basic housing approaches have had on the "state of the art" or the shared 
body of wisdom on what can and should be done to improve the plight of 
the urban poor. Have community upgrading and sites and services lived up 
to the expectations of their proponents or have they been transformed 
in the process of implementation and achieved only limited effects? 
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AFFORDABILITY 1 
Public housing programs often involve the construction of middle-c/ass apartments, San 
Salvador. 
ln most countries, housing might be provided by the private sector, 
government, efforts of the people themselves, or a combination of these 
factors. Policy decisions on what type of housing should be provided and 
by which sector may be heavily influenced by questions regarding afford-
ability. This can be estimated by: (1) how much a family earns, (2) the 
proportion of incarne the family is able or willing to devote to 
housing, and (3) the monthly cost of housing to the family. Although 
these factors appear simple, they are actually quite complex. As housing 
project designers have found out, estimating a project's affordability so 
that it benefits a particular "target group" is not an easy task. 
Estimating lncome 
Although incarne is the most common criterion used to judge one's 
eligibility to participate in a basic housing scheme, it is also the most diffi-
cult to estimate. Incarne can corne from various sources, such as money 
earned in exchange for labour, production for one's own consumption, 
the sale of items produced but not consumed, the increased value of assets 
owned, proceeds from the sale of assets, gifts from relatives or friends, or 
transfer payments from the government. V'l!ien incarne is used as a require-
ment for participating in a housing project, the level of incarne is not the 
only important aspect. lt is also useful to find out whether the incarne flows 
are regular or sporadic, whether or not they are sustained over a long 
period of time, or whether they are rising or declining. 
Faced with these complexities, planners sometimes decide to base incarne 
figures on declarations by the households themselves. As most incarne 
surveys have shown, however, such estimates are peculiarly subject to bias. 
Respondents have a way of anticipating what the objectives of the survey 
are and may adjust their responses accordingly. Thus, they may undervalue 
their incarnes to influence a housing agency to set lower repayment rates 
or to decrease incarne ceilings in a project. On the other hand, they may 
sense that a certain level of incarne is required for entry into a project and 
may inflate their incarne statements to meet this requirement. 
There is the possibility, of course, that some families may not really know 
what levels of incarne they will receive in the future. This is particularly 
true of families earning incarne in the so-called informai sector, where 
boom or bust situations are quite common. Thus, a vegetable vendor 
might have a good day and earn quite a bit or the vendor might be arrested, 
have ail wares confiscated, and return home without even the day's initial 
capital. A pedicab driver might be charged with obstruction and use the 
day's earnings to bribe himself out of the situation. These daily uncertainties 
add up to uncertain months, and trying to estimate average incarne 
becomes a chancy game at best. 
Incarne uncertainties place the responsibility for determining affordability 
on the shoulders of project designers. A conservative planner wanting to 
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minimize risk can use as a definition of incarne only the proceeds, from 
formai sector employment (salaries and wages), of the head of the family. 
Such incarne is regular and predictable and housing payments can be 
collected at the source if need be. Another planner, who desires to serve 
more families, might add to the incarne of the head of the family earnings 
of the spouse and other family members, whether these corne from formai 
sector employment or not. Still another planner, who wants to increase the 
accessibility of the project to lower incarne families, might cansider as 
incarne regular or irregular gifts, transfer payments, and ail other proceeds 
in cash or in kind. 
Obviously, affordability limits will change depending upon the definition 
of incarne used. ln a survey in El Salvador, for example, estimates of family 
incarne (using the broadest incarne definition as a base) were 8% lower 
when only regularly earned incarne was considered. When only the earned 
incarne of the family head was caunted, the estimates were only 56% of 
total incarne (Bamberger et al. 1980). lt has also been estimated that, on 
the average, total family incarne can be twice as great as the wage incarne 
of the family head alone (Keare and Parris 1981). 
Conservative housing designers might question the inclusion of gifts and 
transfer payments in household incarne. Studies in El Salvador, however, 
revealed that one-third of ail families surveyed received transfer incarne 
during the month studied. On the average, families received about 
US$11.20 in transfer payments out of a total average monthly incarne of 
US$120. Even more interesting is the fact that the gifts and transfer incarne 
were recurrent and stable and regularly represented some 10% of the 
recipient household's incarne (Kaufmann and Lindauer 1980). 
A study of incarne and expenditures in Tondo also revealed that incarne 
from "extra regular sources" (composed mainly of gifts and transfer 
payments) accaunted for 10.7% of monthly incarne (NHA 1978d). An 
interesting characteristic of this type of incarne, however, was its tendency 
to grow very rapidly when needed. A special study was canducted of 
incarnes and expenditures during the time when families had to move 
their houses from their original sites to the place indicated by the reblocking 
program. The study found that, in the month before this "period of maxi-
mum stress," incarne from cash gifts accounted for 44.2% of total household 
incarne among the affected families. Over a 3-month period, when families 
were moving and rebuilding or improving their houses, extra regular 
incarne accounted for 19.6% of total incarne per month on the average. 
The importance of gifts and other extra regular incarne in the Tondo 
study points to the need to make a distinction between one-shot investment 
expenditures and what may be termed as regular operating expenditures. 
The willingness of relatives and other members of the extended family to 
contribute gifts to a member investing in a house and lot may not be due 
to altruism at ail. Speculation in real estate is a well-developed art among 
the urban poor. The process of what anthropologists call "reciprocity" 
arrangements might have been at work in the Tondo situation. For example, 
a relative in the province with a son who wished to attend college in 
Manila had an excellent reason for sending a gift to the Tondo project 
participant. The gift would be reciprocated later in the form of sleeping 
quarters for the son, a much cheaper arrangement than paying for 
accommodations in a dormitory. 
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By all logical measures, a plot in Tondo was an excellent investment. 
Land in the project was sold to residents at P5 per m 2 when the fair market 
value was doser to P400 per m2• Building materials loans, business investment 
loans, and other benefits cauld be availed of in the project. Tondo was 
located near work sites in the piers and commercial and market sites in 
Divisoria. lt is no wonder, then, that members of the extended family were 
willing to invest in a plot on the site through gifts and other extraordinary 
incarne to project participants. 
ln recent years, many Filipinos have found employment as technicians 
and labourers in the Middle East, domestics and hotel aides in Europe, or 
crew members on foreign vessels. A number of Tondo families had relatives 
who had enjoyed large incarnes from these sources. These relatives were a 
cammon source of the gifts invested in the Tondo project. Even for families 
who did not have access to "Saudi money," gifts and contributions were 
still given. This donation is part of the Filipino tradition cammonly seen 
during times of misfortune, such as severe illness or death in the family. 
The Tondo project revealed that even times of good fortune fitted in well 
with the tradition. 
The main dilemma for project designers, then, is where to set the cutoff 
for incarne to qualify for participation in a basic housing project. Setting 
tao low an incarne requirement would run the risk of default, as well as 
force certain families to spend more for housing than they cauld really 
afford. Under extreme circumstances, this might eut down expenditures 
for food, medicine, and other basic necessities and would be detrimental 
to the family in the long run. Tao high an incarne ceiling, on the other 
hand, would result in a "leakage" of project benefits to families who might 
be able to afford more ecanomic housing elsewhere. Although a certain 
amount of leakage is unavoidable, especially in cammunity-upgrading 
projects in which one is dealing with existing cammunities with given 
incarne distribution patterns, not reaching the right target group tao 
many times does not help the project's economic efficiency and effectiveness. 
ln a number of countries, housing authorities set minimum and 
maximum incarne levels for project participants. For example, minimum 
and maximum incarnes were as follows: US$350-1110 in Kenya; US$375-
1000 in lndonesia; and US$684-1300 in Senegal. Such incarne figures, 
however, have to be seen in the light of other factors such as the size of 
the family, the amount of the housing package to be repaid, how long the 
repayment period is, and the monthly rates of repayment. Because of the 
inherent difficulties in estimating incarne, it is often better to be flexible 
when setting incarne requirements. Often, a range of incarnes, properly 
weighted by family size and other cansiderations, seems to be the best 
approach. The advantages of flexibility, however, should be weighed 
against problems of ambiguity that may arise if incarne figures are tao 
vague. Suspicions that a housing authority is using vague figures to favour 
certain groups can create costly administrative problems. 
Proportion of lncome for Housing 
Housing designers have traditionally believed that, on the average, basic 
housing participants can devote 20-25% of their monthly incarne to 
housing. ln practice, however, ratios rangir.g from 8--50% have been 
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found in a number of projects (Keare and Parris 1981). Obviously, such a 
wide range is of little help to policymakers. lt has been suggested that 
what is needed is a consistent set of definitions, comparable data sets, and 
enough calculations to develop "rule-of-thumb" benchmarks for varying 
circumstances (Keare and Parris 1981). 
The root of the problem is that the proportion of incarne a family can 
devote to housing depends upon many factors. For example, it makes a big 
difference if a family is renting accommodations or paying for a house it 
will eventually own. Families investing in a home are generally more willing 
to spend a higher proportion of their incarne for housing because they can 
see certain payoffs in the future. Renters would most likely seek other 
accommodations when the proportion of incarne they are devoting to 
housing gets too high. ln a survey of families in Santa Ana, El Salvador, the 
mean proportion of incarne devoted to housing by homeowners in an 
illegal settlement was 34%, whereas the proportion for renters in the same 
type of settlement was 7% (Bamberger et al. 1980). 
Certain demographic characteristics, such as the size of the family or the 
sex of the head of the household, also affect the proportion of incarne 
spent for housing. Larger families, because they require more space, may 
tend to spend more for housing (it should be noted, however, that their 
incarnes might appear to be higher because other members of the family 
may contribute their earnings). Households headed by females, because 
they generally have lower incarnes, normally devote a higher proportion 
of their incarne to housing. 
Studies have consistently shown that the proportion of incarne devoted 
to housing tends to decrease as incarne increases. ln other words, poor 
families spend proportionally more for housing even though they need 
more money for food and other basic necessities. ln a survey of meson 
renters in El Salvador, the lowest incarne families paid an average of 23% of 
their monthly incarne for housing, whereas higher incarne families paid 
less than 10%. This tendency was also shown in Fundacion Salvadorena de 
Desarollo y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM) projects, in which families in the 
three lowest incarne deciles paid over 30% of their incarne for housing, 
whereas the average proportion for ail incarne deciles was only 18% 
(Bamberger 1980). 
The proportions mentioned above have been calculated for "normal" 
times. ln designing a project, however, allowances should be made for the 
fact that the strain on a family's resources varies according to the stages at 
which housing expenditures occur. Expenditures tend to bunch up du ring 
the period of "maximum stress" (initial movement and construction) and 
level off thereafter. ln the Tondo project, it was found that, during this 
period, participating families were, in fact, spending not only amounts that 
they had previously saved but also were incurring loans and using gifts and 
transfer payments from relatives and friends. Their regular incarnes, fur-
thermore, were diminishing because participating in mutual-aid and 
self-help efforts in the project took them away from their jobs. 
When determining a project's affordability by estimating the proportion 
of family incarne that can be devoted to housing, a number of policy points 
are worth considering. First, care must be taken to ensure that assumptions 
regarding the proportions of incarne devoted to housing are not set so 
high that lower incarne families will be forced to eut back on food, medi-
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cine, and other basic needs to keep up with housing payments. Second, 
the fact that housing expenditures vary through time may call for flexi-
ble procedures with respect to repayment. To enhance a project's accessibility, 
therefore, consideration might be given to lowering initial costs, especially 
during the period of maximum stress. Housing design, the level of community 
services, time requirements for housing consolidation, and whether 
temporary housing will be allowed or not ail have important implications 
for accessibility. 
Finally, care should be taken to ensure that certain groups are not 
"designed out" of projects because of affordability assumptions. Among 
those that were adversely affected in the past were renter families (in 
upgrading schemes), households depending upon the informai sector for 
their livelihood, single-parent households (especially those headed by 
females), and small-scale entrepreneurs. A corn mon characteristic of these 
groups is not only low but also irregular flows of incarne. Although there 
are definite limits that can be set on low incarnes, irregularity of incarne 
flows should receive greater attention because there is a danger that 
inflexible incarne proportion requirements and fixed repayment schedules 
might exclude households that would otherwise be eligible for project 
housing. 
Cost of the Housing Package 
The part of the housing affordability equation most amenable to 
intervention by housing designers is the cost of the housing package. 
Economists generally use the concept of "occupancy cost" to refer to this 
element, and usually represent it by a rentai charge or total housing costs 
fully amortized on a monthly basis. 
The actual monthly costs to a project participant usually consist of: (1) 
mortgage or loan repayments, (2) service charges, (3) cost of building 
materials, (4) labour costs, and (5) administration and management costs. 
ln general, such costs are usually lumped together in a single monthly 
charge for ease of administration. lt is also standard practice to require 
a lump sum down payment, followed by fixed monthly charges. 
The main challenge in ensuring affordability is how to make project costs 
low enough to make basic housing accessible to the lowest possible 
incarne groups. This requires careful scrutiny of the costs of project 
elements. Land, for example, is an important cost ingredient. ln El Salvador, 
where FSDVM had to purchase land at fair market prices, land costs had to 
be added to the total project amortizations. ln Zambia, where government 
policy adhered to the principle that land, in itself, is without intrinsic 
worth, only development costs were charged to project participants. ln the 
Philippines, land in Tondo was sold to residents at a fraction of its true 
market value but full development costs were charged. 
Project design, of course, provides good opportunities for lowering or 
raising costs. ln general, relatively high standards, such as the original large 
plot size requirements in Zambia, are the greatest source of high project 
costs. Even though land was "free" in Zambia, the fact that residential plots 
were 300 m 2 or more meant that expenditures for roads, water, sewerage 
pipes, and electricity were much higher. 
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The choice of building materials used in a project also directly influences 
costs. ln lndia, some of the cheapest projects provided only a serviced site 
- families were allowed to bring the old materials saved from their 
shanties and they used these to build their "new" homes. ln the Philippines, 
building materials loans could only be redeemed in terms of "light" 
materials such as lumber and plywood, instead of cernent, hollow blacks, 
steel reinforcement bars, and other "heavy or permanent" materials. 1 n 
contrast, projects in Senegal, El Salvador, and Zambia ail featured the use 
of permanent modern materials, with obvious implications on project 
costs. ln Zambia, use of cheaper materials was encouraged by project 
designers, but the people elected to use more expensive materials. 
ln sites-and-services projects, the various "core housing" options also 
affect costs. Again, the cheapest option is a serviced site. Progressively 
more expensive options take the form of sanitary core only, sanitary core 
and one room, sanitary core and two rooms, etc. Here, however, cost 
considerations should not be limited to the core options alone. Participating 
families also incur a lot of other costs before they can move into the 
project and begin consolidating their homes. Thus, it was found in Kenya 
that providing a serviced site with only a sanitary core actually forced more 
families to spend more in the short run than a site with a sanitary core 
and a room, which allowed the family to move into the project immediately. 
This arrangement saved families the expense of renting a dwelling in the 
old site while working on their new house; transportation costs for the 
builder and the building materials used; and the cost of safeguarding the 
building materials left on the site, which would have been stolen if no one 
was watching the site. 
Another approach that raises project costs is the traditional preference 
for finished houses. Often, the tendancy to attempt to finish a house in 
one costly effort cornes from project participants themselves. Over-
ambitious plans catch up with the limited resources, however, and con-
struction may be stopped even before the structure is ready for temporary 
occupancy. ln some instances, however, project designers may dictate that 
houses be finished within a specified period. ln the Dandora project in 
Kenya, for example, the basic livable structure must be finished within 18 
months. ln Lusaka, the housing authorities ruled that no family could 
move into the site until a basic livable core was finished. 
Even the building of "model homes," well meaning as it is, may encourage 
project participants to attempt to build an expensive house and complete 
it as soon as possible. ln Senegal, the model homes built by the housing 
agency cost as muchas CFAF3 million to complete. Seeing these designs, 
it was only natural for project participants to attempt to build houses similar 
to the models. ln some ways, the extremely slow rate of project occupancy 
might be due to this indirect preference for the expensive model houses. 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters on housing consolidation, use of 
mutual aid and self-help, and choice of building materials and building 
standards, much of the creativity in basic housing programs has been 
reflected in reducing project costs. Traditional housing notions are difficult 
to change, however, and project costs continue to be unrealistically high 
because of the insistence of participants for beautiful finished houses 
located in well-regulated subdivisions that are nestled in landscaped 
surroundings. Even now, many housing authorities still measure their 
success in terms of how solid and beautiful the houses in their projects are 
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and how quickly these houses have been built. ln countless visits to sites-
and-services projects all over the world, the proudest housing managers 
have shown off the biggest and most solid homes, seemingly ashamed of 
the temporary shacks occupied by the families still engaged in housing 
consolidation a number of years after they have moved into the project. If 
the housing managers really understood their function, however, their 
preferences would have been reversed, for their real client is the individual 
struggling for an affordable shelter in an urbanizing world. 
Evaluation of Projects 
ln general, how successful have basic housing projects been in providing 
affordable housing to low-income families in sium/squatter areas? To 
respond to this question, it is useful to determine the target groups that 
have been reached and served by such projects, find out if other equally 
needy groups have been excluded, and assess whether or not the lives of 
project participants have been improved. 
Target Groups 
Most basic housing projects are designed to serve families between the 
20th and 60th national urban incarne percentiles. Because projects adhere 
to the policy of cost recovery, which is closely related to the replicability of 
projects, households below the 20th percentile are considered to require 
greater subsidies than those possible under basic housing programs. 
Families above the 60th percentile, on the other hand, are considered to 
be wealthy enough to avail themselves of housing on the open market. 
As shown in Table 1 the capacity of a project to reach the poorer urban 
families depends upon whether it is a community-upgrading or sites-and-
services project. ln general, upgrading projects serve more lower incarne 
families, as indicated by the fact that 60% of the families in George and 
51% in Tondo belong to the lowest incarne groups. This compares with 
44% in Sonsonate, 43% in Santa Ana, and 54% in Lilanda. 
The ability of upgrading projects to reach the poorer people arises from 
the in situ nature of such projects. Unlike sites and services, where a 
"qualifying" incarne level acts as a screening device, community upgrading 
Table 1. Incarne groups served by projects (%). 
Sites and services Cornrnunity upgrading 
El Salvador Zarnbia Philippines Zarnbia 
National urban Sonsonate Santa Ana Lilanda Matera Tondo George 
incarne percentile (1977) (1976) (1980) (1978) (1979) (1976) 
0-20 6 11 28 18 27 38 
21-40 38 32 26 38 24 22 
41-60 37 38 16 14 23 17 
> 61 19 19 30 30 26 23 
Source: Keare and Parris (1981). 
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must initially include ail families living within the area. As developments 
are introduced, however, some of the poorer families might have to be 
excluded from the project. Experience has shown that such families tend 
to be renters, single-parent households, young families living with parents 
or relatives, and the handicapped. 
Dislocation of the poorest families can be prevented or reduced when 
basic services are introduced without efforts to rationalize housing and 
other structures, subdivide and sell land, or reduce the density of a 
community to certain acceptable standards. This has been tried successfully, 
for example, in the Kampung lmprovement Projects (KIPs) in lndonesian 
cities and in central city redevelopment schemes in Kingston, Jamaica. ln 
lndonesia, KIP introduces a "basic sanitation module" composed of an 
artesian well or deep well, a water receptacle, and a public toilet. Pathways 
and roads, garbage bins, drainage canais, and community centres are also 
constructed. As muchas possible, structures within the community are not 
disturbed at ail. Repayment of project costs cornes from service charges 
and assessed fees. ln Jamaica, similar basic services have been introduced, 
although severe repayment problems have been encountered. Sium land-
lords who often do not even live in the areas upgraded are reluctant to pay 
the service charges. Low-income residents are equally reluctant to pay 
because they argue that property owners whose properties are improved 
should shoulder the project costs. 
Of particular concern in sites-and-services projects are the high initial 
and recurring costs involved in moving into the area and building a house 
there. Such high costs might have been responsible for the relatively small 
proportion of project participants in Sonsonate and Santa Ana belonging 
to the lowest 20th incarne percentile. Although the El Salvador projects 
have the smallest proportions of families belonging to the 60th and 
above percentiles (suggesting that the projects were catering to the intended 
target groups), this pattern lends credence to the oft-repeated charge that 
sites and services serve mainly as a "creaming off" process, whereby the 
better off among the urban poor are taken out of existing sium/squatter 
areas and moved to project sites. ln the process, only the "dregs" are left 
behind to fend for themselves. According to Peattie and Doebele (1976), 
this disrupts the normal economic relationships existing among incarne 
groups in sium/squatter areas and only serves to weaken the organizational 
and other capabilities of the less fortunate. At the same time, the "success 
rate" of sites-and-services programs is assured because they have the most 
able of the low-income families. 
ln this light, community-upgrading projects are less disruptive to 
community life. As shown in Tondo and George, the "normal" distribution 
of lower and higher incarne families in project communities has been 
maintained to a large extent. Whatever symbiotic relationships existed 
between lower and higher incarne families had not been disrupted. An 
even greater number of poor families cou Id have been absorbed in Tondo, 
however, if housing managers had devoted as much attention to rentai 
accommodations as was done in Zambia. The emphasis in Tondo was for 
individual home ownership, which displaced a number of families that 
were renting or living with other families. Although renters were given the 
option of moving to the sites-and-services project in Dagat-Dagatan, the 
higher project costs there tended to discourage them. 
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Walkway prior to the implementation of the Kampung lmprovement Program, Jakarta, 
Jndonesia. 
Another cancern of bath sites and services and upgrading is the extent 
to which poorer families drop out of projects, which results in higher 
incarne families that were not originally allocated plots taking over. A 
study of 101 plots that had been abandoned by allocatees indicated that 
34% of the families had formerly been renters, 10% were households 
headed by females, 21% were single but considered heads of family, and 
18% were self-employed. This distribution suggested the possibility of 
specific groups being eased out of the projects by higher-incame 
groups. 
Further analysis of the research findings, however, revealed that incarne 
did not seem to be the primary factor involved in plot abandonment. A 
check of the incarnes of the families showed that all but one had declared 
an incarne below the minimum level required for participation in the 
project. lt was cancluded, therefore, that speculation cauld have been a 
stronger motive in abandoning plots. Informai interviews revealed that the 
profit in "selling" rights of occupancy in the project was as high as 
120%. ln fact, project authorities had expected that about 3% of the plots 
would change ownership some time in the future and another 3% would 
be sold in unauthorized sales. 
Initial surveys in Tondo have also revealed that about 4% of legitimate 
project beneficiaries have sold their rights illegally (NHA 1980a,b). As 
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lmproved walkway in Kampung lmprovement Program site. 
structures within the community are upgraded further, there is a growing 
fear that the selling of rights will increase because of the increasing offers 
from higher incarne households. As in Zambia, however, research data 
suggest that it is not affordability that is primarily responsible for this 
phenomenon but the fad that a number of families are finding it more logical 
to reap the benefits from the project sooner, sell their rights, and then 
move to another sium/squatter community. ln the Philippines, the willing-
ness of higher-income families to buy plots in Tondo might be an indication 
of the shortage of middle-income housing. Project authorities have reasoned 
that, as long as there is a scarcity of dwellings for particular incarne 
groups, prohibition of sales would be difficult to enforce due to the 
dictates of the housing market. . 
Conclusions 
Establishing affordability criteria is one of the most important tasks in 
implementing a basic housing policy because it determines the eventual 
beneficiaries of projects. Based on past experiences with basic housing 
projects, it is clear that there is a need to define and obtain a better 
understanding of the living conditions of low-income households in order 
to obtain more accurate information on incarnes and expenditures. Socio-
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economic surveys reveal only part of the picture. ln particular, they do not 
provide adequate information on transfer payments and gifts, which 
seem to make up a significant proportion of incarne in sium/squatter 
communities. 
The regularity or irregularity of incarne flow also need to be better 
understood because of their affect on affordability. ln particular, the 
capacity of low-income families to raise considerable resources during 
periods of "maximum stress" is worth noting. Most affordability measure-
ments are based on regular monthly amortizations even though incarne 
flows seem to be irregular among the poor. There is a need to determine 
what types of families are considered eligible for or screened out of 
projects because of this mismatch in incarne flows. 
The ability of community-upgrading projects to penetrate the lower 
urban incarne group percentiles speaks well for its usefulness in a basic 
housing program. However, upgrading is less effective as an instrument for 
fostering greater equity because it also provides benefits to the relatively 
high-income households living in sium/squatter areas. ln contrast, sites 
and services can be designed more effectively for achieving greater equity 
because affordability criteria can be enforced more efficiently in such 
projects. One problem with sites and services, however, is its inability to 
offer shelter and services to the poorest among the urban poor. 
These characteristics of upgrading and sites and services argue for a joint 
approach in which bath programs are included in a comprehensive urban 
development strategy. ln fact, this is now the corn mon practice. Basic housing 
programs in Zambia, the Philippines, and El Salvador are proving most 
successful because they reap the benefits from the complementarities of 
the two basic housing approaches. 
Despite the programs' successes, however, the inability of basic housing 
programs to reach greater numbers of lower incarne groups is a cause for 
concern. Evaluations also reveal the tendency of programs to assist the 
more able among the urban poor, creating a creaming off and even polarizing 
effect. This is a particular danger in sites-and-services programs where the 
polarization might be reflected in the physical separation of the more able 
and the least able. lt is of less concern with community upgrading where, 
at least, the socioeconomic fabric of the community is not disrupted. 
An unstated aspect in the discussion on affordability is the extent to 
which full cost recovery or subsidization policies will be followed in basic 
housing programs. lt goes without saying that if subsidies are increased, 
affordability requirements can be set in such a way that projects can 
become more accessible to lower incarne groups. On the other hand, 
public resources are limited, and the replicability of housing programs will 
also be hampered by large subsidies. These and other issues are discussed 
in subsequent chapters on mutual aid and self-help, housing consolidation, 





Digging drainage canais using the mutual-aid approach in the Tondo project, Philippines 
- an effective method of reducing construction costs. 
Mutual aid and self-help are two of the most important elements in 
sites-and-services and community-upgrading programs. As defined by the 
Salvadorean Foundation for Development and Minimal Housing, ayuda 
mutua or mutual aid is "the cooperation of ail participating families in 
teamwork" to construct project infrastructures or the basic parts of a 
house. Self-help, on the other hand, is the use of a participating family's 
skills, labour, organizational talents, and managerial skills in the construc-
tion and improvement of its own house (Bamberger et al. 1980). 
To an organization like the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y 
Vivienda Minima (FSDVM), housing construction through mutual aid and 
self-help is a methodology for "improving more general social and 
economic changes in the condition of the urban poor" rather than merely 
a matter of producing a certain number of housing units. The foundation's 
goal is to bring about qualitative changes among project participants that 
will stimulate them to build more housing. Among other project designers, 
however, mutual aid and self-help are seen primarily as instruments for 
making housing production more efficient. ln the main, the hope of many 
designers is to lower housing costs through the use of mutual aid and self-
help. 
The conventional view is that a house built by a contractor; designed by 
an architect; constructed by carpenters, masons, plumbers, and electricians; 
and managed by a professional site manager would probably cost a lot of 
money. However, if homeowners sketch what they want, relatives and 
friends help build the house, and technicians and professionals are hired 
only to carry out difficult tasks, such as those related to electricity and 
plumbing, costs would probably be much lower. Furthermore, mutual aid 
and self-help make the building process more responsive to the home-
owner's needs and resources. House building is not constrained by time, 
especially after the basic core of the dwelling is finished and the family 
can move into and live in it. 
As an approach to providing basic housing for the urban poor, mutual 
aid and self-help are based on the assumption that there is surplus labour 
in low-income areas (i.e., there are high rates of unemployment and under-
employment). 1t also assumes that low-income people have the skills 
needed for house construction and that there are traditions of mutual 
cooperation that facilitate working together. 
Surplus Labour 
Early studies of sium/squatter areas indicated high levels of unemploy-
ment and underemployment. Residents in such areas had limited education 
and very few technical skills. They came primarily from rural areas where 
previous occupations had not prepared them for city jobs. Observations of 
life in such areas described crowds of able-bodied men and women 
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hanging around, idly gossiping or drinking together, having nothing better 
to do with their time. 
Survey findings in three sium/squatter sites in Metropolitan Manila are 
typical (NHA 1977). Unemployment rates in these communities ranged 
from 18% in Navotas to 46% in Bagong Barrio. Of the 10 904 household 
heads surveyed in Bagong Barrio, only 23.7% were employed. The rest 
were distributed as follows: 13.5% were jobless but looking for a job; 
21.0% were jobless and not looking for a job; 9.9% were chronically 
unemployed; 17.7% were students; and 14.2% were housewives. 
On the basis of survey results and other data similar to those mentioned 
above, mutual aid and self-help components were introduced in many 
World Bank-supported basic housing projects. Experience with these 
projects, however, has been most surprising (Churchill 1979). 
Experience with World Bank-financed projects indicates that self-
help has an important although somewhat more limited raie than was 
originally perceived. 
The amount of surplus labor available within the household appears 
to be limited and less self-help is being observed on project sites than 
was originally anticipated. Unemployment is not high among low-
income households and any underemployment is likely to go more 
profitably into efforts to expand employment in the existing occupation 
rather than diverting this labor into shelter construction. 
The actual experience in World Bank-supported projects and the 
perceived conditions in sium/squatter areas did not match at all. Even in 
El Salvador, where FSDVM concentrated administrative resources to 
promote mutual aid and self-help, the response of families was not as 
positive as expected. ln the Santa Ana project, in fact, as many as 30% of 
selected participants dropped out of the project before the completion of 
mutual-help obligations. With the drop-out rate stabilizing to about 2.6% 
later on, it was obvious that the mutual-aid requirement played an impor-
tant raie in the drop-out rate, although some administrative problems 
related to finding the correct addresses of participants also added to the 
problem (Lindauer 1979). 
A number of studies have shown that problems with mutual aid and 
self-help are related to the serious misunderstanding of employment and 
underemployment conditions in sium/squatter areas. Part of the problem 
is definitional. Most data on unemployment are based on socioeconomic 
surveys in which some of the words used by the researchers are not defined 
in the same way by the respondents. The truth is that most able-bodied 
individuals in low-income areas earn some money, although what they do 
to earn that money is not readily classifiable in a table of occupational 
titles. A direct question like "What is your occupation?" in a survey would 
probably elicit varying responses. Even a question like "Have you been 
employed during the last 30 days?" is subject to some misinterpretation 
because the respondent might define employment in formai terms. 
An underlying cause of problems is the fact that employment and 
unemployment have formai definitions that require regularity, predictability, 
and recurrence, whereas what people do in sium/squatter areas to earn a 
living may be irregular and unpredictable. A persan in the siums may carry 
loads at the pier for a week and then be laid off. Rather than stay home, 
the individual frequents the market area and helps to load and unload 
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merchandise for which payment is received in varying amounts. Such a 
persan might be classified as unemployed or underemployed in a survey. 
The important thing, however, is that at the end of each day the persan 
usually is able to hand over a sum of money to their spouse. 
Housing agencies may encourage project participants to participate in 
mutual-aid projects by putting a monetary value on a person's labour 
contributions. For example, a family may be given a chance to participate 
in mutual aid instead of paying the down payment on a house and lot. By 
working on Saturdays and Sundays in the project along with other indi-
viduals participating in mutual aid, the family may be able to accumulate 
enough "funds" to meet the down payment. 
Even a policy like the one mentioned above, however, has to contend 
with what economists call the "opportunity cost" of labour. When offered 
mutual-aid work, project participants have to ask whether they will earn 
more by continuing what they are doing or derive more benefits from the 
mutual-aid work. One problem with a question such as this is that costs 
and benefits are not ail translatable into dollars and cents. For example, a 
street vendor who is absent from a street corner to participate in mutual 
aid may be given a higher monetary equivalent for the labour involved. 
However, customers who normally buy from the street vendor might 
transfer their patronage to another vendor, another vendor might take 
over the absent vendor's selling location, the supplier of the goods might 
consider the vendor to be unreliable and choose another outlet, or the 
police officer on the beat whom the vendor has been bribing regularly 
might withdraw his protection. Thus, the direct and indirect costs and 
benefits involved in informai sector work are extremely difficult to define 
and quantify. A persan refusing to take part in mutual-aid work might have 
very good reasons that are only partially explained by "opportunity cost" 
and related calculations. 
Another observation with respect to employment in sium/squatter areas 
is the high proportion of individuals employed in the informai sector. 
For example, a 1977 survey in a Lusaka community indicated that 76.6% of 
household heads were employed, 17.2% were self-employed, and 6.2% 
were unemployed. Among the employed and self-employed, about 22.2% 
were working in the informai sector. Examples of jobs in the informai sector 
included vending, unpaid family work, and working as an artisan or part-
time labourer. 
One of the major findings of research on the informai sector is that jobs 
in this sector may payas well or even better than comparable positions in 
the formai sector. If this is the case, then participation in mutual aid and 
self-help might cost some people more. lt is perfectly logical, therefore, 
for people in such a situation to hire others to build and improve their 
houses instead of doing it themselves. 
Construction Skills 
Another preconception about squatters and sium dwellers is that they 
possess basic carpentry and other skills that can be used in building a 
house. This is often related to the rural backgrounds of low-income 
families, which are supposed to have predisposed them to do-it-yourself 
approaches. 
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Actual experience in community-upgrading and sites-and-services 
projects, however, has revealed that project participants often lack the 
skills needed for construction. Case studies in the community of George in 
Lusaka, for example, revealed that about 90% of the participants felt that 
they did not have the skills needed to build a house of an acceptable 
standard. Most people cou Id use a hammer, saw, or hand drill but they did 
not consider these as sufficient skills for building an acceptable house. 
The important consideration here is the concept of an "acceptable 
house." ln almost all projects, the preferred house is made of modern 
permanent materials such as cernent, concrete hollow blocks, steel rein-
forcement bars, glass, and galvanized iron or aluminum sheets. These 
materials require the specialized skills of masons, bricklayers, carpenters, 
and sheet-metal workers. High status and prestige (and greater economic 
value) are accorded houses that are built by contractors. ln the original 
sium/squatter areas, where makeshift materials were used, families could 
use mutual aid and self-help. However, in projects, where the standards of 
acceptable housing were a lot higher, the amateur efforts of homeowners 
were no longer sufficient. 
Many projects preclude the use of traditional skills in self-help, often 
without meaning to. For example, a strong preference for the finished 
house makes it difficult for the self-builder to construct a dwelling on time. 
Sometimes this preference is only indirectly conveyed, e.g., when "model 
Building with bricks using the self-help approach, Lima, Peru. 
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homes" are constructed to a finished stage and participants are given the 
impression that project designers want to see the actual project houses 
built as soon as possible. At times, the completion of the livable unit 
is actually required, as in the Dandora project in Nairobi, where a family 
has 18 months within which to complete the basic unit. 
Building materials loans are often given in kind, in an effort to encourage 
project participants to work on the house themselves. The theory is that 
giving the loan in cash may result in the participant buying less materials 
and using the rest of the money to hire an artisan or tradesman to build the 
house. ln most instances, however, the building materials available in 
the materials stores are modern, such as hollow blacks and steel bars, 
which people do not know how to work with. Thus, many families end up 
using their savings or borrowing extra money from other sources to hire 
skilled workers. Because quite a number of fa mi lies do not have the resources 
to hire workers, however, construction is often delayed and costs to 
the borrowers increase. 
The shortage of skilled workers in basic housing projects has encouraged 
the setting up of training programs in masonry, plumbing, electricity, 
carpentry, and other skills. ln Jamaica, a unique way of training and using 
trained workers was borrowed from Cuba. The system involved the forma-
tion of micro-brigadas or "workers' brigades," usually composed of seven 
individuals to be trained in various skills (a mason, a bricklayer, a plumber, 
an electrician, and three carpenters). Members of the brigade were chosen 
from a group of project allocatees. After their training, they worked on the 
project and rendered technical assistance to other participants. They were 
allocated housing units in the project they worked in, thus assuring that 
proper skills would be available for maintenance and repairs in the future. 
ln Cuba, where the brigades had been used for some time, they were 
quite successful. Political changes in Jamaica, however, never gave the 
brigades a chance in that country. With the change in government in 
1980, the Jamaican brigade members trained in Cuba were suspected of 
ideological partisanship and the approach was never tried. 
The shared use of trained and skilled workers in group construction, 
however, has been used most successfully in El Salvador. ln FSDVM projects, 
it was found that mutual-aid groups did not usually have an even distribution 
of skilled workers, such as masons and carpenters. The result was that 
some very skilled workers were doing menial tasks within their groups 
because of the particular stage of construction they were at, while other 
groups not having skilled workers were hiring skilled people from outside 
to help them. By identifying ail of the skilled workers and pooling 
them together, each mutual-aid group could "borrow" skilled people 
when they were needed. The result was a more equitable distribution of 
scarce skills and greater efficiency in the project. 
Mutual-Aid Traditions 
The early literature on siums and squatters described cultural traditions 
of mutual aidas being glorified at times to such an extent that they were 
presented as the ultimate solution to basic housing problems. Such 
traditions asbayanihan in the Philippines,gotong royong in lndonesia, and 
44 
panchayati raj in lndia had rural origins but they were thought to have 
accompanied rural-urban migrants to the siums. Whereas in the villages 
mutual aid was useful for such tasks as plowing, planting, and harvesting, it 
was believed that it could now be used in community projects such as 
digging drainage canais, building roads, and constructing houses. 
lndeed, mutual-aid traditions are alive and well in many low-income 
communities all over the world. ln the Tondo project in the Philippines, 
one of the most difficult steps in "reblocking" was moving houses to their 
designated places in the new plan. With very little prompting from project 
authorities, the residents organized themselves into informai bayanihan 
groups and moved the houses, each family taking its turn. A sociologist's 
account of one particular move is nostalgically reminiscent of village life. 
Today, we observed the ba/ikatan or moving of the hou se belonging 
to the Cruz family in Area 1. 
Men started arriving at the Cruz hou se arou nd seven in the morning. 
A few women arrived much earlier, helped Mrs. Cruz with marketing 
and cooked a huge meal. 
After a quick breakfast, men started taking out the furniture and 
belongings from the house. Then they broke up into small groups, each 
one working on a specific task. Sorne lashed long bamboo poles to the 
bottom of the house. Others built wooden stilts that the house could 
rest on while being moved. When the stilts were finished, another 
group sawed off the house posts. The interesting thing was that nobody 
seemed to be in charge. Each man seemed to know exactly what to do. 
The house was ready to be moved around 11:00 o'clock. The amazing 
thing was that around a dozen men who were not involved in the 
process before suddenly came around and helped to shoulder the 
bamboo poles and move the house. The house was moved amidst 
shouts and taunts and earthy jokes. The women were especially bois-
terous in goading the men, challenging their strength and man hood 
and at the same time cheering them on. 
The project architect had marked with stakes the exact new location 
for the house. After a few moves and adjustments, it stood in its 
proper place, perfectly aligned with other houses moved the previous 
days. 
The mutual-aid process described above was repeated many times in 
Tondo until the reblocking program was completed. Today, a huge picture 
of a house being moved bayanihan style adorns one wall of the National 
Housing Authority and another is the chief display in the community centre 
in Tondo. Bath the people and the housing agency are proud of the 
mutual-aid tradition and there are plans to continue using it in future 
projects. 
Although mutual aid was effective for moving houses, project managers 
in Tondo found that it didn't quite work in other activities, e.g., it 
wasn't effective in work requiring sustained effort over a long period of 
time. During the mutual-aid construction of a community centre, for 
example, many volunteers came during the first couple of days but their 
numbers dwindled after a week. People said that they had something else 
to do, that others should do volunteer work also. 
Mutual aid was also less useful for tasks requiring conformity and with 
exacting specifications. Many volunteers for the ditch-digging job for 
laying water mains in Tondo complained, for example, that the contractors 
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were too demanding. The pipes had to be installed at specified angles and 
connected in certain ways. Often, the job had to be done several times 
to get the exact pipe position required. Volunteers resented being told 
what to do by engineers and technicians - "as if they were paying us," 
muttered one mutual-aid worker. 
Mutual-aid work, despite its voluntary nature, was not exactly free. ln 
the case of the Cruz family, the house-moving required serving breakfast 
and a big lunch to more than 30 people. lt also obligated the head of the 
family and other able-bodied members to help other families in the 
community when their turn came up. These reciprocal obligations, which 
Filipinos call "debts of gratitude," are taken seriously by the community. 
The "indebtedness" has to be repaid not just in house-moving but in other 
requests for assistance as well. 
Because of the voluntary and unorganized nature of mutual-aid work, 
it can result in serious project delays. ln El Salvador, the fact that mutual-
aid work was carried out only on weekends caused serious delays in project 
schedules. ln Zambia, project delays forced some private contractors to 
pay some workers to motivate them to perform better in the projects. 
When this became known among mutual-aid volunteers, they also 
demanded payment, which virtually ended volunteer work in the projects. 
Advantages of Mutual Aid 
Among the agencies managing basic housing programs, FSDVM in 
El Salvador has the strongest commitment to mutual aid. This commitment 
is based on the following: 
(1) Mutual aid is the social and organizational basis of community 
development efforts. 
(2) lt replaces a narrow attitude based on the family with a broader one 
based on the community. 
(3) lt is more efficient to work in groups of 20 than individually. 
(4) Families get to know each other in mutual-aid work and interact with 
each other even before they move into their houses. 
(5) Mutual aid replaces the initial down payment and facilitates access 
to home ownership by even the lowest incarne groups. 
To qualify for a plot in an FSDVM project, a family must agree to participate 
in mutual-aid work on Saturdays (14:00 to 17:00 hours) and Sundays (08:00 
to 14:00 hours). Each persan engaged in mutual-aid work is credited C5.5/ 
day, which goes toward the down payment of C450. A mutual-aid group is 
made up of 20-30 families. FSDVM appoints a social worker or "social 
promotor" for every five groups. A technical team (engineer, architect, 
construction technician, and foreman) is also set up to help the mutual-aid 
groups. 
The first accomplishment of mutual-aid work is the creation of a spirit of 
cooperation among the members. Each group elects a president, treasurer, 
and warehouse watchman. They hold a series of meetings initially conducted 
by FSDVM workers but later by themselves. Ali members of the group sign 
a mutual-aid agreement. They work on each other's houses, not knowing 
who will eventually get a house until ail units are completed. Building 
materials issued to the group become everyone's responsibility. At the end 
of the mutual-aid work, the families are so used to cooperating with each 
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other that they make up a harmonious community within the project. This 
spirit of cooperation has been most beneficial in project maintenance and 
even in making sure that fees and amortizations are paid promptly to 
FSDVM. 
Mutual aid made FSDVM projects available even to low-income families 
because they cou Id use their own labour as a down payment. ln a survey of 
project participants in San Miguel, about 75% of the families said that they 
would not have been able to participate in the project without mutual 
aid because they did not have enough savings or other resources to pay for 
the down payment. 
The use of mutual aid significantly reduced housing costs for project 
participants. Studies in Sonsonate indicated that mutual-aid labour saved 
about 27% in costs. Even when the delays encountered in the project 
because of mutual aid were considered, savings were still about 12% 
compared with the costs that would have been incurred if contractors had 
been used. 
To FSDVM, the advantages of mutual aid were reaped not only during 
the early phases of the project but also later on. The significant accomplish-
ment, according to FSDVM, was reflected in the replacement of a vertical 
"authority relationship" between the agency and its clients by a "horizontal 
cooperative relationship" among the people themselves. The organizational 
training during the mutual-aid phase taught the families in a group to 
discuss and salve problems in a cooperative way. This instilled strong pride 
in the community, which was reflected in the construction of community 
centres, parks, schools, and clinics. There are also indications that the high 
cost-recovery rates in the project (FSDVM has only 2.3% of its loan portfolio 
in arrears) are due to this community pride. 
Self-Help Approaches 
The process of self-help involves the use of a project participant's initiative, 
skills, and resources in the construction of a house. Depending upon the 
participant's extent of commitment, self-help might take any of the 
following forms: (1) participant prepares house plans and hires a contractor 
to build the house; (2) participant prepares plans but acts as contractor, 
hiring tradesmen and workers as needed; or (3) participant prepares plans 
and builds house with own labour. 
When a family hires a contractor to build a house it has designed, the 
self-help component is more managerial than technical. The family decides 
on the size of the house, materials to be used, number of rooms, level of 
services to be put in, etc. On the basis of these specifications, the con-
tractor might build the house under a lump-sum contract. The family and 
the contractor might also agree that payment would be on the basis of a 
daily rate. ln some instances, the construction might be broken down into 
stages (foundation work, roofing, siding, and finishing) and specific 
payments as well as completion times might be set. 
When a family choses to be its own contractor, a larger raie is played by 
it in decision-making. Tradesmen and workers might be hired on a daily 
basis or for the completion of specific stages. Family members might work 
side by side with the hired tradesmen or elect to do most of the work 
themselves, seeking expert assistance only when needed. 
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Technically, pure self-help is when the family does everything to 
build a house. This presupposes competence and skills as well as availability 
of time. lt also assumes access to building materials as well as the capacity 
to install appliances and equipment. 
The self-help approaches mentioned above constitute a continuum, 
based on the raie played by the family in planning and building the dwelling. 
The use of each particular approach would have implications for costs, 
pace of construction, quality of work, and family satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the house. 
Ali things being equal, the fastest way to build a house is probably by 
hiring a contractor. This is particularly true of lump-sum contracts, in 
which case the contractor attempts to finish the house quickly to reduce 
costs and increase the profit margin. Because the contractor assumes the 
main risks, however, the costs to the family would be quite high. Also, 
unless the family had specified in writing the specific tasks to be done and 
the time by which they have to be completed, variations between expec-
tations and what was actually accomplished might reduce satisfaction. 
At the other end of the spectrum, costs might be reduced dramatically by 
the family taking on the tasks of designing and actually building the house, 
but the time of completion might be longer. This is particularly true if 
family members cannot work on the house full time. One advantage with 
complete self-help is that the family can use whatever materials are 
readily available. The pace of construction might also suit the needs and 
resources of the family better. However, as mentioned earlier, pure self-
help does require skills, bath managerial and manual. 
To optimize the benefits from the various self-help approaches, housing 
managers have combined characteristics of each approach in their work 
programs. ln Zambia and the Philippines, for example, the construction of 
core houses has been accomplished using contractors, with further housing 
consolidation being carried out by project participants using various self-
help approaches. ln this way, the advantages of contracted work (uniformity 
of design, quality contrai, economies of scale and lower costs, tightness of 
scheduling) were gained. ln due time, the advantages from self-help are 
attained by further improvement of the dwelling through the family's 
efforts. 
Advocates of self-help construction have been critical of project inter-
ventions that accelerate the pace of consolidation and thereby limit the 
scope for self-help. Such interventions include the designing of completely 
finished hou ses that predispose project participants toward faster completion 
of units, the imposition of time limits within which houses must be finished, 
prescribing a limited number of building materials that can be used, or the 
setting of unrealistically high standards with respect to quality of construc-
tion or types of building materials used. The ideal seems to be that the 
basic needs and the resource capabilities (or limitations) of project partici-
pants should be the main determinant of the pace of consolidation, costs, 
and building standards. As seen in many basic-housing projects, this ideal 
is rarely fulfilled. 
48 
Evaluation of Self-Help Approaches 
The extent to which self-help has been used in basic housing projects 
varies. ln the Philippines and El Salvador, self-help played an important 
raie in house construction and improvement. However, in Zambia and 
Senegal the use of self-help was less than expected. 
ln El Salvador, FSDVM delivers an incomplete house to a family. By the 
time the family moves into the structure, it has built an area of 30 m2 on the 
average. ln about 2 years, the family adds 15-20 m2 to the livable part of 
the house through self-help. After that, additional improvements seem to 
be mostly decorative, to improve the house's appearance. 
The extent of self-help in the Tondo project in the Philippines was 
seen in the incarne and expenditure study that revealed that although 
house repairs and improvement used up about 68.2% of resources during 
the month when a family moved to the new site, only 3.9% of total expenses 
went toward payments for hired labour and 64.3% went toward building 
materials. Over a 10-month period, about 11.0% of total expenditures went 
toward house repairs and construction, with 7.2% of this going toward the 
purchase of building materials and only 3.8% for labour. This meant that 
the family did most of the work on the house, with technicians being 
hired only to carry out the difficult tasks orthose requiring a professional 
licence. 
ln contrast, evaluation of the Zambian experience revealed that 92% of 
households in a normal sites-and-services project in Matera used hired 
labour to improve their houses and 85% of households in a basic sites-and-
services project in Lilanda did the same. When researchers estimated the 
value of self-help labour at K0.75/hour, the proportion of the value of self-
help labour was 27% in Matera and 41% in Lilanda. 
A number of factors have been identified as being primarily responsible 
for the limited use of self-help in basic housing projects. These include: 
(1) a lack of time for self-help; (2) tao fast a pace of housing consolidation; 
(3) the types of building materials used; (4) the higher status given to 
professional construction; (5) difficulties with materials loans; and (6) 
problems with technical assistance. 
Lack of lime 
As mentioned earlier, unemployment rates in sium/squatter areas were 
not as high as originally expected. Thus, even if participants wanted to 
use the self-help approach, they cou Id not do so because they had to devote 
more time to their jobs. Studies in Lilanda community in Lusaka, for 
example, found that household heads worked about 45 hours/week on 
the average. Thus, these individuals preferred to use their limited leisure 
hours for other tasks and not on housing construction. 
Pace of Consolidation 
Housing authorities generally prefer an accelerated pace of housing 
consolidation because it reflects well on their efficiency. When project 
participants have to complete a house to an acceptable stage within a 
limited time, they hire labour instead of working on the house themselves. 
The acceleration of construction might be imposed (as in Kenya and 
Zambia) or it may be indirectly suggested (as in Senegal and El Salvador). 
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The effect, however, is the same - when people feel pressured into 
completing their houses within a limited time, they turn toward contractors 
and not self-help. 
Building Materials 
Sorne building materials are easier for low-income people to work with 
because they are more familiar with them. This familiarity encourages 
them to use the self-help approach. Most projects, however, encourage 
the use of modern and permanent materials. This inhibits the people from 
using the self-help approach because they do not know how to work 
with the materials. 1 n general, less self-help is observed when hou ses are 
made of hollow blacks, cernent, and other permanent materials. On the 
other hand, more self-help is used when people are allowed to use their 
old and discarded materials to build their houses. Self-help is also more 
common when people build with timber, sun-dried bricks, or wattle and 
daub. 
Status and Prestige 
People generally want the best house they can afford - this means 
houses made of modern materials and built by professional builders and 
contractors. ln most countries, self-made houses using indigenous materials 
do not have high status and prestige within the community. ln Jamaica, 
for example, despite the fact that people have been building houses with 
nog and wattle and daub for centuries, these types of houses are generally 
regarded as "poor dwellings." The same is true in Zambia. A survey 
revealed that households charged considerably higher rents for houses 
made of modern materials than houses made of sun-dried bricks. Because 
renting was an important source of extra family incarne, project participants 
preferred to hire workers to build their houses. 
Materials Loans 
Generally, a properly working materials loans program encouraged 
families to use self-help. However, if the program deals only with a limited 
variety of materials, if there are shortages and delays, and if there are 
procedural problems, people might be discouraged from using self-help 
and turn to other material sources and contractors. As mentioned earlier, 
most building materials loans programs deal only with a limited number of 
materials (mainly hollow blacks, cernent, and lumber). Thus, builders 
preferring to use indigenous materials have to seek them elsewhere. 
Shortages of materials cause delays and people lacking the time to wait for 
the materials get frustrated and ask contractors, who have access to other 
material sources, to build their dwellings. 
Technical Assistance 
ln a number of projects, technical assistance in construction was given 
by authorities. There has been a tendency on the part of the professionals 
hired to render technical assistance, however, to emphasize the use of 
modern building materials, thus discouraging self-help. ln Zambia, it was 
observed that people hired to provide technical assistance fell into the 
bureaucratie practices of mainly supervising people and calling their atten-
tion to failures to observe certain building standards imposed by the 
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Dagat-Dagatan project in Tondo (Kapit-bahayan). (The Philippines has experimented with 
modem housing but has found it very expensive.) 
housing agency. lnstead of teaching people how to build according to self-
help principles, they saw themselves as watchdogs for maintaining project 
efficiency. As such, they lost their effectiveness and people tried to shun 
them. 
Conclusions 
To date, project experiences with mutual aid and self-help have revealed 
that the high expectations generated by the literature on siums and 
squatters have not been met in adual basic housing programs. The experiences 
reveal, however, that this is due to certain problems with the design and 
implementation of the projects rather than to inherent difficulties with 
mutual aid and self-help. These approaches have an important raie to play 
in basic housing programs. 
Project evaluations have shown that practices su ch as the acceleration of 
the pace of construction, the choice of modern and permanent materials, 
material loans programs, and technical assistance and construction 
procedures are currently discouraging self-help and mutual aid. The insistence 
on using these practices is rooted in professional housing construction 
pradices that persist up to now. These include the emphasis on a professionally 
designed and aesthetically pleasing house, the preference for a finished 
dwelling rather than a slowly consolidated one, the design of standardized 
look-alike houses as the main features of a housing project, and the attach -
ment to acceptable housing standards. Often, these practices are justified 
in terms of safety, health, efficiency, and legal standards. ln reality, however, 
they reflect the professional approach of the architect or engineer that a 
house is something that is built and delivered by professionals to their 
clients who then pay for this professional service. 
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Evaluations in Zambia and the Philippines have shown that self-help is 
used more by lower incarne families (those who cannot afford to pay for 
the services of professionals). If basic housing projects are to cater to their 
true clients, therefore, self-help would play a much stronger raie in house 
construction and improvement. The relatively high proportion of families 
currently hiring contractors and skilled workers is only an indicator that 
the true target groups for basic housing are not being fully served yet. This 






Housing consolidation through time, Lima, Peru. (The houses nearest the road show the 
greatest improvement .) 
Housing consolidation is the process by which families allocated plots in 
a project progressively develop their houses over a period of time. Of 
interest to housing managers are the building methods used, pace of 
consolidation, and cost of improvements and the extent to which such 
costs are affecting family expenditures on food and other basic needs. Most 
important of all, there is considerable interest in the factors that influence 
the manner and extent of consolidation. 
The evaluation studies supported by IDRC and the World Bank showed 
that community-upgrading projects followed a different process of housing 
consolidation than that followed by sites-and-services projects. This might 
be seen by a quick review of the Tondo project and the El Salvador projects. 
ln Tondo, the "reblocking" of the existing community meant that 71.8% 
of the hou ses suffered some form of dislocation. 1 n the case of about 43.6% 
of the dwellings, this meant moving the structure in its entirety to another 
site; about 7.7% of the houses were shifted and realigned; another 20.5% 
did not have to moved, although some portions were "sliced off" to make 
them fit onto smaller lots; and about 28.2% of the houses were not touched 
at all. However, a considerable number of families decided to make 
improvements to their houses, perhaps inspired by the general improvements 
within the community. 
Three months after the start of the reblocking process, a study of 
housing consolidation was conducted. Sorne of the research findings were 
as follows: 
(1) Most Tondo houses were expanded. The proportion of houses with a 
roofed area of only 11-30 m 2 decreased from 47.5 to 30.0%, whereas those 
with a roofed area of 31-50 m 2 increased from 30 to 42.5%. 
(2) Many houses expanded upward, i.e., the proportion of two-storey 
houses increased from 45 to 60%. 
(3) The quality of building materials used improved. The proportion of 
houses using dilapidated or salvaged materials decreased from 25 to 2.5%, 
whereas those using strong materials increased from 22.5 to 40.0%. 
(4) Sanitation improved. The proportion of houses with water-sealed 
toilets rose from 30 to 52.5%. 
(5) Families increased their investments in housing. On the average, 
families spent P6245 for housing improvements, with about P4826 going for 
new building materials. 
The pace of housing consolidation in the sites-and-services projects in El 
Salvador was considerably slower than in Tondo. This is probably due to 
the fact that a family dwelling existed in Tondo at the start of the project, 
whereas an entirely new house had to be built in El Salvador. ln El Salvador, 
also, a lot of time was spent on mutual-aid work devoted to such tasks as 
excavation of the housing foundation (13 weekends), laying a concrete 
foundation (15 weekends), putting up walls (28 weekends), etc. The time 
was spent not only on actual work but also for training, discussions, and 
meetings. 
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Two years after the start of the project, the evaluation study showed that 
the average family had constructed a livable roofed area of 35-40 m 2• 
Families started moving in when an area of about 30 m 2 was finished. 
Beyond the 40 m 2-sized dwelling, further housing improvements seem to 
be devoted mainly to aesthetic and decorative changes, suggesting the 
adequacy of the structure. 
Because of the sanitary core units used, the level of sanitation in El 
Salvador was much higher than in Tondo (ail of the dwellings in El Salvador 
had waterborne toilets). The use of mutual aid and self-help, although 
required in the project, was almost the same as in Tondo, where it was not 
required. Bath the Tondo and El Salvador projects relied on the use of 
strong materials, although there was a tendency in El Salvador to use 
strong materials almost exclusively. ln Tondo, in fact, the building materials 
stores only sold light materials such as timber and particle-board panels, 
whereas the Salvadorean materials stores sold mainly hollow blacks, 
cernent, and galvanized iron sheets. 
Because of the longer period of housing consolidation, the fact that 
families had to move from existing sium/squatter areas to the new sites, 
and due to job dislocations, the costs to families participating in the 
El Salvador projects were higher. The actual direct family investment 
averaged C2821, but other hidden costs were inevitable. For example, 
families started paying for the new ho uses as soon as the targeted completion 
dates were set but they could not move into the new houses due to 
construction delays. This meant that they were paying rent for their old 
houses as well as paying amortization costs. 
Factors lnfluencing Consolidation 
The Tondo and El Salvador projects show that quite remarkable changes 
can occur in a project after it is started. ln analyzing the housing consolida-
tion process, it is important to identify the various factors responsible for 
the pace, costs, scope, and direction of the process. Based on a careful 
study of basic housing experience so far, the following factors seem to be 
the most important influences on housing consolidation: security of tenure; 
condition of the dwelling at the start of the program; value of the existing 
structure; family incarne levels; housing design; infrastructure and support 
services; building materials used; and extent to which contractors, hired 
labour, mutual aid, or self-help are used. 
Security of Tenure 
The earliest and still the best observations on the relationship between 
security of tenure and housing consolidation were those made by Turner, 
based on his work in the barriadas of Peru (Turner 1966, 1967). Turner's 
main hypothesis was that if people were assured security of tenure, they 
would voluntarily improve their dwellings to the fullest extent that they 
were capable of. However, if people felt insecure, they would refrain from 
making home improvements even if they had the means. lnvesting in a 
dwelling when it could be demolished at any time didn't make sense. 
Observations on urban development efforts ail over the world have 
confirmed Turner's hypothesis. An important policy concern, therefore, is 
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what can be done to assure tenure. Among the options that have been 
used to date are: outright sale of land and/or dwellings, long-term leases, 
and leasing with the option to purchase. ln some countries, experiments 
with condominium ownership and cooperative housing have been tried 
but it is still tao early to tell if these approaches will work. 
Outright Sale 
Concepts of property rights vary from country to country but, in general, 
freehold tenure seems to be the most favourable and sought-after status 
among project participants. Enthusiasm for freehold status, however, is 
rarely shared by project managers. There seems to be a widespread feeling 
among housing authorities that giving freehold tenure through outright 
sale diminishes the right of the authority to direct and influence the use of 
land. If a road in a project has to be lengthened or widened and land has 
to be acquired, obtaining the land from freehold owners would involve 
high costs, lengthy negotiations, complicated litigations, and expensive 
delays. ln anticipation of these problems, authorities would rather not sell 
land outright, preferring more flexible tenure arrangements. 
On the part of project participants, however, freehold tenure through 
purchase is the best status one can hope for. Suspicion of the motives of 
housing authorities is acute among former squatters and sium dwellers. ln 
most instances, this may be traced to a "learning experience" involving 
eviction threats and counterthreats, exchange of sium votes for tenure 
status, court cases and administrative hearings, demonstrations, and even 
riots. A favourite slogan among Tondo squatters was "let those who have 
less in life have more in law," and they pressed for laws assuring them 
security of tenure. 
Once security of tenure was assured by the sale of the land to bona fide 
residents of Tondo, the pace of housing consolidation accelerated rapidly. 
ln 3 months, housing improvements exceeded what had been accomplished 
in the past 20 years. Although this accelerated consolidation might be 
attributed to other factors, such as better infrastructures, building materials 
loans, etc., to most Tondo residents it was the legitimization of their land 
daims through the outright sale of land that was the most important factor 
behind the phenomenon. 
Long-Term Leases 
Many project authorities daim that a long-term lease, e.g., for a period 
of 50 years, is ample security to encourage a family to improve its dwelling. 
The lease, in turn, provides the authority with enough powers to contrai 
and regulate land uses as well as to quickly acquire land for new and 
unanticipated needs. 
A frequent concern of housing managers is the tendency of project 
allocatees to sell their "rights" to the house and lot even before they are 
legally entitled to do so. A leasing arrangement specifically prohibiting this 
practice enables the authority to act more effectively. Prohibition of a trade 
in rights is most important in making sure that basic housing projects 
actually benefit the target groups they are supposed to serve. Experience 
has shown that when selling of rights is not controlled, higher incarne 
families eventually end up owning plots in the project. 
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One problem with long-term leases, however, is that they tend to be 
complicated. Leasing as a concept has many legal implications, usually 
contained in complicated clauses about issues such as succession (who 
owns the property when the lessee dies), specific violations, penalties for 
violations, etc. Difficulties in interpreting the provisions of the lease add 
to the sense of insecurity. A land title, at least, is easy to comprehend. A 
lease that requires the services of a lawyer to interpret is not quite the 
sa me. 
Most low-income families perceive basic housing projects as important 
for improving not only their conditions but also the future for their children. 
A lease agreement that postpones determination of tenure status, thus 
leading to an insecure future, is nota good legacy to leave one's children. 
The insecurities generated by poverty stress immediate gratification and 
resolution of outstanding issues as soon as possible. This partly explains 
some of the difficulties with leases in basic housing projects. 
Leasing with a Purchasing Option 
A possible balance between the security of freehold status and the 
flexibility of leasing involves allowing project participants to lease plots 
up to a certain time, after which they have the right to buy the property 
outright. Arrangements can be made so that amortizations un der the lease 
can be applied to the purchase price at the end of the period. ln the sites-
and-services portion of the Tondo project, for example, leases were possible 
for a period of 25 years. After that time, plot allocatees have the right to 
buy outright. 
Leasing within the specified period gives the housing authority the 
power to influence project development and to contrai planned growth 
du ring the most important stages in the project. lt is assumed that the bulk 
of development problems would be encountered during the early stages 
of the project and it is precisely at that time that leasing would enable the 
housing authority to exercise contrais. Toward the end of the leasing period, 
the community would have stabilized enough to warrant freehold status 
for project participants. 
The promised outright sale at the end of the leasing period might be 
sufficient to give participants enough security to encourage further housing 
consolidation. Security might be enhanced further if the lease agreement 
is made flexible enough to allow for earlier purchase by participants if 
they acquire adequate resources before the lease expires. 
Initial Condition of Dwelling 
The initial condition of the dwelling will be an important 
determinant of how much housing consolidation will occur. If a house 
in an upgrading project is adequate enough to meet the basic needs of the 
family, relatively little consolidation might take place. On the other hand, 
a dilapidated house would require considerably more construction to 
bring it to an acceptable level. 
As indicated previously, sites-and-services projects may start out with 
only a serviced site or they may provide a semifinished dwelling. The 
Dagat-Dagatan project in Manila offered participants various options, each 
option featuring varying levels of core housing. Each option also included 
a specific size of plot as well as a corresponding lease or purchase price. 
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The type of core unit provided is intended not only to influence housing 
consolidation but is also an effort to respond to a participant's capacity 
to pay (more options cost more money). lt seeks to influence a participant's 
choice of building materials (a plots-only option allows for maximum use 
of a wide variety of materials). lt also firms up a participant's use of space in 
that the location of the basic core would dictate where the kitchen and 
bathroom would be located. 
An indication of the influence of core units on housing consolidation 
is shown in the Dandora project in Nairobi, Kenya. ln that project, two 
basic options were provided. Type A plots had only a toilet, water connection, 
and party wall, whereas type B plots had ail of these features plus an enclosed 
room. Because type A plots had only a rudimentary level of servicing, they 
cou Id be offered at a cheaper price. However, type A plots required greater 
investments in new construction because an enclosed room was considered 
a necessity before families could move to the plot. Type B plots could be 
occupied almost immediately because the finished room served as a 
temporary shelter as well as a relatively safe storage place for building 
materials. 
Observations of the rates of plot occupation, as well as house construction, 
revealed that the two were closely related. Type B plots were occupied 
rapidly and building activity on these plots also occurred quickly. The 
amount of construction of more permanent dwellings was also higher in 
type B plots. Ali of these accelerated activities seemed related to the fact 
that the initial dwelling unit was ready to accept the family from the very 
beginning (Fig. 2). 
An interesting element of housing consolidation in Dandora was the use 
of temporary shelters. Most families allocated plots in the project lived 
near downtown Nairobi and found it too difficult and expensive to 
commute daily to build houses. The obvious solution to this problem was 
to build temporary shelters. Most temporary shelters built were made of 
sticks, straw, mud, and discarded materials such as plastic sheets, cardboard, 
old lumber, and even animal skins. They were built in the traditional way 
still used in rural areas of Kenya. 
The temporary shelters posed a problem to housing administrators from 
the very start. They were "unsightly, unsanitary, unauthorized, and unfit 
for modern habitation," according to one report. Housing authorities tried 
to demolish some of the temporary shelters but were met by a storm of 
protests from the participants. Families argued that they wasted too much 
time commuting and the temporary shelters enabled them to live on the 
site. They could work as early as they wished or as late as they wanted, 
thus accomplishing more. They could guard the building materials more 
closely on the site (theft of building materials was common in 
the project). Most important of all, families had invested su ms of money in 
building the temporary shelters and demolition would waste these 
investments. 
After much debate, the housing authority allowed the use of temporary 
shelters provided that they would be removed within 18 months after 
construction (this was the time period allowed for completing the 
permanent dwelling to an "acceptable standard"). Acceptance of the 
temporary shelters accelerated the consolidation of houses in type B plots. 
ln fact, as seen in Fig. 2, even allocatees of type B plots built temporary 










... ········· // .... / ····· ,, " ,,,,.,,,."" 
/ / 
/ / 
"' (e),...... / 
~ / / 
-- - -- ,,... (f),.... (g) ..... 
(dl...-" / ..... .... 
/ ........ ........ ..... (h) 
/ ,,,,,,. / / ········ / .......... ~ ... ··; .. ,.,,,,,.. .. 
•• .4".••!,!!.•!.•..Sll... ~/ 
December J anuary February March 
Fig. 2. Rates of type A plot and type B plot occupation and consolidation, Oecember 1976-
March 1977. (a) Occupation, type B plot; (b) temporary shelter, type A plot; (c) occupation, 
type A plot; (d) building activity, type B plot; (e) building activity, type A plot; (f) house 
construction, type B plot; (g) house construction, type A plot; (h) temporary shelter, type B 
plot. 
helped in house construction, or served as storage places for building 
materials, furniture, and household belongings. 
A problem frequently faced by housing authorities offering core houses 
is that people sometimes have a different plan for their dwelling and these 
plans do not conform with the core initially provided. They may knock 
down the core houses, which can be expensive, and start from scratch. ln a 
sites-and-services project in Jamaica, for example, project designers built 
sanitary cores atone end of the lot and set up party walls at the other end. 
People objected to this because they had to build quite a lot to connect 
the wall and the sanitary core. Many families, therefore, ignored the wall 
and built around the sanitary core. Others placed a walled lean-to around 
the sanitary core and built a detached house around the wall. ln either 
case, people spent more than was actually necessary due to their inability 
to use both project components right away. The design also delayed housing 
consolidation considerably. 
Because of problems encountered with core housing similar to those 
mentioned above, some housing authorities have favoured the use of 
serviced plots alone. This approach has the advantage of lower initial costs 
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to project participants. lt also gives participants maximum flexibility in 
designing and building a house. Lower costs and flexibility are maximized, 
for example, when participants are allowed to bring used materials, salvaged 
from original shanties, to the new site. ln a number of projects in the 
Philippines, Zambia, and Jamaica, this was permitted. 
Although the approach was welcomed by some participants, it was not 
popular with politicians who objected that the "new" housing project 
looked tao much like the original sium it was supposed to replace. There 
was even a case where residents of an existing community protested against 
a sites-and-services project because the makeshift houses being built there 
were lowering property values and they were afraid that the unsightly 
houses in the new project would give their community a bad image. There 
was also the.case of a high ranking housing official who ordered that the 
shanties built by people in a new project were "unfit for human habitation" 
and should, therefore, be replaced by new units. The higher costs of the 
new units did improve the project's appearance but they were now priced 
beyond the paying capacity of the original allocatees, who were eventually 
eased out of the project. lncreased project costs also meant that only a 
limited number of families were actually helped in the project because 
fewer units were built. Those helped were, of course, the very families 
who could have obtained housing on the open market. 
Value of Existing Houses 
ln the past, the main issue in urban renewal was whether existing houses 
should be torn down and replaced or whether it was better to improve 
them. Most housing authorities now favour improvement and discourage 
destruction of existing stock. 
The most patent argument for keeping and improving existing 
housing is the finding that it represents a considerable sum 
invested by low-income families. For example, in a study of the value 
of squatter houses in Tondo, it was found that the average house 
represented a value about 90% greater than the average per capita 
incarne of the typical household (Jimenez 1982b). The study sought 
to determine the value of dwellings by two methods: (1) asking the 
owners how much they thought they could sell their houses for and 
(2) asking a professional appraiser to value the dwellings, considering 
such aspects as the size of the house, its age, building materials used, 
availability of services, etc. 
Among 96 houses studied, the average value of the house according to 
owners' estimates was US$1886, whereas the average value arrived at by 
the appraiser was US$1879. Because the average annual family incarne in 
Tondo at the time of the survey was US$982, it was obvious that the houses 
constituted a valuable asset for most families. 
ln some instances, housing authorities have objected to keeping existing 
houses and improving them because of the age of such dwellings. An 
interesting aspect of the study by Jimenez was the fact that the value of 
squatter houses tended to increase with age. This was due to housing 
consolidation, which revealed that homeowners tended to improve their 
houses as they grew aider. The aider the dwelling, it was found, the 
greater the likelihood that it would have services such as piped water, 
flush toilets, and electricity. The use of strong and modern materials 
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also increased with the age of the house. Finally, in a place like Tondo, 
where periodic eradication campaigns have been launched in the past, 
aider houses proved that they had greater "staying power." They had more 
secure tenure because they were located in areas not needed by the 
government, or they were occupied by individuals with greater political 
"pull." Older houses also tended to be stronger. If they had withstood 
earthquakes, typhoons, and other calamities, they were more likely to be 
solid houses. 
The significant su ms invested by fa mi lies in existing housing can become 
a problem in community upgrading. During the reblocking process in 
Tondo, it was found that it was a lot easier to move smaller houses made 
of timber and makeshift materials. When a house made of concrete or 
hollow blacks is moved, it usually means that very little of the original 
building materials can be saved and reused. Thus, in an effort to rationalize 
the layout of houses in the community, a large number of existing structures 
had to be destroyed. 
ln Zambia, a different sort of problem was encountered with regard to 
existing houses. There, families relocated from existing sites were required 
to destroy their old houses so that they would not be reoccupied by 
encroachers. The goal was to reduce the densities in existing communities 
and not removing the old houses would have defeated the project's 
purpose. This approach, however, required very rapid housing consolidation 
in the new site so that the resettled families could be accommodated 
there. Project beneficiaries, therefore, were put under double strain due 
to the loss of their old dwellings, which represented quite an investment, 
and increased expenses to build the new shelter rapidly. Although project 
assistance and building materials loans helped somewhat, this double 
strain created considerable difficulties among a few families. 
Family lncome 
Incarne is one of the key elements in project selection criteria. Ali things 
being equal, selecting families with adequate incarne should accelerate 
the pace of housing consolidation because they would be capable of buying 
building materials and hiring skilled workers more readily. An important 
goal in basic housing projects, however, is to make them accessible to 
lower incarne groups. Thus, a trade-off has to be found between selection 
of higher incarne groups and the problems of slower rates of housing 
consolidation. 
One problem in almost all of the basic housing projects evaluated has 
been the inflationary rise in the cost of building materials and labour. ln 
Senegal, for example, the construction cost index rose from an annual 
average of 180.9 in January 1975 to 251.9 in December 1979. Over a period 
of 4 years (January 1976 - January 1980), the price of a ton of cernent in 
Dakar more than tri pied, i.e., CF AF6773-24 000. 
Spiraling costs have necessitated adjustments in incarne qualifications 
for Senegalese projects. ln 1972, the minimum family incarne for project 
participants was CFAF14 500 on the average. At that time, families with this 
incarne were located between the 15th and 50th percentiles of the Dakar 
population. Because of rising project costs, incarne qualifications were 
raised to CFAF15 000-45 000 in June 1974. This was raised again in 1976 to 
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CFAF18 500-55 000 per month. ln January 1977, the minimum incarne for 
project qualification was CFAF15 000 (OHLM 1980). 
Despite the upward adjustments, the rate of housing consolidation in the 
Dakar project was the slowest among the projects studied by IDRC and 
World Bank teams. Although the project began in 1972, only four families 
had built houses on the site by February 1978. lt wasn't until the Office des 
Habitations à Loyer Modéré (OHLM) increased housing loans from 
CFAF275 000-415 000 that housing consolidation and movement to the site 
accelerated. After long delays, consolidation seems to be picking up in the 
Dakar project. As of 1979, about 1100 families had built their houses and 
moved to the site. By July 1980, OHLM reported that the number of people 
actually on site had more than tripled. 
More intensive studies have shown that housing consolidation in the 
Dakar project was primarily funded from building materials loans. Personal 
savings, according to the studies, were sufficient to finance the full cost of 
construction only in 8% of the cases. Bank loans and loans from employers 
were negligible sources of funds for housing construction. The study 
showed that, in general, the monthly budget of families was about 20% less 
than their actual expenses. Because most families were already spending 
about 65% of their incarne for food, increased expenditures for housing 
construction would have meant cutting back on this basic item. 
A similar incarne and expenditure study in Tondo revealed that the 
strains caused by housing consolidation are not spread evenly but occur 
mainly during the "period of maximum stress," which coincided with the 
3-month period when families had to move to the new project site and 
build their homes. The Tondo study showed that, on the average, families 
spent about 8.6% more than they earned during this period. The main 
reason for the overexpenditure was housing construction, which took 
about 67.3% of total incarne (NHA 1978d). 
The most difficult period for families, according to the Tondo study, was 
the month after the move, when they were spending about 36.9% more 
than their incarne. At that time, the proportion of incarne spent on food 
plummeted to about 25.1%, compared with an average of 34.4% over a 10-
month period. This strain on family incarne was occurring despite sizable 
gifts, donations, and transfer payments from relatives and friends. The 
study revealed that tao rapid a rate of housing consolidation created severe 
dislocations in family finances. 
Housing Design 
A common fault in basic housing projects is the use of overdesigned 
dwellings under the mistaken notion that solid beautiful houses are the 
solution to the housing problem. Even with ample research evidence that 
affordability is the main issue in basic housing, there are still many housing 
officiais who measure their success in terms of how many finished houses 
they are able to add to "housing starts." 
ln Senegal, one of the main reasons for the very slow rate of housing 
consolidation was the expensive design suggested for project dwellings. 
To illustrate to prospective participants the types of houses that would be 
built in the project, the housing agency, in 1975, designed finished 
dwellings that would cost from CFAF750 000-3 million. A 1976 survey of 
prospective participants revealed that no less than 40% of these had lived 
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in a house made of permanent materials before and that "they could not 
countenance living in a shanty" (OHLM 1980). To cater to these families, 
the housing agency felt that only a solid house of permanent materials 
would suffice. This feeling was no different from that of a housing developer 
building a beautiful mode! house to show prospective house buyers what 
they can expect. 
The housing authority succeeded in convincing people to follow the 
design of the mode! houses. As of August 1978, 98% of the households that 
started construction in the project followed the mode! designs. ln fact, the 
designers succeeded tao well. 1 n general, the more expensive "standard 
plans" casting from CFAF1.5--3 million were favoured. 
Another cause of difficulties was the tendency for families to attempt to 
finish the whole house in a single phase. This meant that construction was 
given to contractors with mutual aid and self-help playing negligible raies. 
The problem, however, was that families generally had low incarnes rela-
tive to their preferred housing designs. This meant that the bulk of 
construction costs had to corne from loans, which were raised from 
CFAF275 000-415 000 before accelerated construction took place. 
ln August 1978, an evaluation of the project revealed the main problems 
related to housing design and costs (OHLM 1980): 
This desire to put up OHLM "standard units" in a single phase, the 
rise in the cost of building materials and the cost of labor in relation to 
the low individual savings and the scarcity of construction loans 
explained the slow pace of construction of houses on the site. 
As a result, work on man y of the ho uses was held u p from time to 
time while the purchasers waited to accumulate the necessary funds ... 
almost three-quarters of the purchasers who had not been able to start 
construction of their dwellings indicated a lack of money as the reason. 
The 1978 evaluation convinced project designers that, if housing consoli-
dation was to improve in the project, they had to corne up with a more 
pragmatic approach. Shortly thereafter, the designers suggested that a 
"basic housing unit with a maximum of two rooms" should be the initial 
target of families building a house. The goal was to have an acceptable 
livable unit built on the site first, so that the family would be able to 
move to the project. lt was hoped that after the family occupied the basic 
house, further housing consolidation would occur. This is what is currently 
happening in the Dakar project. 
Lest all the blame is heaped on project designers, it must be noted that, 
left to their own devices, families in a project have a strong tendency to 
opt for solid houses made of permanent materials. ln Tondo, for example, 
the reblocking process triggered a construction boom that drastically 
changed the physical features of the community. Between the start of 
reblocking in 1978 and the evaluation conducted in 1979, it was found that 
29.5% of the one-storey houses in Tondo had been transformed into two-
storey dwellings. ln 1978, about 17.3% of the houses in the reblocked area 
had makeshift salvaged materials but the proportion of such shanties in 
1979 was only 6.9%. 
Aware of this tendency to overcommit their resources, the National 
Housing Authority tried to influence families in Tondo to use light or 
mixed rather than strong materials. The building materials loans program 
was managed in such a way that borrowers could draw only lumber, 
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On-site improvement was found to be an effective approach to upgrading siums -
improved houses are built to replace old shanties in Tondo, Mani/a, Philippines. 
galvanized iron sheets, plywood, and particle board from the project 
stores. People who wanted to use cernent, hollow blacks, or steel rads had 
to obtain these from the open market. This policy succeeded in limiting the 
use of strong materials and favoured the use of light and mixed materials. 
ln 1978, most Tondo dwellings were made of light materials, whereas in 
1979, 50.3% were made of light materials mixed with salvaged materials. 
The proportion of houses made of mixed (light and strong) materials wen.t 
up from 27.2% in 1978 to 34.5% in 1979 (NHA 1980a,b). 
ln general, therefore, the desires of project participants and the 
professional pride of housing designers combine to influence basic housing 
projects to design and build larger houses made of permanent and strong 
materials. The impact of this tendency on housing consolidation is deleterious 
to the attainment of project goals. The high costs of houses and low 
incarnes of project participants inhibit families from moving to project 
sites early. This, in turn, deters housing consolidation. Ambitiously 
designed houses may force families to award construction to contractors 
rather than working on the houses themselves. The added costs of this 
approach serve to delay construction further. Finally, when expensive 
houses eventually prove to be beyond the capacity to pay of project parti -
cipants, they may drop out of the project. This changes the target group 
served by the project and takes it out of basic housing programs altogether. 
Infrastructure and Support Services 
ln a well-designed project, construction of infrastructure and support 
services is phased in such a way that these important elements are made 
available at about the time project participants selected for the project are 
ready·to move to the site and start construction. ln El Salvador, for example, 
the formation of mutual-aid groups is timed with the availability of basic 
infrastructures and services in the project area. This desirable phasing of 
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project activities does not always happen, however. The affect on housing 
consolidation in such instances is negative. 
One of the most important services required for housing consolidation 
is water. Drinking water is needed not only for the people, but it is also a 
necessary factor in construction, especially when cernent and mortar are 
involved. Proper sanitation is also important because improper disposai of 
human waste poses a great health hazard. lt also gives the project a very 
bad image. 
Although most housing consolidation in basic housing projects does not 
require power tools, electricity is a necessary service because of the need 
for security. Theft of building materials is common in most projects, 
especially those located in newly opened areas left uninhabited at night. 
ln the Senegal project, for example, project managers noticed that most 
people were spending large amounts to fence and enclose their lots with 
high walls. About 19% of plot allocatees in a 1980 survey said that they had 
not moved to the project site yet because they had not finished the 
enclosure. They felt the enclosure was necessary to safeguard not only 
themselves but also the expensive building materials they had brought to 
the site. With improved street lighting, the people said security would be 
much better and they would not feel so pressured to build lot enclosures 
first. 
ln the same survey, Senegalese project participants were asked why 
they had not moved to the project when they had finished con-
structing a "basic two-room unit" that was accepted by project designers 
as being a livable structure. The respondents gave the following reasons: 
no sanitary facilities on the site, 42%; enclosures around the house not 
finished, 21%; no police station, market, or community toilets, 16%; and 
other reasons, 21%. From the pattern of answers, it was obvious that the 
lack of infrastructure and basic services was responsible for the delayed 
movement to the project site. 
Building Materials 
The building materials used in a project have a direct affect on housing 
consolidation because of cost considerations, the availability or scarcity of 
the materials, the skills needed to work with the materials, and the people's 
attribution of status or prestige to certain types of materials. ln early sites-
and-services projects, such as in Senegal, there was a strong tendency on 
the part of project designers and the people to choose strong and perma-
nent materials. ln later projects, however, there has been a tendency to 
favour light or mixed materials, but this has not always met with success. 
ln Zambia, initial house designs assumed that people would use sun-dried 
bricks and soil-cement blacks. The main consideration in this choice was 
cost. 1t was estimated in June 1973 that it would be possible to build a three-
room house with a floor area of 24 m 2 for the sum of K241 if sun-dried 
bricks were used. To build the same house with commercial hollow blacks 
and steel reinforcement rads would have doubled the cost. 
Efforts to get people to use sun-dried bricks and soil-cement blacks, 
however, met with serious difficulties. The quality of the bricks and blacks 
produced was rather poor because of poor soil analysis, faulty equipment, 
or improper procedures. ln a semi-rural project in which bricks and soil 
blacks were used successfully, this was achieved by heavy inputs of foreign 
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technical assistance from the American Friends Service Committee and the 
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE). lt was estimated that 
if the cost of such technical assistance was added to total project costs, the 
project would have been as expensive as one using cernent and hollow 
blacks. 
Project authorities realized that, contrary to expectations, it took longer 
to build with bricks and soil cernent than when hollow blacks were used -
people had to gather the soil, water, and other ingredients; they had to 
wait for the machines; and the bricks had to dry in the sun for some time. 
ln the case of hollow blacks, they were readily available from commercial 
outlets and from the project materials stores. Although they cost more, 
they could be used right away. There were also many masons and other 
skilled labourers who could be hired to build with cernent and hollow 
blacks. There was a trade-off, therefore, between the initial cost of hollow 
blacks and the costs of delays, self-help, and other difficulties involved 
with building with bricks and soil cernent. 
ln the long run, it was the people's preference for hollow blacks that 
influenced project decisions and the pace of housing consolidation. 
Surveys in 1979/1980 in two project sites in Lusaka found that 89.5% of 
families in the first site and 92.5% in the second chose to use hollow blacks 
for their houses. The reasons were aesthetic, economic, and related to 
considerations of status and prestige. A bungalow with cernent hollow-
block walls, a galvanized iron roof, and a timber frame was a "solid 
modern house." A house made of sun-dried bricks, soil cernent, or wattle 
and daub was a "poor man's house," no different from the original dwellings 
in the sium/squatter areas that the people came from. An important economic 
reason also influenced the choice of building materials. A survey found 
that the average rent for a hollow black house in 1978 was about K10-11/ 
month, compared with a rentai of KS-7 /month for a house made of sun-
dried brick or soil cernent. Because renting a portion of the house is an 
important source of incarne for Lusaka families, building with hollow 
blacks was a wise economic decision from the homeowner's perspective. 
The housing agency's desire to accelerate housing consolidation also 
tipped the balance in favour of hollow blacks rather than bricks or soil 
cernent. The housing project unit had a rule that a family moving from an 
upgrading site to an overspill area must demolish the original house as 
soon as possible, before it was occupied by other families or encroachers. 
This meant that a new shelter had to be prepared on the new site as soon 
as possible. ln view of the delays involved with using brick or soil cernent, 
many families found that the only way they could build the new shelter 
quickly was to use modern materials and hired labour for the job. 
Hired Labour, Mutual Aid, and Self-Help 
As indicated earlier, most project participants in Zambia and Senegal 
preferred to use hired labour in housing construction, whereas mutual aid 
and self-help were used more in El Salvador and the Philippines. ln general, 
the pace of housing consolidation was faster in projects in which hired 
labour and contractors were used. Such projects, however, tended to 
cost more and as a result excluded many low-income families from 
participating. 
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Delays in housing construction when mutual aid and self-help are used 
are related to the need to train project participants in construction skills, 
organized decision-making, and establishing better working relationships 
between the people and the housing agencies. Sorne difficulties were also 
encountered in the collection and distribution of building materials 
because self-help projects tend to use a wider variety of building materials 
than projects dominated by contractors and hired labour. 
Where mutual aid and self-help had a definite edge over hired labour 
was in the matter of cost. Even when the slow pace of housing consoli-
dation is considered and despite the fact that training and organization of 
mutual aid and self-help also entail considerable administrative costs, 
projects using contractors and hired labour still remain more expensive. 
Because this has serious implications on the affordability and accessibility 
of projects, the benefits from mutual aid and self-help are still worth 
considering. 
Conclusions 
The process of housing consolidation exemplifies the problems of 
transforming a natural process that occurs in sium/squatter areas into a well-
ordered administrative program. ln the literature on siums and squatter 
communities, the tendency of families to improve and consolidate their 
dwellings as their resources and skills improve has been observed. Such a 
process, however, took time - Turner estimated that in Limait took 10--15 
years to consolidate barriada houses into more or less acceptable dwellings. 
The task faced by many housing authorities is to condense this process 
into a couple of years. 
Many of the problems encountered in housing consolidation are self-
inflicted. Housing managers often prefer modern houses made of strong 
and permanent materials, want to see the houses finished in the shortest 
possible time, dictate the use of a limited type of building materials, "tie" 
building materials loans to materials of their choice, are impatient with 
mutual aid and self-help approaches, fail to provide basic infrastructures 
and urban services on time, and generally lack respect for the innate 
abilities and resources of the low-income families they are supposed to 
serve. lt is no wonder, then, that they encounter so many problems in the 
execution of housi ng projects. 
Despite these criticisms, there are, at present, a number of innovations and 
approaches that are being used to improve housing consolidation in basic 
housing projects. Most of these are critically related to costs. There is some 
evidence, for example, that mutual aid and self-help lower the costs of 
housing consolidation despite the fact that they do cause delays. lt is also 
clear that housing designs that allow families to move as quickly as possible 
to the project site (and this includes allowing the use of temporary shelters) 
are most effective in enhancing housing consolidation. ln Zambia, El Salvador, 
and the Philippines, as well as in Jamaica and Kenya, the value of constructing 
a "basic livable unit" that a family can move into right away has been proven. 
There is still a lot to be done to evaluate the proper raie of various 
factors in housing consolidation. Specifically, there is a need to understand 
how technical assistance can be used more effectively to improve and 
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accelerate construction. This is especially the case with respect to the use 
of indigenous building materials and construction processes in basic 
projects. To date, the general tendency is still to rely on modern materials 
put together in standardized designs in the construction of projects. Projects 
in Lusaka look tao much like projects in El Salvador, which look amazingly 
similar to projects in Jamaica. One wonders if these similarities are natural 
and inevitable or are the result of an imposed solution. 
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BUILDING CODES AND 
HOUSING STANDARDS 
4 
During the early stages of sites-and-services· projects, houses may be at various stages of 
deve/opment, San Salvador. 
Traditional housing administration is mainly control-oriented and 
regulatory. The primary instrument by which contrai is exercised is the 
building code, which is a compendium of standards designed to caver ail 
possible events and situations. Many administrators defend building codes 
and housing standards as being necessary for safety, economy, and 
efficiency. They contend that if people are not told what should be built 
and how such things should be built, the result would be anarchy and 
the rights of people would not be protected. 
The concern for safety may be seen in codes that prohibit the use of 
grass thatch, reeds, or even bamboo in urban houses as these are considered 
to be fire hazards. lt is reflected in careful specifications for the use of 
stone and other heavy materials in earthquake zones. Fear of epidemics is 
behind regulations on how many people can live in a house. Fear of 
contamination of water sources dictates that the leaching field of a septic 
tank be at least 50 feet (15 m) from a well. 
ln technologically advanced countries, the institution and enforcement 
of building codes and housing standards have made great contributions to 
human welfare. lt is hard to imagine how the plague, choiera, influenza, 
and other epidemics that swept through Europe could have been controlled 
without the active pursuance of standards. ln developing countries, how-
ever, there are many who question how useful building codes and housing 
standards are. These critics accuse standards of inhibiting the efforts of the 
poor to build hou ses for themselves. Even worse, when sium and squatter 
houses are destroyed, codes and standards are instrumental in denying the 
poor the benefits from what they had already invested their resources in. 
Dwellings in sium/squatter areas have made a mockery of building 
codes and housing standards. They violate practically every regulation in 
the books. They are fire hazards, people are packed into rooms like sar-
dines, a number of families may share one toilet, or there may be no toilet 
at all. Housing is built on dangerous ravines, steep hillsides, or even railroad 
rights-of-way. 
ln almost ail developing countries, efforts to enforce codes and standards 
have been frustrated by the enormity of the sium/squatter problem. Where 
offending houses have been torn down, people have merely built some-
where else. Eviction orders have been ignored or contested in the courts. 
Even when the courts have upheld the legality of building codes and 
standards, rulings have proven impossible to carry out. As one frustrated 
Manila administrator said after a court victory against squatters: "How 
do you throw one million people into jail?" 
Frustration with respect to implementing building codes and standards 
has prompted some people to advocate throwing them away completely. 
The case against codes and standards revolves around a number of issues. 
First, it is charged that strict adherence to building codes and standards 
limits the number of dwellings that can be made available to people. ln 
most developing countries, the poor generally use mutual aid or self-help 
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in building their own houses. Because of the building materials they use, 
their low level of skills, and their Jack of awareness of existing standards 
and code provisions, the products of their labour would probably be ruled 
il legal or su bstandard. 
Strict adherence to codes and standards also makes houses too expensive. 
This is dictated by the strong and permanent materials advocated, profes-
sional quality of construction needed to pass inspection, time delays arising 
from site supervision and periodic inspections, and ruling that a family 
cannot move into a dwelling until it is finished to a minimum acceptable 
standard. 
Even efforts to provide basic housing programs to the urban poor can be 
frustrated by strict adherence to building codes and standards. ln 1976/1977, 
for example, progress in the Dandora sites-and-services project in Nairobi, 
Kenya, was critically set back by a controversy involving minimum housing 
standards. The city Health Department ruled that the entire first phase of 
the project was not conforming with health rules and regulations and 
could not, therefore, be accepted by the city. This meant that the second 
phase of the project could not be started because it followed the same 
design as the fi rst phase. 
One of the offending items was a sewer pipe connection that required 
one plot owner to enter the plot of another to clean the sewer pipe if 
it became clogged. Project designers had made this design to eut costs. 
Project management argued that people in the community were cooperative 
and that an urban community development program trained and mobilized 
the community to tackle problems like cleaning sewers. ln any 
case, the probability of a sewer pipe getting clogged was remote. lt was 
unfair to hold up a multimillion-dollar project because of some fears that 
neighbours would not be able to get along well enough to cooperate in 
cleaning up a sewer pipe in the future. 
The controversy dragged on (observers of the case pointed out that the 
offending sewer pipes were only symbolic of larger conflicts in city govern-
ment) and it took formai revisions of the city's building code to resolve it. 
The revisions followed the principle that the city is divided into various 
zones and each zone al lows and restricts certain activities. 1 n an R-1 (fi rst-
class residential) zone, only single pipe sewer connections are allowed. ln 
other zones, where "mixed" land uses are tolerated, other types of sewer 
connections are allowed. 
What the Nairobi case points out is that building codes and housing 
standards do have their uses but only if they are based on existing situations 
and reflect current realities. The problem with many building codes and 
standards is that they are typically old and outdated. Turner noted, for 
example, that the building code of Lima had been instituted in 1915 and 
minimum housing standards had been incorporated in a revised version in 
1935. ln many countries, existing codes and standards are handed down 
from colonial administrators who essentially ruled two cities - the modern 
European city they lived in and the native quarters they largely ignored. 
Even as colonizers departed, however, the codes they left behind still 
dominate decision-making in many countries. The situation in Jamaica, for 
example, is quite typical (PADCO 1981). 
ln Jamaica, each Parish administers its own code. The code for Kingston 
and St. Andrew does not cover the whole urban area. ln format, it 
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be longs to the early part of this century. Although certain amendments 
and additions were made in the 1950's, the document is now truly 
historie and offers a poor guide to good practice. lt relates poorly to 
the task of checking plan proposais and has proven time consuming to 
ad mi nister. 
lt is obvious that there is a need in many countries to revise and update 
existing building codes and housing standards. The issue, however, 
is what form these codes and standards should take. ln tao many instances, 
there is a very strong tendency to follow the approaches used in old codes. 
Administrators who have gotten used to existing codes sometimes believe 
that a few changes here and there will salve the problem. 
The experience with sites-and-services and community-upgrading 
projects reveals that, on the whole, an entirely new approach to the 
formulation and use of building codes and housing standards is needed in 
most developing countries. ln the search for a new approach, a number of 
issues have to be resolved first. These include: (1) specificity or generality 
of code provisions; (2) functional versus geographical approaches; (3) 
legal versus guidance nature of codes; and (4) implementability of codes 
and standards. 
Almost all conventional building codes have specific provisions that 
have to be followed, coupled with specific penalties for noncompliance. 
They specify the heights of ceilings, breadth and height of windows, thick-
ness of load-bearing walls, diameter of steel reinforcement bars, etc. The 
problem with these codes, when applied to the vast variety of housing 
practices in developing countries, is that it becomes almost impossible to 
legally specify what is and what is not acceptable. ln the particular case of 
basic housing approaches, in which the capacity of clients to pay is 
extremely low, tao specific approaches would probably limit the options 
available, which, in turn, raises the cost of allowed options beyond the 
people's ability to pay. 
Recently proposed codes are tending to be more general than specific 
and are concerned with the proper definition of tasks and the formulation 
of "performance standards" to be met in the accomplishment of the tasks. 
The goal is not to set the minimum acceptable thickness, weight, or density 
of certain materials but to indicate the performance required. This gives 
designers maximum freedom in choosing materials, construction 
techniques to be used, and sizes and shapes of structures. 
Another trend in the formulation of codes and standards realizes the 
futility of setting functional limits that would meet all possible eventualities 
for all time. Greater relativity and flexibility, therefore, are being exercised 
to take into account cultural, historical, and other considerations. Thus, 
although it is still common practice to refer to the British or American 
"code of practice" for approved specifications and standards, many 
technicians in developing countries are devising specifications of their 
own. 
ln Jamaica, for example, it has been proposed that different types of 
building practices, roughly analogous to the formai and informai sectors of 
the building construction industry, be embodied in a new code. These 
include: (1) modern buildings constructed by professional builders; (2) 
traditional buildings constructed by small contractors and skilled artisans; 
and (3) makeshift dwellings built by small builders or residents themselves. 
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lt has been proposed that different types of code provisions are needed for 
each of these types of building. lt might also be possible to identify the 
specific parts of the city where a particular type of building is being 
constructed and formulate an appropriate zoning or subdivision code for 
that area. Thus, the new code will encompass the full spectrum of building 
practices within the country, rather than having a supposedly "universal" 
code that is largely ignored or openly violated by 40% of the people, i.e., 
by those people living in makeshift dwellings. 
lt has been suggested that the legal enforcement portions of building 
codes and housing standards be clearly separated from the sections that 
merely seek to guide or instruct builders in appropriate practices. The 
primary difficulty with existing codes is that they are extremely difficult to 
enforce. Separating code provisions that have to be legally followed from 
those that lay out guiding principles clarifies the nature of the enforcement 
process. Codes that have sections that provide desirable practices (separate 
from practices that have to be legally followed) have greater flexibility. They 
can also be used for training and instructing building practitioners, thus 
taking on a positive rather than a punitive stance. 
Areas of Controversy and Concern 
ln planning and managing basic housing projects, a number of areas 
have cropped up repeatedly in relation to building codes and housing 
standards. Among the most common of these have been: size of plots, size 
and design of dwellings, building materials, sanitation facilities, density 
standards, and mixed use of land and dwellings. Housing authorities have 
confronted these issues and solved the problems they entail in various 
ways. ln general, no universally acceptable codes and standards seem to 
have been found but there is great similarity in bath the nature of the 
problems and the logic of the local solutions. 
Size of Plots 
There is wide variability in country policies related to the size of project 
plots. ln Tondo, plots ranged from a minimum of 30 m 2 to a maximum of 
96 m 2, whereas in Zambia the minimum plot size originally set was 210 m 2 
and the maximum was 324 m 2. Plot sizes in El Salvador and Senegal ranged 
between these two extremes. 
ln relation to safety, the concern with plot sizes is that small plots tend to 
favour high densities and overcrowding, which expose people to danger 
in the event of fire, outbreak of epidemics, natural disasters such as 
typhoons and earthquakes, and man-made disturbances such as riots or 
gang wars. ln Zambia, large plots were favoured by the people because, for 
the most part, they used pit latrines for sanitation. A large plot enabled 
them to build the latrine far enough from the house so that it would not 
pollute water sources or the air. lt also made it possible to move the latrine 
from place to place within the compound as the pit began to fill or smell. 
Safety considerations, however, had to be tempered with other factors. 
ln Tondo, an important issue was how many families could be accommodated 
in the upgraded area in order that fewer families would have to be dislocated 
and moved to a sites-and-services project in the overspill area. A related 
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issue was greater equity in the allocation of plots. Before upgrading, plots 
occupied by families ranged from 13.7-400 m 2 in size. The project 
narrowed this range so that after upgrading the plots occupied by families 
ranged from 33-88 m 2 in size. Present plot allocation is more equitable, as 
seen from the fact that 77.5% of all families in Tondo now occupy plots 
ranging from 31-60 m2 in size. Before upgrading, only 37.5% of families 
occupied plots within this range. 
An important consideration with respect to plot size is cost. ln El Salvador, 
the relatively modest plot size in the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo 
y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM) projects was dictated by the high cost of land 
and the fact that this cost had to be passed on to the low-income beneficiaries 
in the project. ln Manila, where a heavy government subsidy made up for 
the large difference between the market value and selling price of plots, 
project participants in Tondo still had to pay development costs that were 
added to the purchase price of plots. The Zambian project designers 
favoured larger plot sizes because land was "free" in Zambia. However, 
project managers found that large plots increased development and service 
costs significantly because longer roads and more sewer pipes, electric 
wires, and water pipes were needed to reach houses that were far apart 
from each other. 
A unique argument for larger plots in Zambia was based on the need 
expressed by project beneficiaries to have a garden. A survey carried out 
in 1976, before the community of George was upgraded, showed that 31.4% 
of households had gardens. Of these, 11.6% tilled gardens adjacent to their 
houses and 23.8% had "rainy gardens" quite a distance from their houses. 
Having a garden was not only seen as a traditional African practice but 
was also justified on economic grounds because the corn, sweet potatoes, 
beans, and other crops grown augmented family meals or were a source 
of cash. Larger plots (and gardens), however, reduced the project's capability 
to absorb more people. This was an important consideration in plots close 
to the city centre, which were in great demand. ln George, housing 
authorities attempted to provide enough space for gardening, but a survey 
in 1977 revealed that the proportion of households with gardens had 
decreased to 29.3%. Furthermore, project managers were informed that the 
high incidence of malaria in the project site was probably due to the 
planting of corn (the "stagnant" water in the cornstalks was suspected as 
a breeding place of the dreaded anopheles mosquito). Because corn was 
a favourite crop, especially in the rainy gardens, a ban on its planting was 
met with objections from the people. 
Larger project plots might also encourage land speculation. Experience 
has shown that speculation takes place even if project authorities expressly 
prohibit the sale of plots within a specified period of time or until al! 
payments have been met. This has been the experience in Tondo and in 
Lusaka, where "rights of occupancy" are clandestinely sold. ln view of the 
fact that basic housing projects are subsidized by the government to make 
them more accessible to lower incarne groups, the clandestine sale of 
plots to families who most likely have higher incarnes than the target 
population lessens the beneficial impacts of such projects. 
Project experiences have shown that justification of plot sizes from the 
point of view of safety constitutes only a partial reason for the regulation 
of this factor in building codes and housing standards. Regulation of plot 
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sizes is better justified in terms of a project's capacity to accommodate 
more people, more equitably allocate a scarce commodity such as land 
among project participants, prevent land speculation, and reduce project 
costs. ln the final analysis, it is cost that determines a project's affordability 
and accessibility to low-income groups. 
Size and Design of Dwelling 
The size and design of a house, like the plot size in basic housing projects, 
is regulated in building codes and housing standards because of safety 
considerations. The main concern, again, is density. Too small a house 
would mean overcrowding, which exposes people to health, physical, and 
other dangers. 
Very few basic housing programs, however, provide finished houses. lt is 
more common for them to provide just a serviced site, sanitary core, sanitary 
core with one room, or sanitary core with two rooms. The expectation is 
that project participants will construct and improve the houses themselves, 
using whatever designs and building materials they choose. 
Although housing authorities rarely contrai the size of houses directly, 
they exert a strong influence on this factor by the type of "model houses" 
they present to the people. Technically, such model houses are not binding 
on project participants. However, as revealed in the Senegal project, 
where many families built houses according to the standard plans offered 
by the Office des Habitations à Loyer Modéré (OHLM), there was a strong 
tendency on the part of the people to conform to the models, believing 
them to be preferred by the authorities. 
The model houses built in basic housing projects so far illustrate the 
strong preference by housing authorities for relatively high standards in 
size, style, workmanship, and building materials used in upgrading and 
sites-and-services efforts. The influence of architects seeking to design the 
"house beautiful" and engineers wanting to build strong and permanent 
dwellings (in other words, the standards of "professionals") are depicted 
by the models. Not surprisingly, the model houses also embody the values 
of top politicians and administrators who want to build houses they can 
be proud of, good houses they can defend against the criticism of opposing 
politicians, and idealized testimonials to what is being done to improve the 
plight of the "poorest of the poor." 
The only problem is that the poor cannot afford this high standard of 
housing. To add to the problem, high-minded politicians and idealistic 
reformers are not about to offer subsidies to bring the price of model 
houses within their reach. The model houses, therefore, become a cruel 
joke. As they are often presented in their finished state (complete with 
furniture and interior decoration), they often raise people's expectations 
and influence poor families to overcommit themselves to ambitious 
projects they cannot afford. When the families falter in their construction 
schedules, project codes and building standards regulations are enacted 
indicating that a basic livable unit should be finished within 18 months 
or that a family cannot move to the project until an acceptable standard 
of accommodation is completed. People familiar with middle-class housing 
developments would readily recognize the code regulations and standards 
noted above. However, some basic housing managers have tried to enforce 
them in a sites-and-services project (with little success, of course). 
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Mode/ home in Dagat-Dagatan (Kapit-bahayan) project, Tondo, Philippines. 
A number of housing innovators with a better understanding of the 
housing needs of the urban poor have recommended that, instead of 
finished model houses, housing authorities might do better to construct 
models of units being progressively developed (Fig. 3). Thus, one model 
might depict a sanitary core with a party wall; another model would have 
this sanitary core with a partially finished room; a third model would illus-
trate how a sanitary wall and a finished two-room unit might look, etc. This 
type of model would not only show the housing standards and designs 
favoured by housing authorities, but it would also suggest to project parti-
cipants that it is ail right for them to take their time if their skills and 
resources do not make it possible to finish the dwelling right away. 
ln a project in the Philippines, supported by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme and the National Housing Authority, several "model 
houses" were built that illustrated how old and salvaged materials from 
demolished shanties could be aesthetically and economically used in an 
upgrading project. ln another project in lndonesia, similar model houses 
were built in the siums to illustrate how some technological innovations 
such as sanitary modules and water-storage systems could be used. By 
actually setting up houses and sanitation systems that met minimum 
standards, the models managed to convey the acceptability of such 
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ln a number of countries, there have been suggestions that what is 
prabably needed in basic housing prajects is a statement of maximum 
allowable rather than minimum permissible standards. As in the case of 
plot sizes, putting a maximum limit on the size of a dwelling a praject 
participant can build might imprave equity. If very large and expensive 
houses are not allowed, the right target graup might be served by the 
praject because families with high incarnes who can afford to build such 
houses will not be permitted in the praject. Participating families, there-
fore, will be more homogenous, "leakage" in praject benefits will not 
occur, and there might be more peace and harmony among praject 
participants. 
Maximum housing standards, however, will be equitable only if they are 
applied to the larger society rather than to participants in basic housing 
schemes alone. lmposing a ceiling on what families in basic housing prajects 
can build when the elite of a country can build large, expensive, and 
luxurious houses will only polarize social classes further. lt would be the 
height of hypocrisy and iniquity to rule that a limit on what the poor can 
build should be imposed because that is ail they can afford. lt is tantamount 
to saying that the poor do not know their own limits, which should, 
therefore, be set for them by building codes and standards. The rich, 
however, should be free to do exactly what they like. 
Even for the prajects themselves, setting maximum standards would 
prabably create artificially homogenous communities for the poor. Studies 
in existing sium/squatter areas (the "contrai graup" communities in the 
IDRC - World Bank study, for example) revealed that families in these areas 
are not "all of a kind," they encompassed a wide range of incarne levels. 
The smooth functioning of these communities could be partly traced to 
this heterageneity because it allowed individuals and groups to perform ail 
raies: leaders and followers, financiers and borrowers, and buyers and 
sellers. Much of the petty trading and income-generating activities in the 
so-called informai sector arise from the fact that people "live off each 
other" in a most positive way in these communities. An intervention that 
would artificially impose a limit on the variety of people in a community, 
therefore, would prabably help to sunder the delicate web of human 
interrelationships that makes community life so vital. ln the long run, it 
would be counterpraductive. 
Building Materials 
Most building codes and housing standards do not allow the construction 
of dwellings made primarily of renewable materials in urban areas. Safety 
is the primary reason given why easily combustible materials such as grass, 
reeds, bamboo, and scrap wood are banned from densely populated cities. 
Safety in the event of natural and man-made disasters also dominates in 
building materials standards. Another aspect of safety, i.e., health, also 
governs the choice of building materials. 
Evaluations of basic housing prajects show that bath housing 
authorities and praject participants have a strang preference for strang 
and permanent materials. Even when praject managers attempted to 
intraduce lighter materials to imprave housing affordability in the 
Philippines (lumber and plywood) and Zambia (sun-dried bricks and soil 
78 
cernent), people still persisted in using cernent, hollow blacks, and steel 
rads. This suggests that the most important factor in basic housing may not 
be contrai and regulation of materials standards but a more accurate 
estimate of what people can really afford. 
If safety, health, and other considerations are to dominate housing 
standards on building materials, the buildings constructed in basic housing 
projects would probably be priced beyond the paying capacity of the 
urban poor. To date, the basic housing projects already set up have rarely 
reached lower than the 15th percentile of urban incarne groups. As families 
who are better off are served by basic housing projects, newer programs 
will cater to poorer and poorer clientele. Because there is no basis for 
assuming that governments would be more willing than they are now to 
subsidize housing for poorer families, the challenge for housing designers 
is to find less expensive materials and better ways of utilizing them. 
Already, house-building practices in sium and squatter areas provide 
many examples of how affordable building materials can be used in basic 
housing projects. So far, these practices have been disallowed in housing 
projects because of strict conformity with building codes and housing 
standards. ln view of the fact that the professionals responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of codes and standards do not seem to 
have viable alternatives, perhaps it is time to reconsider existing conditions. 
lt does not make any sense, either, to continue to enforce codes and 
standards for certain acceptable levels if authorities are not willing or able 
to subsidize nonconforming fa mi lies to bri ng them up to acceptable standards. 
The limitations of a single code on minimum housing standards to govern 
all types of buildings are well known. What usually happens is that the 
code and standards are applied only to housing in the formai sector. 
Because building in sium/squatter areas is outside the bounds of the code 
and standards, they are ignored and not regulated. The scope and magnitude 
of such buildings, however, cannot be ignored anymore. Many cities and 
towns in developing countries have reached a stage where building in 
sium/squatter communities is the most important single activity in housing 
and the continued pretense that it does not exist will not make it go away; 
neither does it improve the existing situation. 
What is needed, therefore, is the revision of existing codes and housing 
standards so that they include conditions in sium/squatter areas. This can 
be done using an areal approach, which allows planning and housing 
authorities to designate certain areas where the code provisions and 
standards apply. This should be combined with pragmatic codes of practice 
and standards that are based on actual situations in sium/squatter areas 
rather than on some ideal statement of a minimum requirement. 
An example of such a code is the "regulations for semi-permanent 
dwellings built of recovered and renewable materials" that has been 
proposed for Jamaica. The proposed code is designed to be applied to areas 
specifically designated in development or zoning plans. This selective 
approach is already being used in the Philippines, for example, where 
more than 200 sites in Metropolitan Manila have been identified for 
improvement in the Zonal lmprovement Program. 
An important aspect of regulations such as those proposed for 
Jamaica is that they be based on actual conditions in the areas to be 
covered. This means that provisions such as the size of a room, dimensions 
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of a door, ceiling heights, etc., should be derived from empirical checks of 
existing dwellings. The main reason for the regulations - to help assure 
safety for people - should be constantly in the mincis of those who formula te 
the regulations. At the same time, the implications of the regulations on 
the affordability of the housing options should not be lost sight of. 
The main advantage of building codes and housing standards that apply 
even to sium/squatter areas is that they will help to prevent the haphazard 
and uncontrolled building that occurs when such areas are ignored. The 
codes and standards can be invoked when authorities regulate what would 
otherwise be illegal activities in these areas. They could also be used in 
community-upgrading programs when existing conditions are improved 
and rationalized. The effect of all this is the "formalization" of activities 
that originally were in the informai sector. 
The biggest challenge to housing authorities, therefore, is assuring 
that the vitality, creativity, and dynamism that is found in the informai 
building sector does not get emasculated by the introduction of codes and 
standards. Authors of codes and standards have to get away from the 
authoritarian or paternalistic attitude that they have the specific answers to 
the building problems and that what others have to dois conform. Rather, 
authors of codes and standards should see themselves as primarily playing 
a supporting raie, making sure that the conditions that release and unlock 
the energy and vitality of the poor are provided in project areas; for in the 
final analysis, it would be these factors that would build the proper 
dwellings. The main issue as far as codes and standards are concerned is 
not whether they should exist or not, but whether they can assist in the 
real building process. 
Sanitation Standards 
ln most basic housing projects supported by the World Bank, sanitation 
accounts for 40-50% of total on-site infrastructure costs and water accounts 
for 20-30%. Clean water and sewerage systems, therefore, normally make 
up more than three-quarters of infrastructure costs, leaving relatively little 
for other services. 
Because of the importance attached to sanitation standards, a very wide 
gap exists between what basic housing projects provide in the way of sani-
tation and what actual conditions are in sium/squatter areas. Most sites-
and-services and upgrading projects rely on waterborne sewerage systems, 
often with individual sewer pipe connections to every dwelling. Surveys 
in sium/squatter areas reveal that from one-third to more than one-ha If of 
the houses do not usually have toilets. 
ln some countries, sanitation standards for basic housing projects even 
exceed those found in the city at large. Thus, the waterborne sewerage 
system in Tondo is far superior to the Metropolitan Manila system. Only 
one-thi rd of the whole metro area, in fact, was connected to the central 
system. The central city system, built in the 1920s, had not been properly 
maintained and damage that occurred during World War Il had not been 
repaired. Project engineers who designed the Tondo system did not 
connect it to the main city system for fear that it would not have sufficient 
capacity. Thus, despite the fact that the main outfall of the city system cuts 
across Tondo, the Tondo system was linked to an oxidation pond and was 
maintained independently. 
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One of the justifications for the expensive high-standard sanitation 
systems introduced in low-income projects is that such projects do not 
exist in isolation from the city as a whole and, because germs and epidemics 
do not respect community boundaries, diseases that start in the siums can 
spread rapidly. This argument, however, is curiously out of synch with fiscal 
policies that require full recovery of development costs from basic housing 
project participants. If, indeed, high sanitation standards are needed in 
low-income areas for the sake of the whole city, then the costs of attaining 
these standards should be borne by the whole city, which means a subsidy 
for the projects. 
The question of high costs for waterborne sanitation systems has forced 
a number of project authorities to use other systems. ln projects in Lusaka, 
Zambia, and Mombasa, Kenya, pit latrines have been accepted by project 
authorities as meeting minimum standards. Local conditions, such as a 
relatively dry climate and appropriate water table depths, combine with 
cultural acceptability of pit latrines to make the system work. 
An interesting innovation in lndonesian KIP programs is the MCK, a 
basic sanitary module composed of a communal toilet, an artesian well, 
and a water-storage system. Cast considerations and cultural acceptability 
have made the MCK one of the main improvements in lndonesian 
kampungs. A particularly useful bit of "social engineering" has been the 
successful effort to organize families in the community to maintain the 
MCK and keep the toilets clean. ln other countries, communal toilets have 
been unsuccessful because they have not been properly maintained. ln 
lndonesia, people have organized at the neighbourhood level to look 
after the MCK. One approach has been to assess a "user charge" on every 
family using the system and to use the money collected to paya caretaker. 
Another involves rotation of the task of cleaning and maintenance among 
members of the organization. 
Between the pit latrine and centralized waterborne sewerage systems, 
smaller septic tank arrangements have been designed in which a number 
of houses (e.g., 20 in a UNEP-NHA community-upgrading project in the 
Philippines) are connected to a septic tank. Although the tank still has to 
be emptied every couple of years, the economies of scale achieved in the 
project make it superior to the individual septic tank for each house. ln 
Cuba, larger waterborne sewerage systems have been designed, ending up 
in compartmentalized oxidation ponds. The efficiency of such middle-level 
systems has been high and some of them have even been linked to 
aquaculture fisheries and vegetable-raising projects. 
The problem of sanitation, however, still awaits breakthroughs either 
in physical, mechanical, chemical, or human engineering for a solution. 
Centralized sewerage systems, after ail, have changed very little since 
Greek and Roman times. There have been scientifically interesting exper-
iments on biogas digesters to produce energy, waterless composting 
toilets, and water and waste recycling systems. These have ail been either 
tao complicated or tao expensive for basic housing projects. Until effective 
and inexpensive solutions to attain better sanitation are found, sanitation 
standards in basic housing will remain a problem area. 
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Density Standards 
Plot size, size of dwellings, number of rooms allowed, and size of rooms 
are usually governed by specific provisions in building codes to limit 
human densities in projects. As in most code provisions, density contrai is 
justified in terms of safety. lnfectious diseases spread faster in densely 
populated projects. lt is more difficult to evacuate people during disasters 
and calamities. There are even suggestions that lack of privacy, high noise 
levels, and other concomitants of high densities may tend to increase 
mental illness and social maladjustments. 
The usual standard for density is one persan for each habitable room. 
ln basic housing projects, however, density standards may vary. The Dandora 
project in Nairobi, for example, has a minimum standard of two persans 
per habitable room. A survey conducted in 1979, however, revealed that 
95% of the households in Dandora exceeded this standard. Half of the plots 
surveyed were occupied by 2 or 3 families. The mean number of persans 
per occupied plot was 8.4 and 42% of the people interviewed said that they 
lived in plots with 7-12 residents (MEDIS 5, 1979). 
Even though the densities seem high, they are definitely less than 
densities in existing sium/squatter areas, such as those in Mathare Valley 
or the Eastleigh majengos of Nairobi. The tendency for densities to be 
reduced after moving to a basic housing project has been noted in almost 
all countries. ln the Tondo project, for example, movement to the sites-
and-services project increased the proportion of nuclear families occupying 
a dwelling. Even the reblocking process, which only involved moving the 
house to another part of the neighbourhood, reduced the rate of doubling 
up and the proportion of families renting accommodations. 
A difficult issue with respect to implementing density standards is renting. 
ln the Dandora project, the high densities were due to the fact that two-
thirds of the plot owners were subletting at least one room at the time 
of the survey. The mean monthly rent per room was Sh175.50. The survey 
found that about half of the plot owners renting rooms had increased their 
incarne by more than 50%. 
The high rates of renting in Dandora are due to the policy adopted by 
housing authorities that allows subletting because it augments family 
incarne. lnitially, doubts were expressed about the wisdom of subletting 
because of density standards. However, the high demand for rentai 
accommodations in the project, coupled with the argument that cost 
recovery would be enhanced, convinced housing managers to allow and 
even encourage subletting. As a result, in 1979, a survey found that only 
43% of the plots in the project were occupied by original allottees. About 
39% were occupied by renters alone. Among the original plot allottees, 
79% also had tenants in residence. 
To accommodate high densities, project designers in the Dandora 
project prepared a variety of plot designs that would allow original allottees 
to construct from three to six rooms on plots ranging from 100-160 m 2 . As 
shown in Fig. 4, the key problem in ho use design is the location of the "wet 
core," which is composed of a toilet, shower, store, and kitchen. Communal 
use of these facilities by families not directly related to each other was a 
problem. Another problem was the use of kitchens as living rooms, 
especially during the early stages of housing consolidation. 
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Fig. 4. Plot designs to accommodate higher densities, Dandora project, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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Despite density standards in basic housing projects, therefore, the 
number of people actually living in such projects is usually very high. 
Although numbers rarely exceed densities in sium/squatter areas, they are 
usually higher than the minimum standards set by project designers. 
The "violation" of density standards is recognition that there are other 
considerations in basic housing projects than safety and health. There is a 
strong need to accommodate as many people in a project as possible to 
increase their cost effectiveness. There is also a desire to make the infra-
structure and basic urban services accessible to the low-income people 
who do not enjoy these services in their original communities. Finally, the 
financial rewards from renting (which is a common cause of high densities) 
are just too strong to resist. Due to the extent that renting enhances 
cost recovery in projects, it is often tolerated and even encouraged. 
Mixed Use of Land and Houses 
Another traditional building code provision is that specific places in an 
urban area should be devoted to only one or two uses. Thus, residential 
areas should be reserved for peaceful enjoyment of home life. Allowing 
commerce or industry in such areas would produce safety problems; 
encourage noise, chemical, or other types of pollution; and lower property 
values. 
This standard of unifunctionalism goes against normal conditions in low-
income communities where production, commerce, leisure, community 
affairs, and home-life activities all happen in the same area and often at the 
same time. This variety of activities is the source of vitality and dynamism 
that is so characteristic of low-income communities. Social relationships 
in the siums are still mainly in the primary group, face-ta-face stage. They 
have not yet become functionally differentiated to formally make up 
compartmentalized raies or activities. 
The complex admixture of activities is seen in the uses for structures 
and dwellings. ln Tondo, for example, about 20% of all structures were 
devoted to some form of productive or commercial activity. Often, pro-
duction, sales, consumption, and maintenance are conducted in the same 
structure. Case studies of income-generating activities revealed that most 
enterprises in Tondo were family run. They were conducted mainly from 
the entrepreneur's house, which partly explains the popularity of the two-
storey house in Tondo that allows people to use the first floor for produc-
tive and commercial activities and the second floor for domestic activities. 
One immediate impact of basic housing projects is the disruption of the 
complex of activities existing in the improved area. This is especially true in 
sites-and-services projects in which people are moved to another place. 
Even without building codes and regulations regarding standards, the 
mere institution of the project disturbs land-use and home-use activities. 
Producers are moved further away from suppliers and workers. Markets, 
which had been developed through years of careful estimation of credit 
worthiness and nurturing of goodwill, are tom apart. Distribution 
networks are sundered by increased transport costs. ln other words, the 
delicate network of economic and social activities upon which the smooth 
functioning of the enterprise is based becomes dislocated by the move. 
To actually institutionalize this disruption by codes and standards that 
impose unifunctionalism in the project would be the final blow to produc-
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tive project participants. If there is one lesson for planners in the massive 
literature on sium and squatter community life, it is the finding that housing 
in these areas is not for home life alone. A house is a production place, 
marketplace, entertainment centre, financial institution, and, also, a 
retreat. A low-income community is the same, only more so. Bath the 
home and the community derive their vitality from this multiplicity of 
users. The imposition of artificial restrictions on bath, therefore, would 
only hinder their growth and development. 
Conclusions 
The wide difference between existing conditions in sium/squatter areas 
and the "minimum housing standards" sought by planners and housing 
designers is more than a reflection of the dualism that exists in most 
developing countries today. ln many ways, it is the result of differing atti-
tudes, values, and "world views" between professional engineers, architects, 
and planners and the urban poor. Although it is simplistic to label the 
former middle class and the latter lower class, they are, nevertheless, 
influenced by different environments and thus see things in different 
lights. 
Frustrations with the use of building codes and housing standards in 
basic housing projects have prompted proposais to completely abandon 
such efforts. As experience with the many projects that have been studied 
reveals, however, the answer may not be the elimination of standards 
completely but the formulation of more appropriate ones. Many problems 
have arisen because of the blind borrowing of legislative codes and profes-
sional codes of practice from technologically advanced countries. Because 
most of these codes were devised with different cultural and historical 
conditions in mind, their imposition on the conditions existing in developing 
countries naturally created problems. 
Fortunately, there are now attempts to formulate codes based on more 
information and better understanding of actual conditions in low-income 
communities. Almost three decades of experience in setting up basic 
housing programs have also generated many lessons with respect to what 
does and doesn't work. The gulf in world views between professionals and 
their low-income clients has narrowed, somewhat, to the extent that more 
realistic codes and standards are now being developed to replace the 
authoritarian or paternalistic documents of the past. 
As the formulation of better codes and standards progresses, one of the 
most difficult problems that has to be faced is how to strike a balance 
between the conditions, as they actually exist, and the ideal (hopefully 
not idealized) conditions of how things can be. Most traditional codes and 
standards insisted on how things ought to be. Perhaps, this orientation is 
what has been responsible for most of the problems. 
The categorization of low-income communities as being in the informai 
sector, and building codes and standards as a mark of the formai sector 
has, perhaps, created an unwarranted polarization in planning efforts. As 
pragmatic efforts to set up appropriate codes and standards have shown, 
the actual conditions in developing countries reflect a continuum that 
ranges from the conditions in sium/squatter areas to the situation that 
exists in the subdivisions and housing estates of the rich. A body of codes 
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and standards, therefore, should reflect the full gamut of ail of these existing 
conditions and not try to impose a universal code that applies to all 
situations. 
Almost all building code and housing standard documents at present 
reflect this philosophy of appropriateness. What has been lacking has been 
a fuller and better realization of what life really is like in low-income 
communities in developing countries. ln many ways, this better under-
standing cou Id not be attained by research and professional studies alone. 
lt had to entail the active participation of the urban poor themselves in 
the development process. As the studies supported by IDRC and the 
World Bank reveal, this participation has been taking place and basic housing 
projects are that much better because of it. 
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INCOME GENERATION 5 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
Makeshift store, Dakar, Senegal - if market outlets are not provided, the people 
will provide them. 
One reason for the failure of past sites-and-services projects has been 
the fact that they were seen mainly as housing projects. People were relo-
cated to sites on the city's periphery, thereby physically tearing them 
away from their jobs. At the same time, the jobs and income-generating 
activities promised on the new site did not materialize. Even as families 
faced higher expenses arising from the move and payments for the project, 
they were denied the means with which to meet these obligations. 
The frustrations that can be created by a sites-and-services project are 
reflected in a comment from a squatter being moved to a relocation site. 
The squatter had lived in Tondo for 15 years and was "awarded" a plot in 
Sapang Palay, 30 km away. 
1 guess 1 should be thankful that 1 now have a house and lot instead 
of being a squatter. But what good is a house and lot if 1 cannot pay for 
it? They say Sapang Palay is nice but what will 1 do there, plant camotes? 
1 am a stevedore, my work is here at the piers. 
The man interviewed was one of more than 8000 persans moved to the 
site in 1963. Before the year was out, more than 80% of the people had 
abandoned the project and filtered back to Metro Manila (Laquian 1966). 
As more and more basic housing projects are set up, the importance of 
providing employment and income-generating opportunities is being 
recognized. ln general, community-upgrading projects have had a better 
record of employment and incarne generation because they have not 
disrupted the relationship between the participant's residence and place 
of work. Sites-and-services projects, however, have had their share of 
problems. Project designers have found that it is extremely difficult to 
duplicate the market conditions that govern employment and incarne 
generation in project areas. 
A review of various basic housing projects ail over the world revealed 
that the main project components that have been used to create employ-
ment and generate incarne in communities are the following: (1) employment 
in the project itself; (2) attracting industries and manufacturing enterprises 
to the project; (3) providing credit and technical assistance to small-scale 
enterprises; and (4) skills training. 
Employment in the Project 
Project designers often assume that construction and other activities in a 
basic housing project will create jobs and improve the incarne situation 
of participants. lt is anticipated that the people would have the skills 
needed by the contractors, that the construction technologies used would 
be able to utilize these skills, and that contractors would be willing to hire 
people from the area. Aside from jobs provided by contractors, it is usually 
expected that plot allottees in the project would hire small-scale 
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contractors, artisans, and tradesmen to help them in building and 
improving their dwellings. Finally, project participants are expected to use 
mutual aid and self-help in the construction process. To the extent that 
mutual aid and self-help utilize idle labour, they can be regarded as 
providing employment and generating incarne in a project. 
The ability of basic housing projects to create employment (measured in 
person-months of actual employment) and generate incarne (valued in 
colones) is shown in an evaluation of the construction phase in three sites-
and-services projects in El Salvador. As seen in Table 2, the greatest contri-
bution to employment and incarne came from labour hired by participating 
families during the self-help phase of the project (38.6% of incarne 
generated); followed by labour hired by contractors (33.0%); mutual-aid 
labour (27.6%); and labour hired by cooperatives (0.8%). lt was estimated 
by project analysts that, on the average, the construction of one house in 
El Salvador generated C1243 (US$497) in incarne and created 6.4 person-
months of employment. For the total project goal of constructing 7000 
houses, therefore, the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda 
Minima (FSDVM) estimated that about C10.4 (US$4.16) million of incarne 
and 3700 person-months of employment would be added to the Salvadorean 
economy (Bamberger et al. 1980). 
The Salvadorean projects were successful in generating employment 
and creating incarne but in other countries many problems have been 
encountered that have detracted from the projects' ability to achieve these 
goals. The most serious of these problems have been those involving large-
and medium-scale contractors in charge of constructing infrastructures, 
core units, and other basic services in project areas. Problems have also 
Table 2. Estirnated incarne and ernployrnent generated by house construction in FSDVM projects. 
La Periquera Sensunapan El Naranjo Average 
Santa Ana Son sonate Usulutan per farnily 
Nurnber of housing units 1190 563 435 
Construction by contractors 
Person-rnonths of ernployrnent 1908 1330 420 1.7 
ln corne generated (colones) 478368 307508 112263 410 
Labour hired by farnily 
Person-rnonths of ernployrnent 2600 1200 950 2.2 
Incarne generated (colones) 571200 270240 208800 480 
Mutual help 
Person-rnonths of ernployrnent 2471 1673 1342 2.5 
Incarne generated (colones) 392267 217580 174550 343 
Construction cooperative 
Person-rnonths of ernployrnent 130 0.1 
Incarne generated (colones) 20000 9.1 
Total 
Person-rnonths of ernployrnent 7109 4203 2712 6.5 
Incarne generated (colones) 1461835 795328 495613 1242 
lnvestrnent required to generate C100 
of in corne (colones) 364 228 300 316 
lnvestrnent required to generate 
1 rnonth of ernployrnent (colones) 551 432 554 516 
Source: World Bank, 1980. Evaluation of the first El Salvador sites and services project. Urban and Regional 
Report No. 80-12, 7-20. 
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been encountered in using hired labour, mutual aid and self-help, and 
"building groups" or cooperatives. For various reasons, the amount of 
employment created and incarne generated through the use of these 
approaches have proven less than anticipated. 
Large- and Medium-Scale Contractors 
A common source of jobs in basic housing projects is the construction 
of infrastructures, basic core units, and urban services by large- or medium-
scale contractors. lt is not always certain, however, that contractors will 
hire people from the project area. The number of jobs actually generated 
will also depend upon whether labour-intensive or capital-intensive 
methods will be used. 
ln almost ail basic housing projects, contractors are encouraged, if 
not forced, to hire people from the area. If the housing agency does not 
insist on this, politicians, labour leaders, and community leaders will. 
This is certainly the case in Zambia and the Philippines. ln Jamaica, where 
political parties and labour unions are dominant in low-income areas, 
private contractors cannot hope to work on basic housing projects without 
employing local people. 
According to a ranking member of the Jamaican Master Builders' 
Association (an organization of large- and medium-scale contractors), costs 
for a regular housing project funded by the government would probably 
be as follows: building materials, 50%; labour, 30%; professional costs 
(engineering design and architecture), 5%; transportation, 4%; physical 
plant and equipment, 2%; and profits, 9%. ln a sites-and-services project 
in which only core units are provided, building materials could cost less; 
however, the cost of labour rises proportionately and inefficiency might 
raise labour costs by more than 50%. 
The most important source of inefficiency is the practice of hiring 
people from the project area. These people are not recruited by the con-
tractors directly. They are recommended by local political party chieftains 
and union leaders. Because there are always more job applicants than 
jobs, project managers have devised a way of rotating the workers in 2-week 
shifts. ln this way, each persan seeking a job is at least given a chance to 
earn something. 
Because of this system of hiring, a basic housing project in Jamaica that 
is not plagued by strikes, slowdowns, or work stoppages is rare indeed. 
Contractors complain that productivity is very low. Workers complain that 
they are not being paid enough. Because workers owe their jobs more to 
political leaders and union chieftains, they are often insubordinate. The 
fact that jobs are rotated every couple of weeks does not motivate labourers 
to work very hard. Also, the frequent rotations waste whatever training 
effect is achieved on the job because workers have to stop working just 
when they are beginning to show some competence in their work. 
Saddled with high labour costs, a number of Jamaican contractors have 
opted for heavily mechanized "building systems" that prefabricate building 
components for quick assembly on site. Housing factories are set up in 
which building panels made of prestressed concrete, timber, or aluminum 
are manufactured. When needed, the components are transported to the 
site, using heavy equipment. Equally expensive equipment is used to lift 
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the panels into place. Ali of these processes minimize the need for labour, 
with the bulk of costs going toward materials, equipment, and manage-
ment (including highly trained technicians). Systems building, expensive as 
it is, salves the problems of large contractors but it does not help unskilled 
labourers much. ln fact, because the panels used are often used as is, with 
no need for finishing and rendering, systems building also does away with 
the need for tradesmen and artisans. 
ln most developing countries, the construction industry is not used to 
the innovative approaches required by basic housing projects. lt is highly 
profit motivated, which prompts contractors to reduce the price of inputs 
to the fullest extent possible. This means that creation of jobs and genera-
tion of incarne in a community are secondary items in a contractor's 
calculations. 
Contractors are also product oriented, i.e., they see their outputs in 
terms of finished units. Progressive development, as already mentioned, is 
process oriented, i.e., interested more in the manner through which shelter 
and services are provided. The final product evolves, and it might take a 
long time to take shape. These differences in point of view are frequent 
sources of conflicts between contractors and project management. To the 
extent that contractors choose production technologies and construction 
techniques to maximize profits and products, they usually adversely affect 
the employment- and income-generating aspects of projects. 
Small Contractors and Hired Workers 
Basic housing projects have created more employment and generated 
higher incarnes more successfully through the use of small contractors and 
hired workers during the house consolidation phase of projects. lt has 
already been noted that in El Salvador the use of hired labour accounted 
for the most important economic outputs among various approaches, 
generating incarne of about C480/family on the average and about 2.2 
person-months of employment. ln Zambia, a study of three community 
projects found that they created about 8010 person-months of employment 
for small contractors and hired labour alone. The total household expen-
ditures for hired labour amounted to K888 421, nota surprising sum when 
it was revealed that from 85-92% of the households in the project relied 
on hired labour for construction and house improvement. 
ln general, small contractors and hired workers did not play a big raie 
in the construction of infrastructures and core housing units. They had 
neither the capital nor managerial abilities to bid for such projects. Their 
most important contributions were during the housing improvement and 
consolidation stages. Here, they were hired by families directly, either on 
a full-time or part-time basis. 
ln relation to mutual aid and self-help, there are a number of reasons 
why small contractors and hired labour were employed. First, allottees 
might not have the skills needed for house construction. Second, family 
members might be employed elsewhere and it would be more advan-
tageous for them to continue at their work rather than build their own 
homes. Third, higher status and prestige was accorded to houses built by 
skilled persans and very few homeowners were skilled. Fourth, building 
materials used in projects often required ski lis and abilities that homeowners 
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did not have. Finally, project managers often wanted houses to be finished 
as soon as possible, which left little time for self-help and encouraged the 
use of hired labour. 
ln the Dandora project in Kenya, three different methods of construction 
were used: families using self-help, building groups or families who band 
together and pool their resources to build houses, and small contractors. A 
1978 study found that families using self-help used the greatest number of 
workers per plot, about 8.9 workers on the average. Despite the self-help 
nature of the work, about 76% of the workers were actually paid labourers, 
earning from Sh180-210/month. 
Building groups usually employed six workers per plot, 60% of them 
paid labourers. Small contractors used 7.5 labourers per plot and paid 
95% of them regular wages. The remaining 5% were usually homeowners 
who supervised the work or assisted in the construction. An interesting 
finding in the Dandora study was the fact that for ail the houses actually 
finished, small contractors working with materials furnished by plot 
owners managed to do the job in the cheapest and most efficient manner. 
They averaged Sh3539/room or Sh354/m 2• A large portion of the lower 
construction costs was due to the fact that they could finish the units 
more quickly. Homeowners were also given the benefit of better 
workmanship (MEDIS 3, 1978). 
Despite the willingness of small contractors and hired workers to work 
in housing projects, housing authorities have been somewhat ambivalent 
about their use. One reason for this is the strong commitment to mutual 
aid and self-help. Somehow, one can detect a feeling on the part of project 
managers that something is wrong when families who are supposed to 
work on their houses hire others to do the work for them. lt matters little 
that opportunity cost, lack of skills, and a desire to finish the dwelling as 
soon as possible make hiring a small contractor and skilled workers the 
most rational option for the homeowner. 
The ideal of self-help, after ail, does not mean that a plot allottee must 
actually build a house manually. The important aspect of "freedom to 
build" is that one contrais the design, choice of materials, construction 
techniques, and costs of the whole building process. The use of small con-
tractors, artisans, and tradesmen makes this possible. Homeowners, in fact, 
to the fullest extent that they are able, can actually work side by side with 
the hired workers. They are free to hire workers for only parts of the job. 
They can elect to pay workers by the day or by what has to be accomplished. 
ln view of the proven contributions of small contractors and hired 
workers in generating employment, creating incarne, and generally getting 
the job done with some degree of economy and efficiency, it is the duty of 
project designers to plan conditions in such a way that the raie of hired 
labour in construction is not artificially barred by regulations and pro-
cedures. For example, the choice of building materials could determine 
whether or not the raie of hired workers would be enhanced. ln Kenya, 
original project plans favoured the use of hollow cernent blacks. However, 
small contractors and hired workers proved that using stone purchased 
from a nearby quarry could result in less expensive and better looking 
houses. Aside from economy and efficiency, stone houses had a special 
character not achievable among look-alike concrete black houses. The use 
of stone, furthermore, generated considerable employment in the area. 
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About 49% of the skilled workers surveyed in the project were masons. ln 
fact, about 8% of plot allocatees turned out to be skilled in stone work 
as well, and found gainful employment in the community when not working 
on their own homes. 
Another example of project intervention that has created negative effects 
has been the strict requirement of mutual-aid participation in the Salvadorean 
projects. As previously mentioned, this resulted in about one-third of the 
participants withdrawing from the projects before the mutual-aid phase 
was completed. Although some low-income families were included 
among these dropouts, it was found that incarne was not really the main 
factor. Many of the families had enough incarne to hire skilled workers 
to take their place in mutual aid work. Sorne families, su ch as those headed 
by women, did not have the skills, time, or inclination to do mutual-aid 
work. However, all families needed housing and were willing to pay for 
this, and there were skilled people willing to do the work for them. What 
got in the way was a project-management requirement based on a philosophy 
of housing provision that saw housing as a means to achieve other goals. 
Attracting Industries and Manufacturing Firms 
To help create employment opportunities and generate incarne in basic 
housing projects, housing authorities designated specific sites where 
industrialists and manufacturers cou Id set up enterprises. Use of these sites 
was based on the understanding that entrepreneurs would give people 
from the area first chance at any jobs created. Sorne projects offer incentives 
such as free land, a moratorium on taxes, low rents, or adequate services. 
Others, however, assume that investment opportunities in the area are 
good enough to attract entrepreneurs. There are even projects in which 
industrial and commercial sites are sold at fair market values, the intention 
being that profits from this project component can be used to cross-
subsidize other parts of the project. 
Examples of programs to attract industries and manufacturing firms can 
be found in the Tondo and Lusaka projects. ln Tondo, about 9.2 ha in the 
project was designed as industrial estate. A number of large buildings were 
constructed and offered to industrialists and manufacturers at conces-
sional rates. lt was estimated in the project design that the industrial 
estate would create some 800 full-time jobs. ln Lusaka, about 100 plots within 
the project were earmarked as business and industrial sites. These were 
relatively large plots, ranging in size from 250-875 m2• No additional incen-
tives were offered with the plots. 1 n fact, because entrepreneurs had to 
provide basic services themselves, they were actually offered more 
onerous conditions than families with residential plots. 
To date, experiences with industrial estates and investment sites have 
not given encouraging results. Entrepreneurs have not exactly been lining 
up for the plots and industrial estate components have typically lagged 
behind in relation to housing and other elements in the projects. Sorne 
of the difficulties encountered have been due to project design. Most 
were due to implementation difficulties, such as those involving delivery 
of basic urban services. Other difficulties could be traced to problems in 
the project communities themselves. 
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Design Problems 
A frequent problem with industrial estates and manufacturing sites is 
location. Many sites-and-services projects are in peripheral urban areas 
where transportation is difficult. The same problems that beset residents 
afflict investors as well, only more so. If their costs for transporting raw 
materials and finished products to and from the site are tao high, they will 
not locate in the project despite subsidies and incentives. 
There have been cases where the inclusion of industrial estates and 
manufacturing sites has been guided more by good intentions to help 
the people than on accu rate information about the economic viability of the 
enterprises. A common problem is a lack of data on the educational and 
skill levels of project participants. The main benefit from the community 
is supposedly a rich and reliable source of cheap labour, but project 
authorities rarely have reliable information on this. The problem is that 
unemployment in cities is usually very high and an investor knows that 
people will go to the firm - the factory need not go to the people. Project 
designers, therefore, have to make it worthwhile for the entrepreneur to 
choose the project site through concessions, subsidies, and other incentives. 
Another design problem is a lack of adequate information on what types 
of enterprises would be suitable for a basic housing project site. Because 
of their professional and middle-class orientation, project designers 
might have a strong preference for factories that are labour intensive, 
clean and nonpolluting, and follow regular office hours. Such enterprises, 
however, do not have any clear advantage for locating in low-income 
project sites because such locations would probably not provide the highly 
skilled people needed to sustain operations. 
Other project designers have assumed that the rural backgrounds of 
former squatters and sium dwellers would make them good workers in 
cottage industries, crafts, and traditional vocations. Entrepreneurs who 
followed the proposais of these designers found to their chagrin that such 
skills were notas abundant as expected. Even when production problems 
had been solved through training and technical assistance, other problems 
related to marketing, distribution, quality contrai, and financing cropped 
up. Unfortunately, such problems are tao complex to be adequately solved 
by project managers, who are usually architects or engineers. 
lmplementation Problems 
One of the most serious problems in attracting industries and manufac-
turing firms to basic housing sites is the difficulty involved in providing 
them with adequate services. One critical issue is good transportation 
between the project site and market centres. Earlier sites-and-services 
projects tended to be isolated from cities because no provisions were 
made in the World Bank loans for roads that would link the projects with 
the metropolitan transport network. Most loans now include off-site 
infrastructures that allow planners to place basic housing projects within a 
metro-wide context. 
Another common implementation problem arises from the fact that 
basic services to the project are managed by other government agencies. 
The actual delivery of services, therefore, is not within the contrai of the 
project managers, so it might be delayed or not corne at all. If it cornes, it 
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might not be in amounts sufficient to meet demand within the project. 
This is one of the main reasons for the lack of progress in the industrial 
estates program in the Tondo project. Despite the fact that the industrial 
zone was finished in 1977, the metropolitan waterworks and sewerage 
system had not been able to provide water to the site at the time of writing 
(1982). Thus, manufacturers needing water for production have not been 
able to start operations. The lack of water also makes the sanitation system 
inoperational, greatly limiting the number of people who can work on the 
site. 
Similar failures to provide services are responsible for slow building on 
the business and industrial sites in the Chawama and George projects in 
Lusaka. According to project reports, about 294 applicants had expressed 
interest in the 100 plots allotted to this project component. Of these, 
however, only 81 applications had been approved and only 10 businesses 
had been completed and were operational. About 13 plots were still under 
construction and the rest were completely undeveloped. 
An investigation into the reasons behind the slow pace of construction 
revealed that plot allottees were finding it difficult to pay for the basic 
services they needed to make their enterprises work. Unlike owners of 
residential plots, those who received business and industrial plots were not 
entitled to water or electrical connections. Also, they were prohibited 
from obtaining building materials loans. Project authorities had assumed 
that those people interested in the business plots would have had more 
resources. ln fact, higher standards of construction were imposed on 
business plot structures. Apparently, the expectations have not been met. 
Community Problems 
From the point of view of the average entrepreneur, there may be very 
few advantages to locating in a basic housing project. Experience has 
shown, however, that some project managers do not seem to appreciate 
this when attempting to influence enterprises to move to project sites. 
Thus, they fail to anticipate the misgivings of investors and are notable to 
provide good conditions. 
A common deterrent to entrepreneurs is the widespread impression 
that basic housing projects are "trouble areas." Most entrepreneurs 
assume that crime rates, juvenile delinquency, and theft would be prevalent 
in such areas. Such entrepreneurs would be investing heavily in buildings, 
equipment, and supplies. The real or imagined troubles in the area are a 
cause of worry. Good security measures, such as high fences, security 
guards, and watchdogs, can be instituted but they cost money, which 
reduces the firm's profitability. 
For high-technology firms, locating in a basic housing project would not 
provide any advantages because most of the people there would be 
unskilled. Heavy investments in training are expensive and there are no 
assurances that, after being trained, people from the project would not 
seek employment elsewhere. 
For manufacturers of consumer products, basic housing projects do not 
offer any real advantages. Incarnes in such areas are generally low, so only 
a limited market can be expected. 
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When investors are from outside the community (as they would most 
likely be), they may not be welcomed by the residents. Studies have shown 
that project participants generally show some distrust of "outsiders." This 
is partly due to their knowledge that people from outside the community 
are usually eager to obtain plots within the project. They may also be 
aware that people with strong political backing, relatives of those in power, 
and other "influentials" are after plots as well. There are even some enter-
prising individuals who offer to buy plots in the project, despite the 
fact that this is illegal. Ali of these factors can make project residents 
antagonistic toward outsiders who are given the chance to invest in the 
project. ln the Zambian projects, this was a notable reason for the relatively 
slow progress in the business plot scheme. 
One characteristic that might discourage investors is the fact that life in 
low-income communities is usually highly politicized. Entrepreneurs 
might fear that, if they set up a business there, they would be under 
constant pressure to hire political partisans, relatives, and friends of 
powerful politicians. They might be forced to overstaff to accommodate 
these pressures. Like contractors in Jamaica, they might have to rotate 
workers in shifts to spread the jobs around. Ali of these problems, of 
course, would have serious cost implications that may adversely affect the 
viability of the firm. 
Although some of these community problems have been encountered 
in some projects, careful planning and a good community-relations program 
usually overcome them. ln a community-upgrading projed in the Philippines, 
for example, a community-relations program was able to establish excellent 
working relationships with the low-income community by simply explaining 
that the capacity of the factory to create and provide employment for 
community residents would depend heavily upon the cooperation of the 
people. Because many people from the community were employed in the 
firm, they influenced others to refrain from vandalism, theft, and other 
negative activities against the firm. ln turn, the firm returned the commu-
nity's goodwill by donating a community centre, sponsoring a basketball 
tournament, allowing people to get clean water from its faucets, and 
contributing toward the expenses incurred by the community to celebrate 
the an nuai fiesta. Mainly, however, it was the fact that the firm provided 
jobs to residents that made them most protective of its interests. 
Credit and Technical Assistance 
A v1s1t to any sium or squatter area usually reveals the existence of 
many small enterprises that people engage in to earn a living. The late 
Charles Abrams loved to refer to the many signs that he read while strolling 
around low-income settlements - signs that advertised stores, persona! 
services, small factories, cooperatives, professions, etc. The signs were 
testimonials to the economic vitality existing in such areas and Abrams 
believed that employment- and income-generating programs could build 
upon such dynamism (Abrams 1964). 
A 1978 survey in Tondo revealed that 20% of ail structures were devoted 
to some form of commercial, manufacturing, craft, or service activity. A 
sample study of 203 establishments found that 24.1% were engaged in 
some form of manufacturing or processing; 12.8% were trading firms; 
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28.0% were services and professional establishments; and 35.1% were small 
retail establishments called sari-sari stores. Sari-sari stores were a 
ubiquitous fixture in all low-income communities. They sel! a great variety 
of foods, dry goods, rice, cigarettes, and other basic necessities. Most 
of them extend credit to customers, allowing trusted clients to tally pur-
chases in an informai "list." Amazingly, because of community traditions 
(and strong peer group pressures) sari-sari stores thrive and loan recovery 
among them has an excellent record. 
One concern of housing authorities is that community-upgrading or 
sites-and-services projects might disrupt economic enterprises. A study in 
the Dandora sites-and-services project in Nairobi showed that there is no 
strong basis for this concern. The study revealed some 171 enterprises 
active in the community. Of these, 77.8% were engaged in selling items 
such as food (57.9%); other necessities (11.1%); illegal home-brewed beer 
and other intoxicants (7.0%), and building materials (1.8%). About 7.6% 
offered services such as tailoring, laundry facilities, shoe repairing, etc., 
and 11.7% were engaged in "other business activities." About 2.9% were 
workshops where useful items were manufactured for sale. lt was estimated 
that economic enterprises in Dandora had a weekly turnover of around 
Sh140 000 (MEDIS 7, 1979). 
The results of the 1978 Dandora survey were compared with a 1974 survey 
of Mathare Valley, a sium/squatter area that still exists in Nairobi. The 
pattern of small-scale enterprises in the two communities was remarkably 
similar, especially the predominance of trade. Although the community of 
Dandora is more "regularized" in that it is a Nairobi City Council 
project, the extent of illegal economic activities is more or less the sa me as 
in Mathare Valley. If project rules and regulations in Dandora had been 
observed, in fact, only 1.8% of the enterprises (those selling building 
materials) would be deemed legal. However, the only illegal activity actually 
controlled by the police is the brewing and selling of beer and other intox-
icants. There are more people in Mathare Valley engaged in this activity, 
where it is combined with the running of bars and the renting of bed space 
for prostitution. Considering the situation in Dandora, the 7.0% of enter-
prises dealing in the brewing and selling of illegal liquor is remarkably 
high. 
Small Business Loans 
To help project participants increase their incarne, some basic housing 
projects have a small business loans program that extends credit and 
technical assistance to entrepreneurs. ln the Tondo project, a small 
businessman might borrow up to P3500 to increase capital or expand oper-
ations. Small business loans were also a feature of the projects in El 
Salvador, Kenya, and Zambia. 
Evaluations of small business loans programs in almost all projects 
have revealed that they were beset with many problems. The most serious 
of these are administrative. Housing agencies have found it expensive and 
difficult to manage small business loans. Asking a financial institution, 
su ch as a bank, to manage the program (as the National Housing Authority 
did in the Philippines) only served to reduce the efforts of entrepreneurs. 
The biggest problem is the imposition of formai banking procedures in 
the processing of a loan. A small businessman who wants to borrow money 
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for business purposes must first apply to the Development Bank of the 
Philippines. There, the businessman is handed a long application form that 
demands ail sorts of details about capital funds, operating expenses, equip-
ment and supplies, persona! assets, etc. The businessman is also asked to 
make a profitability analysis of the enterprise and is required to secure the 
loan with persona! assets or guarantees from people who have to act as 
cosigners of the loan. If given a loan, the businessman must keep official 
books on ail operations and must also agree to a regular audit, as well as 
periodic surprise checks, on the operations of the enterprise. Before being 
given a loan, the borrower needs to go to City Hall and obtain an official 
business licence. The recipient must also get police clearance and security 
clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation. Ali of this for a loan 
of less than US$500! 
With ail these administrative requirements, it cornes as no surprise that 5 
years after it was incorporated into the Tondo projed loan, the small business 
loans program had only been able to reach 62 businesses, for a total loan of 
US$36 000. Part of the problem was a lack of information about the 
program. A survey of small businesses found that less than half of the 
entrepreneurs interviewed had heard of the program. Among those who 
knew something about the program, many said they never bothered to 
take advantage of it because they learned that the bank asked tao many 
questions. Sorne cynically observed that one needed "political pull" to 
qualify for the loans. 
The Philippine experience with small business loans is not unique. The 
fact is that the record for small business loans in basic housing projects has 
not been tao successful worldwide. 1 n almost ail cases, administration of 
the program has proven to be the most difficult problem. Housing agency 
personnel do not know how to handle such programs and banking personnel 
do not seem to have much better success. 
These administrative difficulties bring to mind the experience of the 
National Development Foundation of Nicaragua in setting up a small loans 
program for market vendors. lnstead of asking a banker to organize the 
program, the foundation asked a former usurer to undertake the task. First, 
the program organizer set up a modest office in the market. He made it 
known that vendors needing capital funds could borrow from him provided 
that they paid the loan back, plus a small amount of interest, within 24 
hours. There were no loan applications to complete - just a simple 
promissory note stating the amount of the loan and when the repayment 
was due. The program organizer, of course, knew most of the market 
vendors and relied on a network of informants for information on good 
and bad risks. However, the loans were made on the basis of trust - the 
borrowers were not required to secure the loan. 
After a year of operation, this small business loans program was so 
successful that it could hire a full-time manager and a couple of clerks 
to run it. Analysis revealed that the main elements in its success were: 
giving loans on the basis of trust and persona! knowledge about borrowers 
rather than on collateral and "sureties," which only symbolized distrust; 
making loan repayment periods as short as possible but making these 
coincide with natural "breaks" in the vending process; keeping the 
amounts small but the money turnover rates high; managing the business 
right in the place where the clients worked rather than in a distant insti-
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tution; and establishing certain simple routine procedures for borrowing 
and lending, thus avoiding the formalization and institutionalization of 
the lending and borrowing process. 
This Nicaraguan venture seemed to point to a number of factors that 
differentiate formai credit arrangements and small business loans. ln view 
of the difficulties encountered in the small business loans programs in 
basic housing projects, the lessons learned might be worth introducing in 
other countries as well. 
Cooperatives 
1 n accordance with the social orientation of the Salvadorean Fou ndation 
for Development and Minimal Housing, assistance to small enterprises in 
its basic housing projects did not involve direct loans but assistance in 
setting up seven cooperatives. These included savings and loans co-ops 
as well as consumer, agricultural, and construction co-ops. The co-ops 
were off to a promising start in 1975 with 637 members, but membership 
declined to 629 in 1977. Capitalization in co-ops increased slightly from 
US$11 400-15 314 during the 3 years. 
As a rule, the performance of the FSDVM-supported co-ops was notas 
good as expected. An agricultural production co-op found it difficult to 
find arable land near the project site and ended up renting and developing 
marginal land on very steep slopes some distance from where the members 
lived. This venture incurred serious losses. A bakery co-op found that the 
project site only provided a limited market for its products and failed to 
expand. A construction co-op managed to carry out specific jobs for the 
FSDVM but its performance did not really compare with the work of small 
contractors in terms of costs and the quality of its jobs. The savings and 
loans co-op suffered high rates of arrears and defaults. 
The most successful co-op was a production venture that turned out 
handwoven rugs, embroidered clothes, and other handicrafts. lt employed 
50 women and 2 men full time. These workers increased their incarnes by 
70% in 3 years. The main problem, however, was that the co-op was heavily 
dependent upon FSDVM for purchasing raw materials, designing the 
products, marketing the finished products, and managing the finances. 
Although the administrative and technical assistance given by FSDVM to the 
co-op were not included in its cost (and they were substantial), a true 
evaluation of this production co-op revealed that it would not have been 
viable by itself. 
To summarize, credit and technical assistance components in basic 
housing projects, be they small business loans or cooperatives, have not 
proven too successful in creating employment and generating incarne. 
Evaluation of such programs points to problems of administration and 
management as the most important reasons for failure. Unfortunately, 
increased understanding of such problems has not suggested ways and 
means of solving them. What the evaluations do suggest is that housing 
authorities often underestimate the complexity of such programs and 
attempt to substitute formai business solutions (as in the Philippines) or 
social reform experimentation (as in El Salvador) for appropriate management 
approaches. 
To date, credit and technical assistance programs constitute rather minor 
elements in the total basic housing approach. Despite this, however, they 
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have used up valuable management resources in generally busy housing 
agencies. ln the Philippines, more recent World Bank loans have proposed 
that credit and technical assistance programs should be decentralized to 
other units with better knowledge about credit management and finance, 
such as the Technology Resource Center or the lnstitute for Small-Scale 
Industries. There are even efforts to delegate the running of these programs 
to private groups who generally have more flexibility and are less bureau-
cratie than government institutions. lt is tao early to tell if these efforts 
will be successful. One hopes that they will be because incarne generation 
and the creation of jobs are important elements in a basic housing 
program. 
Skills Training 
To help project participants find jobs within or outside the community, 
housing authorities have included skills-training programs in basic housing 
schemes. Skills training might involve instruction in construction so that 
people can obtain employment in the project itself or use skills learned in 
mutual-aid and self-help work. One is reminded of the "construction 
brigades" trained in Cuba that, unfortunately, had such a dismal record in 
Jamaica due to political factors that had nothing to do with the nature of 
the training program itself. There were also many training programs in 
"aided self-help" launched by the US Agency for International Develop-
ment through their housing advisors. Typical of such programs was the 
"training in aided self-help housing" program conducted at the African 
Development Area Center in Zambia, which attempted to "adapt traditional 
and modern means of construction for effective use of unskilled labour." 
The program used various techniques such as lectures, movies and slide 
shows, field exercises in areal planning, and actual work on demonstration 
houses. A great number of publications were issued as a result of these 
programs but systematic evaluations of their results and impact are very 
difficult to obtain (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
ldeas and Methods Exchange Publications). 
A common complaint about skills-training programs is that they tend to 
be tao academic, being based on lectures and multimedia presentations 
rather than on-the-job training and practice. This arises from the fact that 
they are conducted by professional trainers, who are more at ease in class-
rooms than on the construction site and more used to wielding microphones 
than hammers, saws, and chisels. A great deal of attention is given to con-
cepts and ideas, and not enough to the development of manual dexterity 
and physical skills. The typical graduate of a skills-training program can 
tell you how the combustion engine works but will find great difficulty in 
actually changing a spark plug. 
Another problem with skills-training programs is that they are usually 
geared to jobs in the formai sector. This is especially true of training 
programs for employment outside the community. Early skills-training 
programs introduced by government agencies in Tondo, for example, 
concentrated on stenography and typewriting courses for women and 
carpentry and automotive mechanics courses for men. The limited 
education of most participants, organized and formalistic nature of the 
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courses, failure to formulate an effective placement program, and overly 
high expectations of the success of the courses combined to make them 
frustrating experiences for the participants rather than productive 
ventures. 
More and more, basic housing authorities are realizing that employment 
for project participants is more likely to be found in the informai sector 
than the formai sector, and that training programs should be geared to this. 
ln the Tondo project, for example, skills-training programs have been 
conducted in such areas as beauty care (manicure and pedicure, cos-
metology, hair styling, therapeutic massage), vending (simple accounting, 
how to estimate profit and loss), dress making, etc. For men, such service 
jobs as being a waiter, jeepney driver, barber, or bus conductor have been 
found to be more productive. 
With skilled Filipino technicians being in great demand for jobs in the 
Middle East, technical training in such fields as welding, sheet-metal work, 
becoming an electrician, automotive mechanics, and handling heavy 
equipment have become popular. One of the earliest skills-training pro-
grams in Tondo was the technical program offered by the Don Bosco 
School for Boys that was set up in the area in 1963. Many Don Bosco 
graduates are now gainfully employed in firms bath in the Philippines and 
abroad, and they are an important source of gifts and transfer payments to 
families in the community. 
ln other countries, important gains have been made in on-the-job 
training and apprenticeship programs because of the realization that 
formai and organized classroom-type training programs are just as effective. 
ln Zambia, groups of technicians hired by the Housing Project Unit train 
and supervise construction workers and render technical assistance in the 
process. ln El Salvador, the technical group that supports the mutual-aid 
groups performs training and supervisory tasks. These approaches are 
based on the premise that the best way of learning technical skills is by 
actually exercising those skills. 
An important adjunct to skills training is assistance in the placement of 
graduates. ln the basic housing programs evaluated, housing authorities 
have hired trained individuals for construction projects managed by the 
agencies themselves. Contractors have been encouraged to hire graduates 
as well. ln addition, project managers have contacted firms around the 
project community to help them place their graduates. ln some countries, 
a number of firms have been willing to hire apprentices recommended 
by the housing authorities, absorbing the workers as they became skilled. 
ln a number of instances, firms have even been willing to pay the placement 
unit for their assistance and such fees have been used to improve the 
training and placement programs of the agencies. 
Skills-training and placement programs can add to a project's admin-
istration costs, of course. One can argue, however, that such administrative 
costs would have to be paid by the agency anyway, and it is best that they 
are devoted to productive activities. To the extent that the trained 
individuals find jobs, they add to the family's capacity to pay for housing 
costs and they assure returns to investment on the part of the housing 
agency. The rewards from skills training and placement may not be direct 
but they eventually enhance the family's welfare and improve the project's 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
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Conclusions 
Programs to create employment opportunities and generate incarne in 
basic housing projects are not, strictly speaking, traditional elements of a 
housing program. They have been instituted, however, because project 
designers have realized that the problem of housing the urban poor does 
not involve housing alone - often, housing is a function of people's 
poverty and if such poverty can be alleviated, housing would probably 
improve. 
To date, the success of programs intended to enhance employment and 
incarne has not been overwhelming. Part of the difficulty may be traced to 
the lack of experience and knowledge on the part of housing authorities in 
the management of such programs. As shown in the evaluations, programs 
have tended to be formalized, overorganized, academic, bureaucratie, 
and irrelevant to the actual conditions existing in low-income communities. 
Because of the difficulties with such programs, there have been proposais 
for taking them out of basic housing packages. There have been theoretical 
studies that have suggested that basic housing is quite independent of 
poverty, that substantial and comfortable housing can be found in sium/ 
squatter areas, and that families with high incarnes in sium/squatter areas 
do not necessarily see housing as the most important item for investment. 
A housing program, therefore, need not be seen as an effort to alleviate 
poverty. Programs to alleviate poverty, in turn, may not necessarily affect 
housing quality. 
lt is all very good to clarify these theoretical distinctions but in the sium 
and squatter areas themselves the close relationships between employment, 
incarne, and housing quality are directly observable. Cast recovery is one 
of the most important indicators of project success and it depends heavily 
on whether or not people have jobs and incarne. 
Whether programs for job creation and incarne enhancement should be 
handled by the housing agency or by other institutions is a separate issue. 
As already mentioned, there is a tendency in recent World Bank loans to 
allocate the responsibility for these programs to other agencies. What is 
important is that the loans themselves have program elements for helping 
to create jobs and generate incarne. If there is any lesson that the literature 
on siums and squatters has driven home, it is that housing is only part of 
the total socioeconomic package that makes up the totality of life in low-
income areas. To isolate housing and interprete shelter and services programs 
only in terms of housing construction would be rolling back the dock. ln 
a world where the numbers of urban poor are growing rapidly, this is a 
move that society cannot afford. 
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COST RECOVERY 6 
Access to Tondo, Philippines, was difficult before the road network was upgraded. 
Housing projects evaluated in this study showed wide discrepancies in 
cost recovery records. Zambia and Senegal had high rates of arrears and 
defaults. On the other hand, El Salvador had only 2.3% of its total loan 
portfolio in arrears as of July 1980. With respect to payments in arrears, 
only 22.4% were behind in payments for 90 days or more. 
The evaluations suggest that cost recovery is closely related to a number 
of factors, among the most important of which are: (1) levels and rates of 
repayment, (2) types of participants selected for the project, (3) collection 
machinery and procedures, and (4) raie played by the community in cost 
recovery. There are, of course, other factors that enhance or impede cost 
recovery. A frequently mentioned factor, for example, is the lack of 
"political will" on the part of housing authorities to collect project repay-
ments. One criterion in identifying the factors mentioned above, however, 
is the extent to which they are amenable to "tinkering" by project authorities 
(i.e., that they can be regulated and managed to achieve better results). 
Factors such as political will, which leave little to be done beyond exhorta-
tion to do better, are not considered in detail here because they are more 
in the province of politics than administration and management. 
Levels and Rates of Repayment 
A crucial factor affecting cost recovery is the determination of how 
much of project costs should actually be recovered. This translates into the 
terms of the loan. Most World Bank loans for basic housing in the mid-
1970s were issued at interest rates of 7-8% per year for periods of 20-25 
years. These loans were made "softer" by the inclusion of grants, usually 
for training and technical assistance, which were nonrecoverable. A 
common practice, also, was to mix more concessional International Devel-
opment Association (IDA) funds with International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (1 BRD) funds. 
Housing agencies in developing countries usually reloaned World Bank 
funds at interest rates of 12% or more over 15-20 years. The higher interest 
rates and shorter period for repayments were justified by the administrative 
costs, security against inflation, and a desire not to disrupt existing lending 
practices that were usually less soft than basic housing loans. Developing 
country economists treated World Bank funds as "expensive money'' 
because it had to be repaid in hard currency over a long period of time. 
They usually favoured repayment terms that reduced the element of 
subsidy in such loans. 
No matter how one figures out interest rates and periods of repayment, 
the main policy issue to be confronted in basic housing projects is whether 
there should be full recovery of ail project costs or whether ail or a 
portion of such costs should be subsidized. lt has been argued that because 
of the urgent nature of the housing need, the low capacity to pay of the 
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urban poor, the inability of ex1sting credit structures to respond to the 
needs of the poor, and the fact that basic housing generates benefits that 
go beyond housing there is sufficient justification for subsidies. However, 
even if these arguments are accepted (and there are sti!I those who 
adamantly refuse to accept them), there are still a number of ways by 
which project designers can determine whether subsidies cou Id be woven 
into the project or not. 
Based on country experiences so far, subsidies in basic housing may be 
influenced by such factors as: (1) mixing of local with foreign funds; (2) 
valuation of land; (3) treatment of infrastructure costs; and (4) administrative 
costs. 
Mixing of Funds 
The "expensive" nature of international loans can be softened considerably 
by the choice of what local funds can be mixed with it. Ali loans require 
"counterpart funds," which may corne from proceeds from taxation, 
capital funds, or special funds and reserves. Because the types of local 
funds also have varying "costs," the choice of whether basic housing 
programs should be subsidized or not (and, if subsidized, to what extent) 
can be determined by which funds are mixed with foreign loans. 
ln developing countries with functioning financial systems, there are 
usually special funds such as government insurance systems, pension 
funds, social security funds, or trust funds. Because repayment to benefi-
ciaries of these funds is usually deferred, the funds are excellent sources 
of relatively "inexpensive" matching funds for foreign loans. ln Jamaica, 
for example, all government and private sector employees have to contribute 
5% of their salaries to a National Housing Trust (NHT), with the employer 
putting in 3% and the employee the other 2% of the amount. These contri-
butions are to be paid back to the employees after 5 years, but in the mean-
time they could be used for basic housing. lt was proposed in 1982 that if 
the NHT funds were mixed with foreign loans they would go a lot further 
and subsidies would be much lower than if proceeds from taxation or capital 
funds were used. 
Value of Land 
The cost of a basic housing project can be increased or decreased by a 
policy decision on whether land costs should be included or not. This is 
heavily influenced by the government's philosophy on the matter. ln 
Zambia, the cost of land is not considered, only development costs. ln El 
Salvador, where the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda 
Minima (FSDVM) had to purchase project land at the fair market value, the 
cost of the land was added to the total project costs. Tondo, in the 
Philippines, because of its special history, charged project participants only 
a fraction of the real value of the land. ln subsequent community-upgrading 
projects, however, the full value of the land was included in the recoverable 
cost. 
Infrastructure Costs 
Because expenses for constructing infrastructures make up the bulk of 
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Drainage canal prior Io the implementation of the Kampung lmprovement Program, 
Jakarta, lndonesia. 
project costs, the usual policy is to include them in recoverable develop-
ment expenses. However, there are a number of factors that should be 
considered, factors that may determine whether subsidies are justified or 
not. 
As previously mentioned, most recent projects now include off-site 
infrastructures such as roads to connect the project to metropolitan road 
networks, water or sewer pipes, and drainage canais and trunks. These 
infrastructures are not used by project participants alone but are accessible 
to ail residents. To charge the full costs of such infrastructures, therefore, 
would be unfair. lt would be tantamount to a reverse subsidy, where those 
less able would be helping those with better means. 
Similar arguments can be used for expensive waterborne sanitation and 
drainage systems used in basic housing projects. If the projects are designed 
for the low-income clients alone, sanitation services such as pit latrines or 
cesspools might be deemed sufficient. However, because the projects 
have to be considered in the context of the larger society, higher levels 
of sanitation standards are used. Again, to charge full development costs 
for systems of this type would be unfair to project participants. 
Management Costs 
lt takes a sizable bureaucracy to run a basic housing project and one 
question worth raising is the extent to which the costs of running such 
a bureaucracy should be charged to development costs. ln most developing 
countries, government bureaucracies are paid from tax proceeds. 
However, many basic housing projects are often treated as "special 
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lmproved drainage canal in Kampung lmprovement Program site, Jakarta, lndonesia. 
projects" requiring the organization of a separate administrative arm (e.g., 
the Housing Project Unit of the Lusaka City Council, the Tondo Foreshore 
and Dagat-Dagatan Development Authority of the National Housing 
Authority). ln El Salvador, because FSDVM was a private foundation and 
the basic housing program was its most important activity, administrative 
costs were included in development costs. Because including administrative 
and management costs in recoverable expenses raises the amounts to be 
repaid by clients, it has been argued that they should be subsidized by 
public authorities. After ail, this is the normal procedure for most bureau-
cratically run government programs. 
Fixing Levels and Rates 
The policy issues raised above can influence the extent to which the 
government would be willing to subsidize basic housing programs. If 
subsidies are decided upon, they would probably be included in capital 
subsidies, i.e., how much of the actual development costs would be 
recovered. Aside from this type of subsidy, however, project designers 
can also formulate ways and means of including interest subsidies in 
projects. This may be done by manipulating the interest rates applied, time 
period of repayment, and whether down payments would be charged or 
not. 
One way of subsidizing project participants who need assistance to 
make the project accessible to them is to apply variable interest rates to 
different incarne groups. This option was used in Jamaica, for example 
(Table 3), where families able to afford only )$3500 for a basic housing 
package are charged 4% over 30 years and those who can afford a )$30 000 
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Table 3. Variable levels and rates of repayment (]$) (1982). 
Amou nt Amou nt 
Dawn lnterest Monthly of interest of capital Monthly 
Housing option Cast payment rate ('X.)a payment subsidy" su bsidy0 payment0 
Type A: site only, 
with minimal 
services 3500 4 16.71 5042 1155 20.58 
Type B: site 
fully serviced 6000 5 32.21 7360 2000 35.10 
Type C: site fully 
serviced, with 200 
feet 2 (18.58 m 2) 16000 1600 6 86.34 14410 5334 93.60 
Type D: site fully 
serviced, with 300 
feet 2 (27.87 m 2) 
core house 21000 3150 7 118.76 13639 7000 122.86 
Type E: site full y 
serviced, with 480 
feet 2 (44.59 m 2) 
core house 30000 6000 8 176.10 12426 10000 175.51 
Source: PADCO (1981, p. 27). 
"Based on a period of 30 years. 
0 Difference between interest rate charged in 4th column and a fixed rate of 10'X, over 30 years. 
• Assumed at 33'!f, of total cost per unit. 
"Based on total cost minus capital subsidy at 33%. 
house are charged 8% over 30 years. This makes the basic housing option 
affordable to families down to the 13th percentile of urban incarne groups 
and enhances accessibility of the project. 
Another way of enhancing the affordability and accessibility of basic 
housing is to vary interest rates over the time of indebtedness. Thus, 
repayments for the first 3 years of indebtedness may be fixed at 1%, with 
rates being raised gradually in later years up to 12%. ln this way, loan 
repayment charges can be made easier during the "period of maximum 
stress" when families are spending heavily for building materials, furniture, 
labour, and other housing expenses. The variable rate through time is based 
on the assumption that the incarnes of project participants generally 
improve in later years. lmposing a higher rate when the family can afford 
to pay makes repayment easier for the participant. The lower rates during 
the early years also mean that more poor people can be accommodated in 
the project. 
ln general, the longer the period of indebtedness, the larger the amount 
to be repaid, although regular amortizations might be lower in the short 
run. Project designers can ease the situation for project participants by 
giving them the option of paying a down payment or paying off the debt 
earlier than the maturation date if they have the means to do so. As pre-
viously mentioned, incarnes in low-income areas are usually irregular and 
subject to boom or bust tendencies. Allowing project participants to close 
their accounts during boom periods not only results in effective cost 
recovery but it is also of tremendous help to the project participants as well. 
Grappling with issues of rates and levels of loans and repayments is just 
a technical way of assuring the affordability and accessibility of projects. 
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ln general, affordable projects, all things being equal, should have no 
problem recovering costs of investments. Accessibility, however, cannot 
be achieved without meeting the issue of subsidies head on. As indicated in 
Table 3, subsidies can be made in the form of interest-rate manipulation or 
capital subsidies. Bath approaches can be used, of course, if the government 
so desires. 
One point worth emphasizing in figuring out rates and levels of repay-
ment is the need for maximum flexibility to assure that project participants 
are able to repay their loans. The literature on siums and squatters has 
revealed the irregular and indeterminate nature of incarnes. Families find 
it easier to spend less money more frequently because of the small trickle 
of their cash flow. Lump-sum payments are extremely difficult to meet 
because of low savings. However, one-time large payments, such as a 
down payment, may be met through transfer payments and gifts from 
relatives and friends. Priorities, in terms of what bills should or should 
not be paid, are decided on a daily basis. Ali of these research findings 
should be considered when setting levels and rates of loan repayment. 
They will probably help to enhance cost recovery much better than the 
setting of the rigidly scheduled repayment terms favoured by banks and 
other institutions in the formai sector. 
Selection of Participants 
A good way of assuring cost recovery in basic housing projects is careful 
selection of participants. Ali sites-and-services projects in this study had 
eligibility criteria for participants. Factors included in these criteria were: 
household incarne, family status, residence in a project site or city, and 
good moral character. ln El Salvador, willingness to participate in mutual-
aid work was required. ln Manila, only families included in a 1973 census 
and whose houses were "tagged" at that time were deemed eligible for 
the project. 
The proportion of a family's incarne that can be devoted to housing 
seems, at first glance, to be a foolproof element in cost recovery. The 
Zambian evaluation, however, revealed that arrears and defaults did not 
correlate with incarne levels at all. ln a study of three sites in 1978, it was 
found that default rates were 72% in George and 61% in site 1. Bath high-
and low-income families were in arrears. Two substudies further confirmed 
that inability to pay was not the main factor in the large proportions of 
families in arrears. First, a previous study of renters in Chawama was cited. 
1t found that renters had much lower incarnes than project participants 
but that their default rates were negligible. Second, a survey of families in 
other housing projects run by the Lusaka City Council was made. lt was 
found that families in these projects had much higher levels of incarne 
than renters but their repayment rates were even worse than those in the 
Chawama, George, and site 1 projects. 
With respect to family status, evaluations in Senegal and Zambia, as well 
as studies in Kenya and Jamaica, suggest that single-parent households 
tend to have more difficulty in meeting project payments than nuclear or 
extended families. This is particularly true among households headed by 
females. The studies also suggest, however, that it is low incarne, rather 
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than family status itself, that is more important in determining one's inability 
to pay. The mutual aid requirement in El Salvador also tended to force 
those households headed by women to drop out. ln Jamaica, households 
headed by females had a lower participation rate in mutual-aid and self-
help activities as well. Difficulties in meeting project repayment demands, 
therefore, might be just one of the problems faced by households headed 
by women in basic housing projects. 
Prior residence in a project site (or from one definite community in 
sites-and-services projects) might enhance cost recovery in that community 
pressures of a direct or indirect nature may be used to encourage people 
to pay their debts. ln El Salvador, it was found that participation in mutual-
aid work, aside from the direct benefits it brought about, also tended to 
make social relationships in the project much better. The experience of 
working together, of being exposed to the social-consciousness training 
given by FSDVM, and of solving common problems as a group tended to 
make neighbourhoods more cohesive. This cohesiveness, in turn, might 
have been responsible for the high repayment rates in the projects. 
Selecting the right participants, however, has to be balanced between 
ability to pay and accessibility. If high cost-recovery rates are due to over-
qualified participants, then the projects might not be achieving optimal 
resu lts. 
Collection Machinery and Procedures 
Structuring levels and rates of charges and choosing the right participants 
for basic housing projects might help achieve better cost recovery but in 
the long run it is the institution of effective machinery and the enforcement 
of correct procedures that will help ensure that development costs are 
collected. Based on country experiences, the most important factors 
responsible for achieving good cost recovery are: (1) provision of accurate 
information to project participants; (2) development of effective sanctions 
in cases of default; (3) establishment of clear procedures for billing, collec-
tion, payments, recording etc.; (4) determination of the level of satisfaction 
with services rendered by management; and (5) community pressure. 
Information 
Lack of accurate information has been proven to be one of the most 
important factors related to high default rates. This was shown in the results 
of a survey conducted in Zambia in 1978, in which the following was found: 
(1) Among those families who had defaulted on loans, about 50% did 
not know the correct status of their arrears. 
(2) About 75% of defaulting families did not know that the Lusaka City 
Council cou Id impose sanctions because of their failure to repay the loans. 
(3) About 15'}{, of those families who were in arrears were under the 
impression that their employers were deducting house payments from 
their salaries; another 15% said they were not told when payments should 
start; and another 10% believed that they were not supposed to start paying 
until their total loan was completely withdrawn or their house was 
completed. 
(4) About 67% of respondents were not aware that service charges in the 
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project had been increased to K3.0/month. Of those who knew about the 
increase, 94'X) did not know the reason for the increase. 
(5) About 51% of respondents could not remember having attended a 
meeting regarding loan repayment conditions; 58% said they had never 
been contacted by project officiais to pay their arrears; and 91% said that 
local community leaders never talked to them about paying their arrears. 
Even if it is assumed that project participants are wont to suffer from 
momentary memory lapses when confronted with the fact that they are in 
arrears, the specificity of the items not known by the respondents 
points to a lack of information. The Zambian study reveals the need for a 
good information system to effect cost recovery. lt is true that such a system 
can be expensive; however, the increased possibility that more funds can 
be collected through its use makes the expense worthwhile. 
One problem with many basic housing projects is the tendency for 
project authorities to rely heavily on formai channels of communication to 
reach participants. Community newspapers, printed or mimeographed 
information sheets, organized community meetings, and formai letters 
tend to be used despite repeated research findings that functional literacy 
rates in such communities are low. Communication in low-income areas 
tends to be based more on informai leaders and face-ta-face interactions. 
Thus, selective information dissemination to informai leaders and influentials 
might be a more effective means of communication than printed and 
other media. 
lnstead of using the printed media, many housing agencies have found 
that their own personnel are communicating with people directly. The 
Tondo Foreshore Development Authority discovered in a 1979 survey that 
more people relied on National Housing Authority (NHA) personnel than 
on barangay leaders or the office newsletter for information about the 
project. Of special importance were personnel of the Community 
Relations and Information Office (CRIO), who made a point of establishing 
maximum persona! contact with leaders and community residents alike. ln 
El Salvador, the people considered the promotores sociales or "animateurs" 
of FSDVM the most reliable source of information. Through small group 
meetings, face-ta-face interactions with individuals and families, and just 
plain presence in the project area, FSDVM community-development 
workers have established themselves as a good source of information. 
Communication theorists have long lauded the "two-step" communication 
model as an effective approach to community relations. According to this 
model, messages initially presented in formai media might be reinforced 
by interpersonal relationships with community leaders, agency personnel, 
or "influentials" who lend support to the messages. Project managers 
interested in effecting better cost-recovery rates could heed this approach. 
By clarifying their messages first, then reinforcing them with persona! 
approaches, they might be able to improve their collection rates. 
Sanctions 
Sorne project authorities do not want to rely on negative sanctions to 
effect better cost recovery. However, project participants generally under-
stand that sanctions are part of the contractual agreements they sign. 
When the consequences of their actions are fully explained to them, they 
usually have no trouble complying with project rules and regulations. 
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After ail, most of them are usually convinced that basic housing projects 
are beneficial to them and are certainly better than the sium/squatter 
areas they leave behind. 
There are a number of "rules" that may be formulated with respect to 
sanctions. First, the sanctions must be considered fair and equitable by 
both the participants and project management. Second, they must be 
enforceable. Third, both action and consequences must be communicated 
to ail participants until they are well understood. Fourth, management 
must be willing and able to enforce sanctions quickly and unequivocally. 
Finally, despite ail of the above, sanctions must be enforced as appropriate 
to each case individually so that the merits and demerits of each case can 
be sorted out in order that rules and regulations are not implemented 
blindly. 
Assuring the fairness of regulations on sanctions requires maximum 
community participation. lt is not enough to take some ru les from standard 
leasing contracts and hope that these will satisfy participants in basic 
housing projects. Low-income people live in a world where bargaining is 
the rule, where appeals for charity, pity, or morality on the one hand and 
the use of force and the threat of violence on the other are equally impor-
tant in negotiations. There is a strong tendency, also, for project beneficiaries 
to mimimize the costs and difficulties involved in home ownership, 
especially at the outset when they are still euphorie about being included 
in the project. lt is not until later that the real difficulties are felt, and 
then the problems begin. 
This is not to say that low-income people are wily and tricky, they just 
have their own priorities. Where there are many urgent demands on their 
meagre resources, it is only natural that they will devote their resources to 
uses with the least negative sanctions. If project authorities convey the 
impression that they are notable to apply sanctions - or worse, that they 
are not willing to enforce sanctions - they will be ignored. 
One of the main stumbling blocks to cost recovery in Zambia, for 
example, is a provision in the Housing Act that could be interpreted in 
such a way that it would imply that sanctions could only be used by the 
City Council if they brought defaulting families to court for "breach of 
contract." Knowing how difficult, expensive, complex, and time consuming 
court cases can be, this particular provision has adversely affected collections 
in projects. Even getting a legal opinion on the specific provision has taken 
a long time. ln the meantime, arrears and defaults in the Zambia projects 
have piled up. 
Where sanctions can be administratively enforced - and they should be, 
as muchas possible - quick and decisive action is most effective. Delays 
and vacillation can be interpreted as a lack of will on the part of project 
management to enforce the sanctions. ln some instances, it may be neces-
sary to pursue a few cases to show others that the rules will be enforced. 
One danger related to active enforcement of sanctions is that the com-
munity may turn against project management as a body, resulting in an 
unproductive confrontation. Usually, this can be minimized by explaining 
that the terms of the contractual agreements were clear to both sides. lt 
may be a bit Machiavellian, but isolating the party against whom sanctions 
are being used can be done by painting out the dangers that toleration of 
contractual violations can bring to the whole project. This type of expia-
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nation might bring community pressure to bear on the offending party 
instead of against project management. 
Based on the Philippine and Zambian experiences, one of the most 
common problems in cost recovery was failure to clarify the conditions 
under which sanctions would be used. ln Zambia, it took a couple of years 
before the real obligations of project participants were spelled out (how 
much to pay, when, where, in what way, and what for). ln the Philippines, 
the long drawn out debates and discussions regarding land in the Tondo 
foreshore prevented management from setting up the schedule of 
payments. Even after it was decided that land would be sold outright to 
project participants, continued debates on how much of the development 
costs should be charged further hindered collections. ln the meantime, 
people got used to not paying project charges. ln Zambia, the belief 
became widespread that project management had no "political will" to 
collect charges. The growth of this feeling only makes cost recovery that 
much more difficult in the long run. 
lncentives 
To balance the possible negative effects of sanctions, project authorities 
may set up incentives to reward people who pay regularly or pay in 
advance. Examples of such incentives include: 
(1) Paying a lower rate if participants pay on or before a specified date. 
Among low-income people, every cent saved counts. If they can save 
some money by paying early, they will probably be encouraged to pay early. 
(2) Receiving a discount (or cash rebate) if participants pay in advance. 
As already mentioned, incarnes of participants are often irregular. If they 
can save significant amounts by paying debts in advance during boom 
times, they might be encouraged to do so. Project management can afford 
to give rebates or discounts for advance payments because it saves on 
administrative costs. 
(3) Foregoing interest and other charges if a participant pays in full. 
Again, this will not cost project management much because of the 
savings in administration and management costs. 
(4) Public recognition of families with excellent payment records. This 
may take the form of certificates and awards, publication of their awards in 
community papers, or formai award ceremonies during community 
meetings. 
(5) Public recognition of neighbourhoods with excellent payment 
records. Aspiring for the awards might create community competition, 
thereby creating community pressure on families. 
(6) Public recognition of community leaders whose neighbourhoods 
have excellent payment records. Again, this may create friendly competition 
and result in community pressures to have better cost recovery records. 
Sociological studies of sium/squatter communities point to the fact that 
families often feel uneasy over their debts. If they have the means, people 
will pay cash. Perhaps, because life is already full of pressures and 
insecurities, the idea of long-term debts weighing on their minds makes 
people ill at ease with indebtedness. For a poor family that has little more 
than its honour and reputation, being accused of being a deadbeat is a 
serious provocation. Ali of these factors predispose low-income project 
participants to settle debts on time or in advance. Project management 
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must be flexible enough (and, through incentives, encouraging enough) 
to reward timely or advanced payments. 
lt is worth keeping in mind that low incarnes in project communities 
are not synonymous with inability to pay. If people have the means, they 
will pay, and pay in advance. One interesting research finding in Lusaka, 
where defaults and arrears were common, is as follows: 
ln ail the project areas, the proportion of monthly debit paid is 
consistently higher than the proportion of actual payers each month. 
This is due to some participants making advance payments, particularly 
by using part of their Zambia National Provident Fund. 
ln other words, despite many factors influencing the majority of project 
participants not to pay their regular amortizations, those who paid were 
even paying in advance (Sanyal et al. 1981). 
Collection Procedures 
As noted earlier, people will find excuses for not paying their bills if the 
procedures for doing so are not clear. One of the deterrents to cost 
recovery is the lack of information about when and where people should 
pay. ln tao many instances, project authorities expect people to corne to 
their main offices to pay their accounts. A survey of families in arrears in 
Zambia yielded the following information: 
About 7% of the respondents said that there had been instances 
when they had gone to make monthly payments and had found the 
cashier's office closed; 9% had the experience of not being able to 
make payments because the line was too long and another 7% had to 
corne back because in the absence of the cashier responsible for their 
block, other cashiers refused to accept payments. 
One might say that these respondents were only making excuses. 
However, the specificity of the charges indicates that they may have been 
based on actual experiences (Sanyal et al. 1981). 
Faced with procedural problems, project authorities in Zambia tried 
various approaches. For participants who were regularly employed, 
arrangements were made to collect project payments at the source 
through payroll deduction schemes. This worked out quite well, with only 
a few hitches. ln some instances, employees neglected to sign the 
agreements allowing payroll deductions to be made. There were also some 
small offices that found it tao cumbersome to collect and turnover funds 
to the housing agency. Project authorities solved this problem by asking 
offices to deposit collections in a bank, which credited such funds to the 
housing agency's account. 
Another approach tried was to authorize community leaders 
(representatives of the ruling United National lndependence Party (UNIP)) 
to collect payments in their neighbourhoods. This was welcomed by some 
24% of respondents. However, about 68% of households said they would 
prefer to pay officiais of the Lusaka City Council. Many of these expressed 
a lack of trust of UNIP leaders. 
Based on experiences in a number of countries, it is quite clear that an 
effective procedure for cost recovery might require the following 
elements: 
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(1) Each family should be given a written statement indicating the full 
amount of indebtedness, the amount of each monthly charge, how much 
of the monthly charge goes toward the payment of interest and how much 
toward the principal, when each payment is due, and where the family can 
pay. Any incentives or sanctions should also be clearly indicated in this 
statement. 
(2) If the family is notable to pay on time, specific procedures should be 
followed as routinely as possible. For one payment missed, a persona! visit 
from an agency collector should be made. For two payments missed, a 
written notice, indicating penalties and sanctions, should be mailed or 
hand delivered. For three payments missed, persona! counseling from an 
official from the housing agency may be arranged. Arrears in excess of 
four payments should trigger formai procedures for foreclosure, eviction 
from the project, seizure of furniture and other assets, padlocking the 
house, and denial of access to premises. lt is most important that these 
procedures be clearly indicated to project participants in advance. 
(3) For families who pay regularly, orthose who are able to pay in advance, 
a clear schedule of incentives should also be provided in writing. For 
example, families who pay 15 days before due dates could be given 10% 
discounts, those who pay 1 or more months in advance cou Id be given 20% 
discounts, and families who pay their accounts in full might not be charged 
interest and could be given 25% discounts. These are just examples, of 
course, the exact rates and amounts can be calculated to fit each country 
condition. 
Based on what is known of credit behaviour in sium/squatter areas, it is 
necessary to maintain frequent and regular contacts between collectors 
and debtors if cost recovery is to be effective. Because of man y competing 
demands on the money of low-income families, constant pressure must be 
exerted on them to remind them about their payments. This is the secret 
behind the high cost-recovery rates of sium landlords and those who sell 
things according to the installment plan in the siums. 
ln the Philippines, there are many local traders who regularly make the 
rounds in low-income areas selling goods and services on the installment 
plan. These were traditionally traders from lndia and were generically 
called "Bombay" traders. Their wares included traditional black umbrellas, 
cloth, dresses, rugs, and plastic dishes. The "Bombay" trader visits the 
community almost daily. Families can pay P1 or even smaller amounts and 
the trader deducts this from the outstanding debt. Although the individual 
amounts may be small, the fact that many families owe the trader makes 
the daily trips worthwhile. Housing authorities can take some lessons from 
this method of doing business. Sorne collection procedure patterned after 
the "Bombay" trader making the rounds would probably be more successful 
than one in which families are expected to go to the housing agency's 
offices, only to get mad when the offices are closed or a cashier is out of 
the office. 
Dissatisfaction with Services 
A common reason for people's refusai to pay project charges is dissatis-
faction with existing conditions. This is especially applicable to service 
charges but it can affect loan amortizations as well. 
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ln Tondo, for example, the National Housing Authority has not been 
able to collect rents in the Old Vitas tenements because people have 
vowed that they will not pay until they are provided with water, the sanitary 
system is unclogged, leaking roofs are fixed, and walls and windows des-
troyed by vandals are repaired. Similar dissatisfaction was behind the 
opposition to increased service charges for water, street lighting, and 
garbage collection in Lusaka: 
About 75% of respondents who were aware of the coming increase 
felt that it was unfair on the part of the HPU to ask them to pay for 
electricity which is only provided along the main road and for garbage 
collection when, in fact, no garbage is collected. About 18% of the 
respondents felt that the increase was too much and people would not 
be able to afford it. 
As it turned out, the level of collection for service charges decreased 
because people were dissatisfied with the services. 
Although community dissatisfaction can be disruptive, it can be turned 
around for the project's benefit. Focusing on specific complaints, such as 
services, has the effect of organizing and mobilizing community resources. 
lt tends to identify leaders who become the focal points of common action. 
A sensitive project management can take advantage of the emergence of 
issues and leaders and use these for resolving community-management 
problems. From these interactions, a better system for cost recovery can 
emerge. 
Community Pressures 
ln a number of basic housing projects, community cooperation and 
pride has proven to be a strong ally in facilitating cost recovery. ln 
Zambia, people can pay monthly charges to community leaders. ln El 
Salvador, community leaders are asked to follow up on families in arrears. 
ln the Philippines, leaders are encouraged to disseminate information 
about project charges to their neighbourhoods and they are expected to 
provide feedback on community reactions and feelings to project 
management. 
A rather unique way of using community pressure to effect payment of 
service charges has been tried in Zambia. Participants in Lusaka projects 
were organized into community groups of about 25 families each. Families 
belonging to a community organization were asked to signa formai agree-
ment that they would have collective responsibility for payment of the 
charges. ln other words, if one or more families belonging to a group 
were delinquent in paying service charges, the whole group would suffer 
because the services to the community would be turned off. The theory 
was that because the whole community would suffer if one family defaulted, 
all of the members would help each other, perhaps contributing extra 
amounts to help a member temporarily unable to meet service charges. If 
the inability to pay is not due to a lack of resources, other members of the 
community could exert pressure on the offending member to pay. 
An evaluation of the community pressure system did not turn up good 
results. Families who paid their service charges religiously complained 
bitterly that they were being treated unfairly. They claimed that they did not 
know who the nonpaying families were, so they could not exert pressure 
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on them. Project authorities, somehow, failed to inform the community 
leaders about delinquent members and the abrupt shutting off of 
community services was met with anger. 
Aroused communities, instead of putting pressure on their members, 
used their energies to get at project management. Sorne public faucets 
were forcibly opened, resulting in wasted water and destroyed equipment. 
Health conditions in the "punished" communities also deteriorated 
because people started using old surface water wells for drinking water 
when the taps were shut off. 
The Zambian experience revealed, therefore, that community pressure 
can be a two-edged sword. When used wisely, people will work hard to 
bring honour and pride to their communities, and they will compete with 
others to have the best repayment records. When community pride is 
turned against project management, however, results can be quite disastrous. 
ln the long run, therefore, the use of community pressure for meeting 
project ends is better applied using positive rather than negative 
approaches. 1 ncentives, rather than sanctions, might yield better resu lts. 
The Subsidy Issue 
Cast recovery is the reverse of the subsidy issue bec au se it is di rectly 
linked to affordability. Recovering project costs will not be tao difficult if 
ail project participants can afford them. ln the case of the poorest of the 
poor, cost recovery will also be easy if project authorities decide to 
subsidize the difference between true development costs and what the 
poor can afford. 
One of the principles adhered to by financing agencies and governments 
with respect to basic housing projects is that ail development costs should 
be recovered. Full cost recovery is justified in the name of replicability. lt 
is argued that more projects can be launched if they are self-financing and 
do not eat up precious national resources. 
ln a number of countries where social justice is a lively issue, however, 
full cost recovery has been questioned. Studies in these countries have 
shown that housing, infrastructure, and other services for middle- and 
high-income households do not enjoy full cost recovery. On the contrary, 
such services enjoy considerable subsidies. ln light of this finding, how 
equitable are policies that demand full cost recovery from basic housing 
projects for the poor when housing and other services for the rich enjoy 
substantial subsidies? 
A country in which the issue of cost recovery in basic housing has been 
raised is Zambia. A 1978 study revealed that the Zambian government 
spends about K95.1 million per year in housing subsidies (about K29.8 
million by the central government, K4.6 million by the local governments, 
and K60.7 million by parastatals) (Sanyal 1980). The subsidies take the 
following forms: (1) housing allowances to civil servants and employees 
who own their homes; (2) allowances to house renters, which include (a) 
cash allowances for renters who rent houses in the "open market," (b) 
allowances in kind for employees who live in houses rented by their 
employers for them, and (c) allowances in kind for employees living in 
houses owned by their employers; and (3) low interest mortgage loans. 
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The study revealed that about 93% of the 70 540 public sector employees 
in Zambia received some form of rentai subsidy. Determination of this 
subsidy depended on job status, salary, length of service, size of family, 
and other considerations. ln general, the higher an employee's rank, the 
higher the subsidy. 
The gap between the rich and poor in Zambia is quite wide. lt has been 
estimated that, overall, 10% of the households in Zambia receive 40% of 
all incarne, whereas the remaining 90% receive only 60%. This social 
inequality is paralleled by housing subsidies. The 1978 study showed that 
the top 10% of employees got 50% of the subsidies, with the remaining 
90% receiving the other 50%. 
Housing subsidies for civil servants in Zambia are a carry-over from 
colonial civil service traditions that sought to augment salaries with 
perquisites to attract the ablest and the best people to the civil service. 
When the colonial civil servants were replaced by Zambians after 
lndependence, they did not surrender the salaries and perquisites inherited 
from their predecessors. On the contrary, the subsidies were increased. 
Continued awarding of housing subsidies to those who have and exacting 
full cost recovery of housing costs from the have-nots has been questioned 
in Zambia because it has been having the following effects: (1) the difference 
in benefits between the haves and the have-nots has been widening, thus 
creating the possibility of class tensions; (2) access to housing among the 
very poor, who are likely to find jobs in the informai sector, is becoming 
extremely difficult because housing is tied to employment; (3) home 
ownership in Zambia is being discouraged because employees who receive 
high rent subsidies find no incentives to attempt to own homes; and 
(4) at higher incarne levels, people are "overconsuming" housing in the 
sense that they are occupying houses that are too expensive for their 
needs - something they would not be able to do without housing subsidies. 
Although conditions in Zambia are highlighted here, they are not really 
that different from those existing in other developing countries. Subsidies 
there might be more indirect, but they are considerable nevertheless. 
Aside from the subsidies found in Zambia, there are other forms such as 
greater access to pension funds, savings and loans associations, and 
building trust funds; tax-free mortgages; and tax-deductible allowances 
when one's house is also used as a place of employment. On top of these 
subsidies, services for urban well-to-do families are invariably cheaper. lt 
has been shown that the cost of electricity for the urban poor is invariably 
higher because it is rarely metered and the poor have to pay for the risks 
taken by the "entrepreneurs" who clandestinely provide it. Water is also 
more than 10 times as expensive for the urban poor because it has to be 
purchased from itinerant vendors rather than piped directly into their 
homes. 
lt is one of the ironies of urban conditions in developing countries that 
those who have less in life are charged fully for the little they get, whereas 
those who enjoy formai services pay relatively little. The principle of full 
cost recovery is sound; however, it should be adjusted so that it means full 
recovery of charges after the subsidies due the project participants have 
already been built in. Until that equitable decision is made, it will be 
extremely difficult to achieve effective cost recovery of project costs 





The street becomes a playground in a normal Tondo sium community, Philippines. 
Community development is the pracess by which people become 
involved in and are organized and mobilized for the attainment of 
common goals. ln almost all basic housing prajects, there is a community 
development unit staffed by sociologists, social workers, information 
specialists, and community "animateurs." Such a unit usually has a 
research function (data gathering and analysis, dissemination of information). 
lt also carries out community organization, liaison work with other 
agencies, training, and praject evaluation. 
Because basic housing appraaches require a great deal of explaining, 
motivating, training, and mobilizing, community development has an 
important raie in the pragrams. ln the course of a praject's life, the 
community development workers may be the first persans to enter a 
community to gather data upon which to base the pragrams. They may 
play an active raie in implementing such pragram components as mutual 
aid, self-help, income-generating prajects, or graup construction work. 
They might well be the last technicians to leave a community, arranging 
last-minute aspects of transferring responsibility over the praject to 
community graups, and, of course, they often carry out postpraject 
evaluations. 
Community development is very important in assuring that people's 
wants, needs, and desires are embodied in basic housing pragrams. A 
community development unit can help achieve this by organizing com-
munity participation during the praject formulation stage. Community 
development may also reduce praject costs by urging participants to use 
mutual aid and self-help in praject implementation. lt can organize graup 
work or individual household efforts to set up equity and counterpart 
resources to match external funding. 
When community development is able to create a vibrant and active 
community spirit, it can facilitate coordination of public and private efforts. 
Often in developing countries, housing and basic urban services are the 
responsibility of many agencies. The jurisdictional, geographical, and 
personality conflicts among these agencies may be braught together by an 
active community development pragram that encourages "grass-raots 
government." 
Finally, community development aims to facilitate the eventual turning 
over of prajects to local governments and the local community. This 
requires development of graup skills in community decision-making. 
Training pragrams are needed to develop local leadership and the mobili-
zation of local resources. Community development seeks to encourage 
self-reliance in the continued operation and maintenance of basic services. 
Thraugh skills training and encouragement of economic enterprises, 
community development may imprave a community's economic base, 
thus ensuring that the community will be able to pay its way in the future 
with minimal outside support. 
ln the formulation and implementation of basic housing pragrams, 
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many housing agencies have discovered that they can ignore the people's 
wishes and resources only at their own peril. Housing programs that have 
attempted to "produce and deliver" housing units have ended up as 
expensive flops. The cities of developing countries are littered with the 
gutted and vandalized remains of projects that have been produced for 
the people but not with them. There are many beautiful architectural 
masterpieces that have remained unoccupied because they were unliveable. 
ln contrast, there are ugly and festering siums that are dynamic and func-
tioning despite repeated efforts to have them demolished. They are thriving 
human communities rather than aesthetically pleasing artifacts built by 
housing authorities. 
Community Organizations 
Conventional decision-making theory focuses on the individual, but 
among the urban poor the community is often a more productive unit. 
When engrossed in group action, the results are often greater than the 
sum of the individual acts. Fortunately for designers of basic housing 
projects, they are rarely afforded the luxury of a clean slate when planning 
for low-income clients. Whenever the poor congregate, they create for 
themselves complex networks of social interactions that provide the energy 
with which they accomplish common goals. 
An important factor in community formation among the urban poor is 
their capacity to organize (some say to "overorganize"). ln a study of 
Tondo long before the World Bank decided to support a community-
upgrading project there, a survey indicated that in an area occupied by 
about 2000 families there were no less than 20 formai organizations, 12 
of these legally incorporated bodies (Laquian 1966). Similar findings have 
been reported in other countries (Mangin 1970), with the raie of community 
organization in "invasions" as well as in urban community development 
programs receiving special attention (Clinard 1966). 
Participant observation has indicated that, even in projects in which 
people are individually drawn from various communities, community 
organizations sprout spontaneously. The social linkages evolve, influenced 
by such factors as physical proximity (next-door neighbours tend to become 
friends first); common interests (families with children get to know each 
other through the children); common characteristics (people speaking the 
same dialect, those originating from a particular hometown); and community 
activities (celebrating the fiesta is a major factor in enhancing community 
spirit in the Philippines). Even real or imagined threats to the community 
(eviction plans of the government, juvenile gangs from another community) 
can mobilize people to form associations. 
Ali things being equal, the prospects for community development in a 
project are directly related to the presence of community organizations. 
The presence of organized groups makes it easier to achieve the people's 
participation in project design and program implementation and evaluation. 
The very fact that a leadership structure exists, even if it is initially anta-
gonistic to the project, is a positive sign. Communication with the 
community is enhanced by organizations and mobilization of community 
resources is made that mu ch easier by them. ln general, it is easier to begin 
working with existing groups than to start organizing them from scratch. 
Where people are already organized within a community, the prospects 
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for introducing an effective community development program might be 
influenced by the following factors: (1) prevalent family structures; (2) the 
neighbourhood's sense of community; (3) mutual-aid traditions; and (4) 
political partisanship. Each of these factors merits special attention. 
Family Structures 
Studies have shown that important decisions pertaining to migration, 
employment, borrowing, investing in a house, etc., are usually made at the 
family level rather than by individuals. The decision might even involve 
members of the extended family, which is alive and well in most Third 
World societies. Even in cities, where a tendency toward nuclear family 
formation has been observed, the extended family is usually found among 
the urban poor. ln many sium/squatter areas, nuclear families often form 
the bases for community organizations because leaders often count on 
family members for support first. 
At the other end of the family spectrum are those households headed 
by women. Community surveys in Zambia, Senegal, El Salvador, and Jamaica 
have shown that households headed by females make up one-third to 
one-fifth of the families in low-income communities. A typical situation is 
the prison farm squatter area in Spanish Town, Jamaica, where a survey 
revealed that 25% of the families there were headed by females (Stone 
1978). 
Households headed by women are closely associated with common-law 
unions. Studies have shown that such unions are highly unstable and that it 
is not unusual for a woman to enter into a number of such unions through-
out her child-bearing years, often bearing a number of children by 
different spouses in the process. The fathers may or may not contribute 
toward the children's support, although a study in El Salvador discovered 
high rates of transfer incarne and gifts in households headed by women 
(Kaufmann and Lindauer 1980). 
Countries where polygamy is practiced also tend to show a higher rate 
of households headed by females in low-income areas. This was found in a 
number of projects in Senegal, for example, where the traditional defini-
tion of a family had to be reformulated to make selection criteria for 
projects more applicable to local conditions. 
Regardless of the reasons for the prevalence of households headed by 
women, the fact remains that they require special attention from project 
authorities. First, they tend to have significantly lower incarnes than other 
families. Second, they are more likely to be renters than homeowners. 
Third, they have higher rates of intracommunity mobility. Fourth, the 
female heads of households tended to have low educational levels and 
high illiteracy rates. Finally, studies have shown that female heads of 
households have much lower rates of community participation, i.e., in 
the form of attendance at meetings or participation in mutual-aid work. 
The combined effects of these observed characteristics of households 
headed by females were seen in a community-upgrading program initiated 
by the Jamaican government and the US Agency for International Develop-
ment in the "yards" of Kingston, Jamaica. 1 A study of the yards revealed 
1A "yard" is a Jamaican urban residential unit. lt is usually an enclosure, 
round or rectangular, with about three or four houses in it. Renters in yards share 
common water taps, toilets, and kitchens but occupy individual rooms. ln 1975, it 
was estimated that there were 50 000 yards in Kingston. 
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that most of the rooms were rented to women with families (Brodber 
1975). Evaluation of the program revealed that community participation by 
women in upgrading efforts was very low because they were often tao busy 
trying to earn some money or taking care of their children. The households' 
low incarnes also precluded voluntary contributions in lieu of community 
work. There were practically no female heads of households on the raster 
of community leaders because formai marriage was often a prerequisite to 
social status. 
Most important of all, the program evaluation indicated that households 
headed by women considered the upgrading program as being potentially 
inimical to their interests. They were afraid that improvement of the 
community would encourage landlords to raise rents. Sorne female heads 
of households did perceive some benefits in the cleaner surroundings, a 
more reliable water supply, or a playground for the children; however, 
they felt that such improvements would benefit landlords more and they 
feared that, in the long run, the improved property values would make the 
place more attractive to others and the competition for space would make 
it more expensive to live in the community. 
Because of their tendency not to participate in community affairs, there 
is a tendency for female heads of families to be excluded or eased out of 
basic housing projects. This should be of great concern to project authorities 
because it limits the accessibility of projects to these families who require 
the most help. Rather than ignore the issue or sacrifice households headed 
by females for the sake of project efficiency, certain components designed 
specifically to assist the less able can be built into the projects. For 
example, job training in the informai sector, crèches and day-care centres, 
and guidance and counseling can be made regular parts of community 
development efforts. The community development arm, being charged 
with the social aspects of basic housing programs, needs to be particularly 
sensitive and responsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups such as 
households headed by women. Community development must foster 
equity and social justice because, otherwise, basic housing projects might 
end up helping those who already have much in life. 
Sense of Community 
Whether it is called "community spirit" or "community awareness," the 
perception among residents in an area that they share a common identity 
is a very important factor in a community development program. This 
sense of community may be gauged quite easily by indicators that include: 
(1) numbers and types of associations; (2) existence of formai and informai 
community leaders; (3) perceived or real boundaries of the community; 
and (4) perceived community problems. 
ln addition to determining the number of associations in a community, 
the designer of a community development program has to know the functions 
played by the associations, how long each has been in existence, and how 
effective they have been in achieving their goals. Community organizations 
are not usually active ail year round - they may be dormant for some time 
and then suddenly get caught up in a frenzy of activities. Many of them 
might have very limited areas of activities. The important thing, however, is 
that each organization is an aggregation of individuals adhering to a corn-
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mon interest, and such organizations can become the building blacks of an 
effective community development program. 
lt might be misleading to assume that community organizations are set 
up primarily to further the community's interest. lt is highly possible that 
the organizations are mainly reflections of community leadership structures. 
lt is a common method in community development to "enter" a community 
through the existing leaders. ln the Philippines, this means obtaining the 
cooperation of elected members of the barangay councif. ln lndonesia, 
this involves approaching the appointed members of local bodies called 
the rukun warga or rukun tetanga. ln most instances, however, these 
leaders are representatives of the "establishment" and may not actually 
reflect the pattern of influence and power in the community. lt takes 
careful participant observation and the cooperation of community infor-
mants to really understand leadership in low-income communities. 
However, this understanding is absolutely necessary if an effective community 
development program is to be fashioned. 
lt is important to know the perceived boundaries of a community 
because it reflects the extent of cohesion or fragmentation of the people's 
cognitions. One common method of obtaining this information is to 
include in a sample survey a question requesting respondents to describe 
the boundaries of the community. Sorne people may describe the 
community functionally, equating it with the area served by a primary 
school or health clinic, for example. Others might indicate physical 
boundary markers such as roads, canais, or railroad tracks. Still others may 
perceive communities in terms of the legal jurisdictions of existing 
organizations. Analyzing the perceived boundaries of communities will 
indicate to the community development planner the existence of com-
munities within communities, the interlocking or overlapping functional 
and areal "jurisdictions" that formai and informai patterns of power and 
influence encompass. To the extent that these bits of information make 
the community more understandable, it becomes a sound basis for 
community planning. 
To illustrate how varying perceptions of community boundaries can 
influence program effectiveness, it is useful to cite community participa-
tion in the "reblocking" process in Tondo. As described earlier, the main 
initiative in reblocking was taken by the people, who were organized into 
groups of about 20 families occupying the residential black to be improved. 
With the aid of housing agency technicians, families decided where the 
roads and other urban services should be; where the individual houses 
should go; and where community structures, such as schools and health 
clinics, should be located. However, when the individual black plans were 
finished, community planners found that they did not fit together very 
well - one black might have a road proposed up to a certain boundary 
but the group planning the adjoining black would place the road elsewhere. 
The community planners had to resolve these land-use conflicts among 
blacks by using the concept of the "super black," which outlined the road 
and service networks for four or five blacks. Based on the wider community 
perspective, the individual black planning groups were able to corne up 
with more congruent plans. 
The same scale of community boundaries may apply to the perception 
of community problems. Generally, families within a small area might have 
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a heightened sense of their common problems but they may not perceive 
the overall implications of such problems for the whole community. lt is 
the task of a community development program to expand the group's 
perception of problems beyond the immediate confines of their concerns. 
There is a very strong tendency toward particularism in low-income 
communities and it is up to community development organizers to make 
sure that these tendencies are discouraged and that the welfare of the 
larger community be enhanced. 
Mutual-Aid Traditions 
An important resource for community development planners is the 
traditional form of mutual aid that is practiced in low-income communities 
in most developing countries. Such traditions as bayanihan in the Philippines 
or gotong royong in lndonesia have been mentioned. ln other countries, 
however, there are traditions of mutual aid that are more directly related 
to house building that have been used by community development 
organizers in basic housing projects. 
ln East Africa, one of the most interesting mutual-aid traditions 
is the organization of mbati or "house-building" groups. ln Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and other countries, these groups are traditionally 
composed of women who pool their resources and skills to help each 
other build houses. The members of a group contribute specified sums 
of money to a common fund. They carry out income-generating activities, 
such as tilling communal gardens, raising animais, or making handicrafts, 
and earnings from these ventures are added to the common fund. When 
there is sufficient money, each group member takes her turn in using 
the money to purchase materials for the house. The women contribute 
their labour to the house-building effort as well. Fund raising and house 
building are carried out until all members of the group have had their turn 
and are properly housed. 
ln recognition of the usefulness of this tradition, the housing authorities 
in Nairobi have organized building groups in the Dandora project under 
the supervision of the Community Development Section of the project. 
Two types of building groups were formed: those composed of families 
from a particular ward prior to coming to Dandora, and those composed 
of project allottees who live close to each other in the same new 
neighbourhood. ln bath groups, it is interesting to note that male members 
have been accepted in what has traditionally been a female activity. 
The building groups have been officially recognized by the project 
authorities. ln fact, they have to register under the Societies Act, a 
mandatory statute. Formai registration is very important because people 
contribute about Sh50/month to the group and pay a membership fee 
ranging from ShS--56 (registration helps assure accountability for the funds). 
Project management also releases housing loans to the whole group, 
leaving the determination of whose house will be constructed first to the 
group members (MEDIS 1977). 
To date, experience with building groups in Kenya has been most 
encouraging. Almost all of the groups have raised considerable sums of 
money and members' houses have been built cooperatively one by one. 
Because it is prohibited for any member to drop out until each member 
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has a completed, minimum two-room standard house, housing consolidation 
has been accelerated. The Community Development Section has found 
that very little intervention is required to supervise building groups. Because 
the financing and construction procedures have evolved over centuries, 
each member knows what is expected and the group's work goes on with 
few problems. 
Political Partisanship 
An important consideration in low-income commun1t1es is whether 
community organizations are able to work harmoniously together or not. 
Partisan politics can become very serious in small communities because 
people live practically in each other's pockets. ln Jamaica, for example, 
most of the violence and physical damage during the 1980 elections was 
centred in sium/squatter areas. Local leaders of bath the People's National 
Party (PNP) and the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) were killed in the siums, 
had their houses burned, and had their families terrorized. More than a 
year after the elections, the scars of partisan strife were still not healed. ln 
a newly built housing project in Montego Bay, opposing families in 1981 
literally showed their partisan colours by painting their doors green (the 
PNP colour) or orange (for the JLP). Only the timely intervention of the 
project manager, who ordered that ail doors be painted a nonpartisan 
brown, prevented more serious troubles from erupting. 
Partisanship, of course, may take pro- or antiestablishment forms. The 
history of community participation in Tondo is rooted in the activism of 
ZOTO (Zone One Tondo Organization). Founded in 1970 by religious 
activists who trained community organization workers in confrontation 
tactics, ZOTO was originally composed of 39 existing organizations that 
banded together to pressure the government to involve the people in the 
planning and implementation of housing programs. Much of ZOTO's 
efforts were focused on the single issue of land, taking up the demand 
of the community that land in Tondo be sold to bona fide residents at 
P5/m 2• However, this was simply a way of concentrating the people's 
attention on an important issue. The main goal of ZOTO was to raise the 
consciousness of the poor to the extent that they would have the self-
reliance to plan and develop their community themselves. 
ln the tense premartial law atmosphere that prevailed in Tondo in the 
early 1970s, the confrontational tactics of ZOTO eventually led to violence. 
When ZOTO followers set up a "human barricade" to protesta road con-
struction project in Tondo, the police were called in and in the ensuing 
riot one student was killed. Eulogizing the student, ZOTO wrote (Laquian 
1976): 
He died because he protested against the government who deprived 
Tondo residents of their right to participate with government planners 
to build the area. Outsiders must consult the people and give them the 
necessary information if they are sincere in helping the people make a 
beautiful and better community. 
ZOTO feels that the people on the picket lines fighting for an issue 
against the distorted plans of the government must be heard. They 
must be given enough chance to present their demands across the bar-
gaining table. Democratic negotiations and processes must be used 
instead of bullets and force. 
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Under normal times, the right to participate and be heard in the formulation 
of community plans is taken for granted. lt is with some shock, therefore, 
that one realizes that lives can be lost when exercising that right. 
With the declaration of martial law in the Philippines in September 1972, 
the activism of ZOTO and other similar organizations was curtailed. That 
year, the Philippine government decided to organize thebarangay councils 
as legitimate units of government at the community level. About 200-500 
families in a locality formed one barangay. These families elected the 
members of the council annually, with each council member being in 
charge of a specific function, e.g., health, education, protective services, 
livelihood. The barangay councils were also given such functions as 
the distribution of rice at lower prices, registration of motor vehicles for 
rationing gasoline in times of shortages, and preparation of the raster of 
voters. People were organized into barangay "brigades" and trained to 
assume such functions as fire fighting, conducting traffic, keeping the 
community clean, and controlling riots. The barangay, as the lowest unit of 
government, was even given limited taxation powers to raise resources for 
local projects. 
The growth of the power of officially sanctioned barangay councils in 
Tondo limited the popularity of ZOTO and other activist organizations. 
Since the National Housing Authority decided that it would deal officially 
only with barangay councils in matters affecting the basic housing program, 
most people have kept their distance from the activist organizations. At 
the time of writing, considerable activism existed in Tondo but it was some-
what muted. This is not ail due to repression, however, the possibility has 
been mentioned that people are quiet because they have achieved what 
they wanted. Land in Tondo has been soldat the price demanded by the 
people. The wishes of Tondo residents are carefully heeded in the formu-
lation and implementation of programs by the National Housing Authority 
(NHA). Tondo has changed, and this is best seen in the new houses, new 
roads, and new community centres that have sprouted in the area. 
lt is almost impossible to conceive that ail of these achievements in 
Tondo would have been possible without the activism and sacrifices of 
ZOTO leaders and followers. Although political partisanship became the 
irritant in community-government relations in the beginning, the current 
high level of community participation in Tondo is due to this background. 
lt is safe to say that, without ZOTO, Tondo would not be at the developmental 
stage it is at now. 
Community Participation 
Conditions existing in project areas as described in the previous section 
might exert important influences on community development programs, 
but the most important factor in the success or failure of such programs 
is the motivation of the housing agency in encouraging community 
participation. A housing agency that truly desires to elicit community par-
ticipation must sincerely believe that what the community contributes 
makes a real difference in the outcome of the project. lnviting participation 
simply to legitimize prior agency actions will simply not do. Neither will 
people tolerate manipulative "public relations" approaches that seek to 
127 
make the agency look good by providing some semblance of community 
support. 
Under normal circumstances, people do wish to participate in basic 
housing programs. A 1979 survey in Tondo found that 84.5% of respondents 
felt that consultation by the National Housing Authority with the people 
regarding reblocking was "very important" and 12.7% said it was "impor-
tant" (NHA 1980 a, b). Despite the long history of conflict between housing 
authorities and the people, only 25% of respondents felt that "consultation 
between the people and NHA would not make any difference in the 
programs." 1 n fact, 65% of the respondents said that they were "very 
satisfied" with their interactions with NHA personnel and 23% said they 
were "satisfied." 
An important aspect of participation in Tondo was the fact that people 
seemed to know exactly where their inputs mattered. When asked what 
aspects of the program they wanted to be consulted on, the respondents 
cited the following in order of importance: (1) sizes of residential plots, 
(2) plot distribution procedures, and (3) land-use plans for the black. 
Although most people agreed that these matters involved highly technical 
considerations, they felt that they affected their plight directly and that 
the final decision on these matters should be theirs. 
An important indicator of community participation is the proportion of 
people who attend community meetings. ln Tondo, about 96.7% of the 
heads of families regularly attended meetings. lt was noted, however, that 
65% of those in attendance did not actively join in discussions. They 
seemed content with "following the leaders" and lent support when 
called upon. lt wasn't that they were not interested in what was going on, 
many just felt that their leaders shared their views and that they could 
be trusted to fight for what the community wanted. 
Participant observation studies of community meetings noted the 
importance of "bandwagon effects" during discussions. ln Tondo, one of 
the most important decisions presented to the community assemblies was 
the reblocking option. Plan A was a reblocking process that would disturb 
houses and community structures the least - sizes of plots, location of 
houses, and alignment of streets and services would be carried out in such 
a way that no more than 25% of the structures would be disturbed. Sorne 
participants called this the "as is, where is" option. 
Plan B would result in the dislocation of 26-50% of the structures in the 
community. Plan C, on the other hand, was the most drastic of al!. lt would 
restrict sizes of lots to a minimum of 30 m2 and a maximum of 96 m2• lt 
would realign streets and move houses around so that more than 50% of 
the structures would be dislocated. Because this rationalization of land 
use would not be able to accommodate ail families in the community, the 
plan would result in the relocation of more than one-fifth of the 
households to an overspill area 3 km away. 
Although people were given ample time to discuss these options, 
researchers observing the proceedings found that people made up their 
minds rather quickly and voted for plan C overwhelmingly. They knew 
that this option would create the most dislocations; they also knew it 
would be the most expensive. However, following the perception of their 
leaders, the people felt that "equitable distribution of plots" was the most 
important thing to them. They also saw the grid pattern of houses and streets 
and liked the "modern subdivision" look that would result from plan C. 
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Finally, people felt that plan C would clarify boundary lines between plots 
and would reduce interfamily disputes, which often created conflicts and 
even violence. 
These were ail very logical reasons for choosing plan C. Observing the 
meetings, however, what seemed to have prompted a quick decision was 
the open and early support given by the leaders of the community to the 
plan. Although technicians of the National Housing Authority tried to be 
impartial, it was quite obvious that their technical and professional 
personnel also favoured plan C. Most people went along with the leaders 
and NHA personnel because their preferences seemed to have coincided 
with the choices of the leadership. 
The Tondo experience, therefore, showed that when the people insist 
on having their voices heard in decision-making, a housing agency would 
do well to listen. The principle that the people know what they want and 
that a housing agency should clarify the technical aspects but leave the final 
decision to the community is most valid in basic housing programs. Opening 
up community participation channels would help the agency and community 
make the proper choices. True community participation requires mutual 
respect between the agency and the people and is based on the trust that 
bath parties aspire for the best for everyone concerned. 
Project 1 mplementation 
The participation of people in the implementation of housing programs 
has been discussed in detail in the chapter dealing with mutual aid and 
self-help. As mentioned in that chapter, one of the motivations for eliciting 
participation in the project implementation process is to reduce costs. lt 
has been argued that if people use their own labour in construction; are 
allowed to schedule construction activities according to the availability of 
their time; are encouraged to assist each other so that the skills of the 
people can be used optimally; and are given maximum freedom in choosing 
their own house designs, building materials, and financing scheme preferred, 
overall project costs could be reduced. 
Although cost reductions are important, the people's participation should 
be seen as accomplishing much more than cost reduction alone. Country 
experiences have revealed that when project participants are allowed to 
design their own houses, they generally corne up with structures that are 
more responsive to their needs and are made of materials that they prefer 
and are within costs that they can afford. What is of even greater value, 
however, is the commitment that people make to their home, neighbour-
hood, and community. Because the plans and designs for the project are 
their own, they are more willing to allocate resources and undergo sacri-
fices for them. Whatever problems occur, the people cannot blame them 
on project management or other scapegoats. Thus, they are forced to 
confront these problems and find their own solutions. 
Because the people's participation in housing implementation is so 
desirable, there is sometimes a tendency on the part of housing agencies 
to use it (as in El Salvador where families must participate in mutual-aid 
work to qualify for project plots). Overzealousness in such matters, no 
matter how well motivated, can make life more difficult for project parti-
cipants. lt can lead to paternalistic programs that, in effect, tel 1 people that 
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the housing agency knows better - that mutual-aid work is "good for 
them" - and that they must follow what the agency wants or they won't 
receive the benefits. The fact that one-third of the families in some 
Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM) projects 
dropped out before completing the mutual-aid work was indicative of 
community reactions. Research findings that noted overrepresentation of 
people in the informai sector and those renting accommodations because 
of low incarne among the dropouts were other indications that the mutual 
aid requirement worked against the interests of some whose housing need 
could have been answered if only the agency was a bit more flexible and 
less self-righteous. 
lnteragency Coordination 
One of the problems in basic housing programs is the multiplicity of 
efforts carried out by various agencies. The common bureaucratie solution 
to this problem is coordination of all agencies concerned by a superior 
level of government. This works with many programs but, unfortunately, 
housing is an endeavour that, by its very nature, involves the efforts of 
many agencies. Even a senior ministry, such as the Ministry of Housing, is 
rarely in a position to contrai all the factors that enter into a basic housing 
project. Other functional agencies, such as those providing water, elec-
tricity, education, and social welfare, have their own authority and 
power. They might agree to coordinate their efforts with, but will resent 
being coordinated by, the housing ministry. 
One way of achieving interagency coordination in a basic housing project 
is to attempt to enforce coordination from below rather than impose it 
from above. A common factor among all agencies' efforts is that they 
eventually take effect in specific areas. This can be the project site or 
smaller communities and neighbourhoods within the site. The ultimate 
units in the exercising of authority are the clients and alleged beneficiaries 
of agency programs. What is more logical, therefore, than the coordination 
of various agency efforts at the level of the service users themselves -
the community? 
If communities were organized, they would be in a strong position to 
coordinate agency efforts by indicating what they want, what actions they 
will support, and what they will fight. This type of coordination requires 
community unity because it is also quite common for agencies to pursue 
"divide and conquer" policies. ln low-income communities, it is usual to 
find public agencies developing specific client groups to further their 
ends (the education ministry would have Parent-Teacher Associations; the 
police commission would have "community-relations officers;" and the 
Social Welfare Agency would have Youth Clubs, Mothers' Clubs, etc.). If 
members of basic housing communities allowed this fragmentation, they 
would be mere pawns in interagency rivalries. However, if the people 
themselves set up their own local organizations, they can influence devel-
opments at the grass-roots level and bring about coordination at the 
community level. 
lt is one of the main functions of the community development unit in 
a basic housing agency to develop a community-wide organization that 
would not only pursue what the people want but would also attempt to 
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achieve interagency coordination as well. 1 n most instances, this cou Id be 
a single umbrella organization that encompasses many other organizations. 
Such, for example, is the barangay council in the Philippines, the local 
branches of the United National lndependence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, or 
the mutual-aid groups in El Salvador. These organizations have their own 
goals but are also composed of individuals representing various interests 
with specific goals. Clarification of community interests at the local level 
by these organizations would be of great help in coordinating the efforts 
of government agencies dealing with the community. The unity of people 
through their organizations can help public agencies determine how they 
can best support the activities of the people at the local level. lt would 
also influence them against imposing their own programs on the people. 
Community Development Costs 
One criticism leveled against community development units is that they 
entai! considerable expense to set up and make operational. Aside from 
salaries and wages, there are training costs, expenses for information and 
publicity campaigns, funds for community assemblies and meetings, and 
transportation costs. The output from these units, however, is not easy to 
determine. The engineering section can construct roads and build houses, 
and the finance section can collect amortizations and other payments, 
and both these can be quantified. What the community development unit 
achieves, however, is hard to identify and almost impossible to quantify; 
the costs for the unit, on the other hand, are not. 
To appreciate the role of community development in a basic housing 
program, it might be instructive to think about what would happen if su ch 
a unit did not exist and the people's wishes were not considered in the 
formulation and execution of the housing program. ln the Tondo project, 
an impressionistic attempt has been made to do just that. What were the 
"costs" of previous efforts that did not take the people's wishes into 
consideration? 
One definite cost would have been the enormous su ms spent for police, 
army, and intelligence service operations mounted to suppress activism in 
Tondo. Although many such operations entailed the use of existing personnel, 
a number of large-scale efforts to quel! riots and demonstrations demanded 
extra resources. lt is possible that such expenses could have been avoided 
if a genuine effort to elicit community participation in Tondo had been 
launched early enough. 
There were, of course, the costs of activities that could not be pursued 
because the people objected to them. There were the costs to people 
whose houses were demolished, who were relocated to other areas, and 
who lost jobs because of such dislocation. Also, there were the leaders 
who were arrested, forced to go into hiding, or were killed. 
How much did the years of failure to coordinate activities with the people 
cost? Presumably, one can figure out the monetary value of person-months 
spent by the authorities pacifying activists in Tondo. lt should also be 
possible to establish the cost of the military and police operations incurred 
in raids, massive arrests, and riot contrai. Because there were estimates of 
how many Tondo residents joined in marches and demonstrations, one 
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can determine the person-months of efforts devoted to such activities. The 
opportunity costs of such activities should amount to enormous sums. 
One can argue, of course, that institution of a community participation 
process would probably not have prevented the problems cited above. 
Perhaps, but it would not have done too much harm, and it might have 
helped channel people's energies toward more productive ends, as one 
of the main determinants of overall project costs is the cooperation or 
resistance of people to a basic housing project. If people will not cooperate 
and absorb most project costs themselves, they will have to be shouldered 
by the government. To the extent that people actively resist government 
efforts, total project costs would correspondingly increase. 
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PROJECT IMPACT 8 
Waiting for the bu~, Di!kar, Senega/. (Outlying area projects may run into transportation 
problems.) 
The research design used in the evaluation studies supported by IDRC 
and the World Bank posed project interventions in cammunity upgrading 
and sites and services as the independent variables and the effects and 
impacts of such interventions as the dependent variables. As indicated 
already, the interventions included providing project participants with a 
housing site, water, sanitation, community services, and building materials. 
lt was expected that these interventions, singly or in combinations, 
would have detectable effects and impacts on the following factors: 
incarne and expenditures, employment, housing quality, access to basic 
services, health, migration, and land values in the project and adjacent 
areas. 
The researchers recognized, of course, that various types of project 
impacts would be difficult to trace directly to specific interventions. lnter-
vening variables were expected to influence the nature and direction of 
impacts. Combinations of various interventions might also cloud project 
effects. Despite these methodological difficulties, however, it is still impor-
tant to sort out the perceived effects and impacts of project interventions 
because the extent to which these interventions benefit or adversely affect 
the lives of project participants is an indication of project usefulness or 
effectiveness. 
lncome and Expenditures 
One of the fears in basic housing projects is that a family's expenditures 
will rise because of increased housing construction costs and higher service 
charges at precisely the time that incarnes are falling because of disruptions 
in employment brought about by the housing project. Affordability levels 
are carefully estimated in project design but, as seen in World Bank projects, 
estimates of what proportion of household incarne families can devote to 
housing can range from 5-50%. This wide range might be attributed to 
varying definitions of incarne, as well as types of expenditures involved. 
To determine the impact of participation in a basic housing project on 
incarne flows, a longitudinal study of 526 families was conducted in El 
Salvador from 1976-1980. The families were divided into an "experimental 
group" of 197 families who lived in Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y 
Vivien da Minima (FSDVM) projects and 329 families living in sium/squatter 
areas as a "contrai group." Incarne figures for bath groups were gathered 
in 1976, 1979, and 1980 to find out whether incarnes increased or decreased 
with time. The study showed that incarnes in bath groups increased with 
time (by about 70% among project participants and 75% among non-
participants). There was no evidence, therefore, that participation in the 
project adversely affected incarne flows among experimental group 
families (Bamberger et al. 1980). 
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If basic housing projects do not adversely affect incarne, is it possible 
that they increase housing expenditures to the point that families have to 
eut down on food, medicine, and other necessities because they have to 
devote more resources to housing? The same longitudinal study found 
that expenditures for housing did increase among project participants: 
from C3.95/person in 1976 to C5.7 /persan in 1980 (an increase of 44%). 
However, expenditures for food among participants were not significantly 
different from those of nonparticipants. Expenditures for medicine and for 
transport were also not significantly different between the two groups. 
The incarne and expenditure studies in El Salvador covered a 3-year 
period. Similar studies were conducted in the Tondo project in the 
Philippines but attention there was focused on the period of "maximum 
stress," i.e., the 3 months du ring which the families had to move from their 
original site to a nearby plot designated in the reblocking program of the 
National Housing Authority (NHA 1978d). 
The Tondo studies revealed that within the 3-month period average 
family expenditures rose by 170%. Of the amounts spent, about 64.9% 
went into construction and repair of hou ses. 1 ncome from regular employ-
ment decreased from an average of P512.35/month to P339.12/month. The 
decrease was due to the fact that some family breadwinners had to be 
absent from work to devote time to construction and repair of their 
homes. Because most people worked in the informai sector or in jobs 
where they had no vacation or sick leave, if they didn't work, they didn't 
earn any money. 
An interesting finding in the Tondo study, however, was that the total 
incarne of participant families increased by 51.9% over the period. ln the 
month before the actual move, relatives and friends of the families contri-
buted cash gifts and transfer payments to such an extent that 44.2% of total 
family incarne was made up of such gifts and contributions. Despite the 
decrease in incarne from regular employment, therefore, families still had 
net increases in incarne because of gifts and contributions. 
During the 3-month period of maximum stress, the Tondo study found 
that families were overspending (expenditures made up 108.6% of their 
average total incarne). Overexpenditures were met by borrowing, either 
from the building materials loans program of the NHA or from private 
sources. The heavy spending for house construction lasted about 4 months 
from the time the family moved into the new house. The proportion of 
incarne spent for building materials and labour during this period ranged 
from one-fifth to one-third of total expenditures. After the 4th month, 
however, there was a decrease in housing expenditures, rarely going 
beyond 2% per month. The expenditure patterns revealed, therefore, a 
fairly rapid rate of housing consolidation, after which housing expenditures 
leveled off to a more manageable rate. 
As in El Salvador, the Tondo study analyzed the proportion of incarne 
devoted to food. On the whole, the amounts spent by families on food 
increased because it is a tradition among Filipinos that "volunteers" who 
assist in building or improving a hou se are fed although they are not paid. 
As a proportion of total expenditures, however, food expenses declined 
sharply from around one-third to one-quarter of total expenditures. This 
pattern lasted for about 2 months after the move, after which it stabilized. 
The decline in the proportion of food expenses, of course, was a result of 
the high proportion of expenditures for housing. 
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As expected, patterns of incarnes and expenditures differed significantly 
between families with relatively low and relatively high incarnes. Among 
Tondo families classified as poor, 65.5% of total expenditures went toward 
food (compared with 22.6% for higher incarne families). Poorer families 
also spent considerably more for services (water, electricity, and fuel 
accounted for 6.1% of expenditures among the poor, whereas richer families 
spent only 3.9% of their incarne for such services). Richer families spent 
proportionally more for house repairs and construction, educational 
expenses, and leisure. The proportion of total incarne saved over a 
12-month period was 13.0% for poorer families and 52.6% for richer families. 
Studies of incarnes and expenditures in Zambia indicated that among a 
sample of families in Lilanda community, about 38% said their incarne 
improved after the project, 35% said their incarnes were lower, and 27% 
said there was no significant change in their incarnes (Sanyal et al. 1981). 
After settling down in the community, in fact, about 38% of the families 
surveyed said that their expenditures for housing had decreased. Similar 
studies in George community indicated that living in the project had not 
reduced expenditures on food and other basic necessities. 
Employment 
Project interventions to improve employment in basic housing projects 
have taken the form of absorbing workers in construction, encouraging 
people to engage in mutual-aid and self-help work, setting up sites for 
industries and commercial establishments, giving out small business loans, 
and providing technical assistance. Project designers recognized early the 
disruptive effects on employment of sites-and-services projects. There is 
now a strong tendency to favour community upgrading because it does 
not dislocate people. 
Contrary to common expectations, unemployment in sium/squatter 
areas has not been that high. ln a study of three communities in Lusaka, 
unemployment rates were 1.3% in Matera, 2.4% in Lilanda, and 2.7% in 
George. ln Lilanda, about 92.4% of total family incarne came from wages 
and salaries, whereas the percentage in George was 93.4%. Other 
members of the family, in addition to the main breadwinner, also contributed 
to family incarne. ln Lilanda, 4.6% of family incarne came from part-time 
work. 
Spouses and other members of low-income families in El Salvador also 
contributed significantly to family incarne. ln the 3-year study comparing 
families who were participants in FSDVM projects and those who were not, 
it was found that the employment status of the main breadwinner did not 
change much with time but the employment status of spouses and other 
family members did. ln general, more spouses and other family members 
from participant families continued to work than in families in the contrai 
group. The contributions of such family members to total family incarne 
were significant. lt was not clear, though, if the employment of spouses 
and other family members was forced upon them because of the need to 
pay for project costs or whether the project sites simply provided them 
with greater opportunities for employment. 
Concerns have been expressed by some that the increased "formalization" 
of life in basic housing projects would somehow disrupt employment in 
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the informai sector. For example, relocation to sites-and-services projects 
might dislocate hawkers and vendors and disrupt the delicate seller-buyer 
relationships based on mutual trust. Quite a bit of "illegal" economic 
activity takes place in sium/squatter areas, and this would probably be 
better restricted in project areas. Relocation to project sites might also 
make travel more difficult and expensive, discouraging some vendors, 
load carriers, and other people who work in downtown crowds from 
regularly engaging in such employment. 
Studies in the Dandora sites-and-services project in Nairobi, however, 
indicated that informai selling and even "illegal" economic activities 
(brewing and selling of beer and other intoxicants) did not stop because of 
relocation to the project. ln the Tondo project, the infusion of money into 
the area from the construction and other activities even improved sales of 
sari-sari stores and other vendors. New trades involving buying and selling 
of used and new building materials sprouted in the area. Sorne family 
members even found gainful employment in construction. 
For some reason, more formai project efforts to improve employment in 
basic housing sites have not fared well. Employment in construction handled 
by large- and medium-scale contractors has been less than expected. Even 
mandatory requirements stipulating that only people from project areas 
be hired by contractors, as in Jamaica, have not had satisfactory results. 
Setting up industrial or business sites has not attracted as many entre-
preneurs as anticipated, mainly due to service problems. Establishing the 
availability of small business loans has taken time, and in some countries 
there have been high default rates. Even experiments with cooperatives 
have not created the productive results expected. 
Perhaps the unsatisfactory results cited above merely indicate the 
difficulties involved in trying to put vitality into the informai sector by 
formai means. Project experiences have shown that there is a tendency to 
"overmanage" programs when they are handled bureaucratically. The 
lengthy and cumbersome procedures for processing and servicing small 
business loans have been mentioned elsewhere. The overly academic and 
organized nature of training programs have also been cited. Maybe the 
best that basic housing projects can do is to reduce the disruption of 
normal informai business activities and make sure that project activities 
do not artificially hinder economic processes. Perhaps the task of 
encouraging informai sector employment should be allocated to other 
groups (in the private sector, if necessary) who are better at doing this. 
This is already being done in some Philippine projects. lt may be worth 
trying in other cou ntries. 
Housing Quality 
The opportunity to own a house is probably the most important motivation 
to project participants in basic housing programs. Although the rate of 
home ownership in sium/squatter areas is higher than most people would 
expect, home ownership in such areas is usually beset with insecurities 
arising from the illegal nature of land occupancy, possibility of fire and 
other calamities, and general lack of services. Basic housing projects 
provide security, legality, and better services. These benefits entai! higher 
costs but families know that they are getting more for their investment. 
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Careful evaluations have been conducted of the quality of housing in 
projects compared with that in sium/squatter areas. ln El Salvador, the 
extent of crowding in rented mesones, illegal colonies, squatter areas, 
and FSDVM projects was studied in 1980. Using the number of persans per 
room as an indication of crowding, illegal colonies were the least crowded 
(2.0), followed by FSDVM projects (2.5), mesones (3.0), and tugurios or 
squatter areas (4.0). Measuring the roofed portion of livable areas, illegal 
colonies were also better (14.3 m 2/person), followed by FSDVM projects 
(9.0 m 2/person), mesones (8.3 m 2/person), and tugurios (6.0 m 2/person) 
(Bamberger et al. 1980). 
ln addition to the improvement in the quality of accommodations in a 
basic housing project, once in the project, there is a strong tendency 
for housing to improve with time. This is seen in studies in Zambia where 
indicators of crowding were measured in an earlier period (1975/1976) and 
some years later (1979/1980). The study showed that the percentage of 
households in which five or less persans were living together increased 
from 66.0% in 1975/1976 to 77.2% in 1979/1980 (Sanyal et al. 1981). 
Not surprisingly, an evaluation of the quality of housing by the project 
participants themselves has been most positive. ln a survey of Lilanda 
households, 92.7% of respondents said that the quality of their house was 
good, 0.8% said it was bad, and 5.7% rated the quality of their house "in 
between" the two extremes. When the same sample in Lilanda was asked 
whether the quality of their housing had improved or not 85.2% felt that it 
had improved, 2.5% felt it was worse, and 12.3% felt that it had not changed. 
Another indicator of improved housing quality is the type of building 
materials used. A comparative study made in Tondo in 1978and1979 showed 
that 17.3% of the houses were made of salvaged or scrap materials in 1978 
and only 6.9% of the houses used the same type of materials in 1979. ln 
1979, about 22.6% of the houses were built from a mixture of light and 
salvaged materials and another 27.7% were made of light materials. ln 1978, 
44.2% of ail houses were made of light materials. The greatest improve-
ment was in the number of houses made of mixed (light and strong) 
materials, which rose from 27.2% in 1978 to 34.5% in 1979. The percentage 
of houses made of strong materials declined from 11.3 to 8.3%, but this 
was attributed to the fact that the reblocking process resulted in the 
demolition of some houses and it was taking households some time to 
consolidate their homes. Observations in Tondo in 1981, although not based 
on scientific sampling, give the impression that houses made of strong 
materials now predominate in the area (NHA 1980a,b). 
Access to Services 
More important than physical improvements, as a measure of housing 
quality, has been increased access to basic services by families participating 
in basic housing projects. ln almost ail countries evaluated, improved 
access to services was noticed. 
ln El Salvador, service conditions were compared among three types of 
settlements: mesones, illegal settlements, and squatter areas. The worst 
conditions were found in squatter areas, where 40.8% of the households 
relied on rivers or open wells for water, 83.5% used pit latrines or no toi lets 
at ail, 78.4% used gas or oil for lighting, and 19.6% even used candies. 
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Conditions were a bit better in rented mesones, where 100% of the house-
holds had access to communal water supplies or could buy water from 
vendors, 68.2% had communal toilets, and 86.1% could use electricity for 
lighting. lllegal settlements had even better access to services in that 45.2% 
had individual water connections from a public water supply source, 15.0% 
had connections to public sewers, and 79.3% had electricity for lighting. 
Compared with FSDVM projects, however, ail three types of settlements 
mentioned above had inferior access to services as water, sanitation, and 
lighting were provided in ail project homes (Bamberger et al. 1980). 
Using the mean distance people have to travel to avail themselves of 
services, the El Salvador evaluation revealed that families in FSDVM projects 
had to travel the least to get to schools, public telephones, playgrounds 
and parks, and the electrical company's offices. Families living in mesones 
had better access to medical facilities, public transport, and markets, and 
those families living in squatter areas had the best access to their places of 
work. lllegal settlements, because they tended to be at the city's 
periphery, had the worst access to services in terms of distances from them. 
ln the community-upgrading project in Tondo, the major project impact 
has been in improvements in sanitation and drainage between 1978 and 
1979. Within the year, the proportion of households using water-sealed 
toilets rose from 38.5 to 45.8% and the percentage of families using pit 
latrines decreased from 8.8 to 4.0%. ln low-lying Tondo, where flooding 
was an annual occurrence in the past, the proportion of houses with covered 
drains rose from 14.8 to 27.2% and the percentage of houses with no 
drainage system decreased from 37.9 to 19.4%. Unfortunately, despite the 
installation of water connections and electrical lines to most houses, the 
inability of national agencies to supply water and electricity to Tondo 
meant that no detectable improvements in services took place during the 
year. This lack of water and electricity was behind the dissatisfaction 
with services voiced by Tondo residents in late 1979 (NHA 1980a,b). 
Access to water has been the most notable improvement in services to 
Zambian project participants. ln surveys of two communities, it was 
found that whereas before only 14.3% of the households in the project had 
their own water tap, 98.0% of the households in Matera now had their 
own tap. ln Lilanda, 98.4% of the households had access to shared water 
taps. The proportion of houses relying on open wells for water had been 
reduced to insignificant proportions. ln George community, 97.0% of the 
households had shared water taps as a source of water. 
When asked to evaluate service conditions in their community, house-
holds in Lilanda responded as follows: 67.2% said access to water had 
improved, 16.4% said that there had been no change, and 16.4% said 
access to water was worse. With respect to health services, 9.0% said they 
had improved, 32.8% said that there was no change, and 58.2% said they 
were now worse. Public transport was also criticized, with 5.8% of the 
households saying that it had improved, 43.0% said that there was no 
change, and 51.2% said it is worse. Because of the wider plots and more 
space in the new project, 63.3% of the households said that access to 
gardening had improved, 28.3% said that there had been no change, and 
8.3% said that conditions were worse (Sanyal et al. 1981). 
ln general, basic housing projects succeeded in improving access to 
services for the project participants. ln some instances, however, the 
improved services have suffered from the inability of other agencies to 
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Public faucets are crucial to a project's success, Sènega/. (Urban services are often 
more important than housing.) 
meet their obligations, resulting in expressed dissatisfaction with services 
from the participants. Rates of dissatisfaction with services have been 
higher with sites-and-services than upgrading projects. This has been due 
mainly to the location of such projects in urban peripheries and difficulties 
in extending services to such areas. 
Health 
Various interventions such as improved water, drainage, garbage colledion, 
and construction of health clinics should improve the health conditions of 
project participants. However, improved health is extremely difficult to 
trace to specific interventions. ln almost all projects, sharp declines have 
been observed in such ailments as gastroenteritis and respiratory diseases. 
However, even sophisticated statistical techniques are unable to establish 
the relationship between such improvements and project interventions. 
Methodological difficulties, however, have not deterred project 
authorities from introducing innovative health approaches in project areas. 
ln addition to improved water, drainage, toilets, and garbage collection 
and disposai, experiments have been carried out in health care administra-
tion and environmental sanitation. ln projects in the Philippines, 
community-based health and family planning workers have been introduced 
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in low-income areas to augment the efforts of clinic-based, largely 
curative health professionals and technicians. ln lndonesia, community 
organizations of women and youths have been set up to carry out 
community clean-up campaigns and emphasize environmental sanitation. 
Nutrition education, school feeding programs, and cooking classes have 
involved mothers and children in Jamaica. Health programs in most 
projects have stressed preventive rather than curative programs, environ-
mental rather than disease aspects of health, and long-term rather than 
immediate health needs. 
One difficulty with assessing the health impact of basic housing projects 
is the fact that evaluation of project impact has been going on for only 2-3 
years, whereas developments in health take a much longer time to be 
perceived. If present trends continue, one can expect greater beneficial 
health results from basic housing projects. However, it seems a bit early to 
establish the relationships between improved health and project interventions 
at this time. 
Migration 
For years, one of the arguments against basic housing programs was the 
fear that improved housing and services in cities would only encourage 
more people to migrate from rural areas. Like health, migration is extremely 
difficult to assess because it needs a longer time frame than the 3 years that 
the projects have been evaluated to clearly indicate its impact. lt is 
possible, however, to identify certain aspects of migration and housing at 
this time, although definite relationships are difficult to establish. 
Project authorities point to low turnover rates (usually less than 5%) as 
proof that migrants are not being attracted to basic housing projects. 
However, this is of limited usefulness because most recent migrants would 
probably not be accommodated in projects. They would be more apt to 
take up housing accommodations in aider, more established siums where 
rents are lower or in new squatting areas still undetected by the authorities. 
lt is this realization, in fact, that prompted Zambian authorities to demolish 
old shanties vacated by project participants and accelerate housing 
construction in the projects so that families could move to the new sites 
faster. 
One of the strongest arguments presented against the relationship 
between housing and migration is the well-known model of Harris and 
Todaro that suggests that rural-urban migration is due to the real and 
perceived differences between incarnes in rural and urban areas and not 
to housing and urban service differentials. Surveys in Zambia seem to lend 
credence to this theory. When asked why families had corne to Lusaka, 
71% of the respondents in George and 91% in Lilanda answered "to seek 
employment." Less than 3% cited better housing as a reason for migration 
(Sanyal et al. 1981). 
Another factor cited to counter the charge that projects encourage 
migration is the finding that more project participants are old migrants 
or original city dwellers. About 63% of the respondents in George arrived 
in Lusaka before 1970 (the proportion of Lilanda respondents was 64%). ln 
a survey of two communities in the Philippines, it was found that 57.2% 
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of the residents in Barrio Escopa had lived in the area for more than 10 
years and 30.6% of the residents in Bagong Barrio had also lived in the 
community for more than 10 years {NHA 1977). 
Despite the inconclusive evidence that basic housing projects might 
tend to encourage migration, a number of strategies are now being intro-
duced to counter this possible effect. Thus, more recent sites-and-services 
projects are being set up in small cities and towns instead of being concen-
trated in very large capital cities. More recent projects are also smaller 
and less visible, organized to fill the interstices between large 
developments, and provide housing as close to employment areas as 
possible. 
To date, the number and magnitude of basic housing projects is still too 
small to exert a dominant effect on migration. If they have any impact, it 
would be to siphon off families that are relatively better off to the 
improved project sites. Although project designers have attempted to 
corne up with housing that would be affordable to even lower incarne 
groups, there is still a tendency for project units to go to families with 
relatively higher incarnes. A more important question that should be 
raised, therefore, is what happens to the sites and shelters vacated by 
those who move to project areas. Are they occupied by aider residents in 
those areas or by new arrivais? 
One thing that policymakers often forget is that rural-urban migration is 
not, in itself, bad. Much of the vitality of cities is due to the influx of 
migrants and this positive impact will continue as long as progressive 
migrants continue to corne. ln view of this, a matter for greater concern is 
the effects on migration of policies that allow urban shelter and services to 
deteriorate. If sium and squatter areas grow in numbers and conditions in 
these places become worse, the rural people that will be encouraged to 
move to cities will be those who would find no difficulty living in these 
deteriorating areas. Rather than discouraging migration, therefore, 
policies of do-nothing and neglect would encourage migration. Even 
worse, it would attract to the cities less desirable people from the rural 
areas, i.e., those who would fit well into deteriorating siums. 
Land Values 
Early sites-and-services projects, such as the Pikine project in Senegal, 
were set up to influence the spatial development of cities by providing 
serviced sites where they were needed. The construction of roads, provision 
of urban services, movement of people to the area, and construction of 
houses provide tremendous boosts to land values in the project and 
vicinity. This increase in land values also takes place in community upgrading, 
where the rationalization of land use, decongestion of commun1t1es, 
introduction of better services, and improved houses all contribute to 
higher property values. 
ln Zambia, the development of the peripheral city sites has created a 
great demand for transportation between these sites and the city. The 
demand has been met aggressively by private entrepreneurs who took 
advantage of the improved roads to the projects. Transportation improve-
ments, in addition to other basic urban service improvements, have created 
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increased economic act1v1t1es in the project sites. As a result, not only 
sites near the projects but also those between the city and the project 
area have increased in desirability and value. 
The increases in land values both within the projects and in the 
surrounding areas have triggered two policy concerns: first, would they 
increase the desirability of project sites to the extent that middle-income 
and lower-income families would buy out the original allocatees and, 
second, would it be possible to "recapture" some of the higher values created 
by the projects so that government resources could be improved? 
Regarding the first issue, there is evidence in the Philippines and 
Kenya that basic housing projects are becoming very attractive to investors, 
so much so that, although buying and selling of project plots is illegal, a 
few houses and plots have been the abject of such deals in the past. This 
is not a surprising development because projects in these cou ntries are 
located in choice areas; participating families have been the beneficiaries 
of attractive support and subsidies; and the houses, to the extent that they 
can be developed (or rented, as in Kenya), cou Id provide extremely good 
returns to investments. 
To date, the main response to the problem of buying and selling plots 
has been prohibition (in both the Philippines and El Salvador it is illegal 
to sell a plot within 5 years of the original purchase date). Because this 
legal prohibition seems to be relatively easy to circumvent, there may be 
a need, later on, to improve "recovery" of project benefits through other 
means. 
Financial authorities have a number of instruments that can be used to 
capture increased values. These include special assessment rates for 
designated areas, higher tax rates for areas receiving benefits, capital gains 
taxes, user charges, and other fiscal techniques. To date, housing authorities 
have not used any of these instruments in basic housing projects. On the 
contrary, most efforts have been concentrated on how to provide special 
benefits and privileges to project participants rather than collecting anything 
from them. ln the future, however, project managers will have to confront 
the issue of recovering benefits. ln view of the rapid increase in land 
values in the projects and surrounding areas, this time might not be too 
far off. 
Conclusions 
Basic housing projects have had positive effects and impacts on the lives 
of the people in the projects, on the quality of their shelter and services, 
and on land values in surrounding areas. Compared with the living condi-
tions in the sium/squatter areas where the people used to live, those 
currently prevailing in project sites are infinitely better. 
There is, however, a far more important impact of basic housing projects 
on housing policy and human settlement strategies in the countries included 
in this project. The relative success of the basic housing projects has 
encouraged housing authorities to pay less attention to formai housing 
construction programs and devote resources to incremental improvement 
schemes such as community upgrading and sites and services. The 
demonstration that community upgrading and sites and services can work 
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has also resulted in tapping more national and international resources for 
similar types of housing programs. 
Sorne housing analysts have raised the question of whether or not the 
positive impacts noted in the evaluation will continue in the future. There 
is some fear that most of the positive impacts have been due to the relative 
novelty and innovativeness of the approaches, that as basic housing pro-
grams become more prosaic they will also become less effective. lt has also 
been suggested that the success of most basic housing schemes to date has 
been due to a self-selection process that has included in such projects the 
better-off and more innovative residents of sium/squatter areas, and that 
after this "creaming-off" effect wears off the positive impacts will be 
diminished. 
There is reason to voice such concerns and enough disturbing evidence 
to make them very real. However, the evaluation of project impacts should 
really be relative to what can be achieved using other housing 
options. So far, bath formai housing programs and policies of do-nothing 
do not show any real advantage compared with the basic housing schemes. 
Also, continued experimentation with basic housing approaches are leading 
to new insights and techniques that improve their effectiveness and 
efficiency. Until more productive outputs can be achieved by other means, 
it may be best to continue with basic housing approaches. 
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TOW ARD A BASIC 
HOUSING POLICY 
9 
Hut in Santa Tee/a, San Salvador - basic housing is often what the urban poor build 
themselves. 
The beleaguered housing official in charge of a corn mu nity-upgrading 
or sites-and-services project might not be aware of it but a project site 
is an arena for an old controversy about what the right approach to basic 
housing for the urban poor should be. lt has been 30 years since Abrams 
began the international consultations that eventually led to the pioneering 
Man's strugg/e for shelter in an urbanizing world, and more than 20 years 
sin ce Turner went through 8 years of reeducation in the barriadas of Lima 
to emerge as a critic of conventional architectural and engineering 
approaches to housing. Sin ce those early years, research and experimenta-
tion on low-cost housing approaches for the urban poor have thrived. The 
90 or so projects funded by the World Bank and other international agencies 
today are only the latest developments in this debate. As the evaluations 
of such projects in a few countries reveal, it is unlikely that they will be 
the last such efforts in years to corne. 
Sorne of the forms the debate has ta ken, such as the question of whether 
housing is a "noun" or a "verb,'' have been seen by some as being too 
academic (Turner 1972a). However, such debates have served to clarify the 
underlying concepts and value systems that have been responsible for 
specific housing policies and programs in the past. For example, it is now 
widely accepted by most that the "process" by which shelter and services 
are provided is more important than the physical house shell. However, it 
has taken a lot of arguing that housing is a process and nota product to 
drive this point home. To date, it is still necessary in most housing dis-
cussions to point out that the traditional emphasis on minimum housing 
standards, completed dwellings, industrialized systems building, and how 
many houses were added to housing starts in a year are ail rooted in a 
"product" rather than "process" orientation. 
Another aspect of the debate is the question of "freedom to build," on 
the one hand, and "dealing with larger numbers,'' on the other. The nature 
of this issue has not changed since it was raised by Weissmann during a 
visit to a mutual-aid project in Peru in the late 1960s (see Turner 1972b). 
Essentially, the question was how to use autonomous approaches such as 
mutual aid and self-help in such a way that they cou Id adequately respond 
to the massive housing needs of the urban poor? How can individual initia-
tive be managed so that it can be the main element in a large organized 
program? 
This integration of autonomy and freedom, on the one hand, and organized 
efficiency, on the other, lies at the philosophical foundation of the issue. 
To that extent, it is rooted in the age-old question of individual rights and 
the function of the state, or in the Weberian issue of what happens to 
individual efforts in bureaucracies. ls there a way of harnessing the 
energy, camaraderie, and goodwill among primary groups in sium/squatter 
areas and transforming these intangibles into an efficient housing program? 
ln the words of the Salvadorean Foundation for Development and Minimal 
Housing, it is possible to combine the "horizontal cooperative human 
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relationships" found among mutual-aid part1c1pants with the "vertical 
hierarchical authority relationships" that make a large organization like 
the foundation function? 
Housing Policy as Politics 
Most developing countries have some form of housing policy that 
defines the raie of government and the private sector in providing shelter 
and services. Sorne policies may be little more than statements of how 
many houses are needed per year, what agencies should build them, and 
how much the effort will cost; others are comprehensive documents 
covering short- and long-term perspectives, sophisticated analyses of 
housing needs and demands, estimates of housing investments, and 
institutional responsibilities. 
A commonly ignored side of housing policies is that they are, first and 
foremost, political statements. ln countries where rural power elites pre-
dominate, the housing needs of the urban poor might be ignored. ln 
countries with strong traditions of private enterprise, the government's 
raie in housing might be relegated to influencing socioeconomic conditions 
to allow contractors, developers, and building materials sellers to carry out 
their businesses. This recognition of housing policy as just another aspect 
of politics is often forgotten by planners and technicians. This often makes 
it difficult for them to understand the merits of pragmatism and 
compromise. 
Another consequence of the political nature of housing policies is the 
fact that what is stated in them might not actually be programed or imple-
mented. ln some countries, the policies might be read as just so many 
good intentions. More cynically, they may be seen as "election promises" 
or window dressing for some ambitious social programs that cannot be 
supported with adequate resources. 
Where housing policies reflect a genuine desire to improve the living 
conditions of the poor, they are an invaluable instrument in planning and 
programing effective projects. ln this case, housing policies would most 
likely encompass such areas as defining the housing need, identifying 
target groups, land policy, institutional framework, raie of the private 
sector, and raie of the popular sector. 
Housing Need 
One of the factors that makes it difficult for many developing countries 
to make a housing policy work is the way in which housing needs are 
defined. The main element in estimating housing needs, as currently 
practiced, is the "dwelling unit." Despite years of arguing, on the part of 
housing theorists, that this focus on the "dwelling unit" leads to mistaken 
concepts of housing needs, there are still many countries that continue to 
use it in drawing up their housing policies. 
The main pitfall in looking at housing needs in terms of dwelling units 
is that it predisposes planners to think in terms of finished houses that can 
be counted (the "product" orientation). The fact, however, is that what 
constitutes a dwelling is culturally or historically defined. The United 
Nations, in drawing up instructions for the 1973 "World Housing Survey" 
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recognized this by indicating that a dwelling unit could be "a house, a 
mobile unit, a natural shelter like a cave or a makeshift unit like a tent." 
To avoîd definitional problems, the United Nations proposed the symbol 
"delta" to indicate "dwelling unit." Despite this definitional nicety, 
however, current systems for estimating housing needs are still wanting 
because they rely on a "product," and a finished product at that. 
Once a country commits itself to a definition of a dwelling unit, estimation 
of the housing needs becomes an exercise in the "numbers game." So 
many houses are needed. The productive capacity of the country is only so 
many houses. So much money is needed to reduce the housing backlog. 
The country only has so much money. The result, invariably, is frustration. 
Statistical estimations of the housing need can be quite sophisticated. 
The following, for example, are the most commonly used variables: (1) 
Housing needs existing at the beginning of the planning period: (a) number 
of households without shelter (homeless), (b) households occupying living 
quarters of an "unacceptable" type, (c) households involuntarily doubling 
up with other households, (d) households needing separate shelter to 
reduce density levels in existing structures to an acceptable standard, and 
(e) living quarters of an acceptable type but in need of repair or replacement. 
(2) Actual housing needs during the plan period: (a) dwellings needed by 
new households, and (b) dwellings needed to replace living quarters lost 
during the period due to destruction, obsolescence, or eradication. 
A common formula for estimating housing needs is simply to add up the 
numbers denoted by the variables mentioned above. Despite serîous 
attempts to formulate definitions, however, the resulting numbers are 
really of little help in understanding a country's housing problem. There 
are a number of reasons for this. 
First, a number of variables depend on defining an "acceptable" 
standard, but this is extremely difficult to set. The question may be asked, 
for example, are sium houses and squatter shanties substandard? As 
evaluations of country experiences have shown, there are quite substantial 
dwellings in sium/squatter areas, as there are dilapidated houses in "good 
neighbourhoods." Density standards are also peculiarly culture bound. 
The minimum housing standard of one persan per room might be an indi-
cator of healthy housing in some countries but it may only mean loneliness 
and isolation to a child in cultures where children grow up sharing one 
mat and one mosquito net from birth. 
Second, definitions of a housing unit connote a finished dwelling. This 
negates the notion of progressive development, which is a basic assumption 
in low-cost housing strategies. What a household needs might not be a 
completed structure. lt might be the beginning of a structure that the 
family can then improve upon. lt could be an existing shanty that can be 
upgraded if services are extended to the community. 
ln a review of housing conditions all over the world, the World Bank 
concluded that "general estimates of housing 'deficits' or 'needs' were 
found to be so misleading that they could not be used" (Churchill 1979). 
Analysis is ... complicated by the absence of even reasonably accurate 
data ... the limitations of the data on 'substandard,' 'sium,' and 
'squatter' housing are well known. Such data are collected according 
to widely differing definitions and are not comparable from city to 
city .... Typically, estimates of substandard housing include a great 
deal of housing of relatively high quality; such housing, however, may 
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lack legal tenure, services, or both. Many existing estimates have been 
prepared for other purposes and they may be misleading for economic 
analysis. 
What the quotation indicates is not so much the inaccuracy of the 
data but a lack of insight into the real housing need. If what is lacking in 
so-called "substandard" housing is often "legal tenure, services, or bath," 
then what may be the real need in housing can be sometimes defined by 
tenure and services, not by physical structures called dwelling units. If 
what people are already living in are taken as acceptable dwellings that can 
be "improved" by the introduction of better services, then a housing 
strategy might involve provision of services and not so many housing shells. 
Here, the comments of a housing official in a developing country may 
be worth repeating. 
1 am told that our housing deficit amounts to some 10,000 units per 
year and that we will have to build about 4,000 hou ses just to keep up 
with the housing backlog. However, each day, as the sun sets in my 
country, every person has a home to go home to. So, where is the 
housing shortage? 
lnstead of seeing the remark as a callous disregard for human welfare, 
it cari be interpreted as an appreciation of the so-called housing need. lt 
indicates that housing perceptions are relative. lt denies absolutist stan-
dards that say dwellings must be of standard sizes or that services must be 
of certain types to be acceptable. Although national social accounts or 
comprehensive planning might require figures on housing needs, qualitative 
measures of such figures must be set up first before quantities are introduced. 
ln other words, before figures on housing needs are added up, statisticians 
and planners must first determine what it is they are counting. 
Target Croups 
An alternative to formulating housing plans based upon stat1st1cs of 
housing needs is to formulate such plans in light of what target groups they 
are supposed to serve. As previously indicated, housing might be the 
responsibility of the government, private sector, or people themselves (i.e., 
the popular sector). A basic housing policy should not be confused with a 
national housing policy that encompasses the total housing needs of the 
country. lt is confined to the housing needs of the lowest incarne groups 
in urban areas and leaves out middle- and high-income groups, as well as 
households living in rural areas. 
Household incarne, despite problems in estimating it, is a good guide to 
setting target groups for a basic housing policy. lt is especially useful in 
sites-and-services projects where eligibility criteria can be formulated and 
enforced. ln community upgrading, a more desirable method of defining 
target groups is to identify sium and squatter areas in cities. Once these 
areas are identified, the bona fide residents of those areas become the 
target groups regardless of their incarne levels. 
Experience in a number of countries has shown that sium/squatter areas 
are not all of a kind. They differ according to such characteristics as 
areal extent, number of people, density, age of the settlement, homogeneity 
or heterogeneity, level of services, levels of organized activity, physical 
deterioration, contiguousness or spread, and extent of social disorga-
149 
nization. Sometimes, it is possible to analyze these factors by determining 
how they interrelate with each other, thereby allowing them to be grouped 
according to type. For example, in most cases, central city siums and squatter 
areas are aider, smaller in areal extent, have higher densities, are more 
homogeneous, tend to have higher levels of services, are more physically 
disorganized, and have greater degrees of social disorganization. Conversely, 
peripheral city squatter/sium areas are more recent, larger, have lower 
densities because they are more spread out, are more heterogeneous, 
and possess a higher level of social organization. Characteristics of sium/ 
squatter areas are important in determining the type of basic housing 
programs that may be introduced. Of special concern are levels of basic 
services, the improvement of which may be more important than the 
shelter components in u pgradi ng projects. 
A cammonly accepted notion is that a basic housing policy should be 
designed for that segment of the population that is neither tao poor to 
afford some form of housing package nor tao rich to require the concessional 
conditions offered. Many project designers see this as aiming at target 
groups of households between the 20th and 60th percentiles of incarne 
groups in an urban area. Families below the 20th percentile require some 
type of subsidized housing. Those above the 60th percentile should be 
able to compete in the open housing market, served by private contractors 
and developers and by private credit institutions. 
Studies have shown that there is great heterogeneity among families 
within the incarne brackets mentioned above. ldeally, some type of 
housing intervention shou Id be designed to cater to the needs of each 
subgroup. For families with relatively lower incarnes, for example, the 
mere introduction of such services as water and surface drainage where 
they are living might be an excellent approach. The introduction of basic 
services vastly improves living conditions for these households. lt does 
not disrupt the fragile relationship between residence and work place 
because the people are served where they live. Because the introduction 
of services amounts to tacit recognition of their "squatter's rights" to the 
land, it might give them a stronger daim for security of tenure. Ali of these 
factors might encourage these families to improve their dwellings and 
surroundings further. 
Community-upgrading programs have shown that the costs of services 
to low-income families can be drastically reduced when these services are 
formally introduced in sium/squatter cammunities. lt is official prohibition, 
based on the notion that such communities are illegal and not entitled to 
urban services, that often artificially raises the cost of services. Before 
a water system was introduced in Tondo, for example, people had to buy 
water from itinerant water vendors at ten times the normal rate that the 
average Manila resident had to pay. lllegal electrical connections, in 
addition to cheating the utility campany and the risks imposed by improper 
connections, were actually four times as expensive to low-income families. 
The simple regularization of such services brings down the real costs to 
households, makes administration easier, and improves collection of rate 
charges. 
Sites-and-services projects may suit families with relatively higher 
incarnes but even here the range of incarne groups that may be served can 
be widened by variations in house design, minimum standards, repayment 
schedules, and levels of services. Offering only a serviced site makes possi-
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Residents of Tondo, Philippines, have had to purchase drinking water from itinerant 
peddlers. 
ble a cheaper option, compared with adding acore unit or a semifinished 
house on the site. Allowing families to use salvaged materials from their 
old dwellings can reduce initial costs. The use of temporary makeshift 
shelters while the family is working on the permanent house would 
reduce commuting costs. ln some projects, it has been found that the 
additional cost of building a house core that a family can move into imme-
diately can be easily justified by considering the fact that this option 
enables the family to avoid paying rent on the old house and amortization 
on the new one, spending money on commuting, investing in a temporary 
shelter that will have to be destroyed later, and paying someone to take 
care of building materials stocked on the new site. The financial load on 
the family is further reduced in that the lump sum for the core house can 
be amortized over a longer period of time but the costs mentioned above 
have to be paid immediately, at a time when other costs arising from the 
move have to be met as well. 
Sorne critics of sites and services have charged that insistence on 
serving families within a specific incarne bracket creates homogeneously 
poor communities that may lack the dynamism that a more "normal" 
community possesses. Such communities also become easily identified as 
"projects for the poor," . with connotations of trouble, lawlessness, and 
immorality attached to the label. Observers of sium life have noted that 
people in low-income communities "live off each other," that there are 
networks of economic interrelationships that allow those who are relatively 
well-off to employ others and the masses of the poor can become the 
consumers of the services offered by the well-to-do. lnsisting on a narrow 
range of incarne groups can spoil this economic and social interdependence. 
Again, a number of project variations have been tried to prevent the 
situation described above. ln a project in lndonesia, some parcels of land 
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in a project were sold to higher incarne families at market prices, whereas 
most plots were sold to target groups at concessional rates. This achieved 
not only cross-subsidization but also assured that a greater variety of people 
would be living in the project area. ln the Dandora project in Kenya, a 
much wider range of options was offered to project participants. Plots 
ranged from 100-160 m 2 in size and residents could build from two to 
more than six rooms in such plots. Business and commercial plots, soldat 
market rates, are included in the Zambian and Philippine projects. Indus-
trial sites are leased or sold in almost ail projects. Although many of 
these types of options were offered to create greater economic activity, 
they have also had the effect of widening the range of households served. 
Community-upgrading projects, because they have to take low-income 
communities as they are, are less likely to suffer from serving only a 
limited range of families. They also have the advantage of building upon 
what is already there. This means that even limited interventions can have 
significant effects. A housing agency with limited resources can avoid the 
"lumpiness" of sites-and-services investments that require a certain size 
and level of activity to really become worthwhile. 
Regardless of the basic housing approach employed, it is important 
when choosing project target groups that attention be given to low-income 
communities in towns and smaller cities and that the tendency to concen-
trate on very large and capital cities be avoided. There are many advantages 
to this approach. First, such projects will probably be smaller and easier to 
manage. Second, they will probably be less expensive because land and 
other project components cost less in such places. Third, there is a possibility 
that assisting families in these cities may encourage them to stay there, 
thus reducing population pressures on metropolitan areas. Finally, there is 
a greater likelihood that local government units in such areas will be more 
willing to participate in low-income projects, thus assuring project 
continuation and maintenance. 
Land Policy 
Aside from the cost of providing shelter and services, the other issue 
in a basic housing policy is land. As experience in many countries reveals, 
land per se is not the problem. lt enters basic housing policy in terms of 
the location of available land, cost of acquisition and development, how 
easy or difficult it is to acquire, and what type of tenure should be 
established in basic housing projects. 
Land continues to be a problem in basic housing despite the argument 
that land, in itself, is without value and should not be an item of commerce. 
Land speculation is one of the most lucrative ventures in developing 
countries. Even in countries where government land policies specifically 
try to contrai speculation (as in Zambia), people still find ways and means 
of using land as an item of trade. 
lt was the high cost of land that was responsible for the failures of early 
sites-and-services projects. Because land in central city areas was so 
expensive, planners took the line of least resistance and located the 
projects on urban peripheries. As project after project showed, this did not 
really respond to the needs of low-income people and many of these 
projects failed. More recently, the policy of setting up sites-and-services 
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projects in overspill areas adjacent to communities being upgraded is also 
encountering land problems. ln El Salvador and the Philippines, land for 
overspill projects has to be purchased at "fair market value," which often 
prices the resulting projects beyond the affordability levels set. There is 
recourse to legal expropriation using constitutional provisions on eminent 
domain and inherent rights of the state to contrai land, but such procedures 
take time, are expensive, and can become complex and very nasty. 
To assure that land is available for basic housing projects, there have 
been a number of approaches that have been used in many developing 
countries. Many of these have proven quite effective. They include: (1) 
urban land reform; (2) cadastral surveys and mapping; (3) fiscal and tax 
measures; (4) land development programs; (5) land use contrais; and (6) 
land banking. Many of these approaches are closely related to each other, 
which suggests that a comprehensive land policy, rather than the institution 
of individual measures, might be the best approach. 
A number of countries, such as Chile, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, 
have instituted urban land reform programs whereby large estates owned 
by individuals or families have been broken up and redistributed to 
residents and tenants. The usual practice has been for the government to 
"purchase" estates for cash or land bonds. After acquiring the land, 
government planners could then embark on community-improvement 
and sites-and-services projects to assist the new owners. Urban land 
reform has been most difficult to legislate and carry out because it goes 
against the interests of power elites. lt has also been used more as an 
instrument for achieving social equity than to effect urban improvements. 
Still, to the extent that urban land reform makes more land available at 
more reasonable rates, it is a definite asset to a basic housing policy. 
Land ownership in many developing countries is a complex mixture of 
communal land tenure, leaseholding, freeholding, traditional rights, and 
squatter's rights. Often, a simple intervention such as a cadastral survey 
and mapping exercise can improve the land situation tremendously. Such 
an exercise, for example, will identify ail types of tenure status. lt will 
clarify which lands belong to the government, individuals and families, 
and institutions. To that extent, it is a big boon to tax authorities who can 
update their tax rails. lt facilitates credit and other transactions for which 
land is used as collateral or a surety. lt even helps to reduce the amount 
of litigation over land boundaries that is such a common preoccupation 
among neighbours in many developing countries. Most important of ail, 
because the surveys and maps indicate where various types of lands are, it 
assists planners of basic housing projects in locating various schemes. 
Once locations are decided upon, land acquisition becomes easier because 
the status of the land is known. 
Most national and local governments in developing countries possess 
taxation and other fiscal powers for controlling land use but these are 
often not fully exercised for various reasons. To pursue an effective basic 
housing policy, such powers might have to be exercised, and new measures 
formulated as well. A common measure that can be used, for example, is a 
taxon idle lands. This might help contrai land speculation if a taxis imposed 
for developing or selling land. High rates of capital gains taxes might also 
help discourage speculation in the Philippines, where a law was passed in 
1972 requiring landowners to formally declare the true market value of 
their land. The declared value became the basis for land taxation. To help 
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curb undervaluation in the declarations, however, the declared value was 
also set as the expropriation price if the government acquired the land. ln 
balancing between taxation rates and expropriation prices a fairer valuation 
of the land was achieved. The measure has also significantly increased the 
proceeds from land taxes since it was enforced. 
To make more land available for basic housing, the government, through 
appropriate agencies, might even take the role of developer. ln Korea, the 
government is empowered to declare a piece of urban land a development 
area and introduce roads, drainage, sewerage and other improvements 
into it. After the development program, only that portion of the land 
equivalent to the declared value before the development was launched is 
returned to the landowner. The rest is made available for housing and 
other developmental purposes. ln Hong Kong, the government is also 
empowered to swap rural lands that it owns for urban lands, or vice versa. 
ln these land exchanges, the predevelopment value of the private land is 
used, enabling the government to acquire more land for development 
purposes. 
The inherent right of the state to contrai the use of land and prevent its 
abuse is usually embodied in zoning and building codes. Where such 
codes exist, they may be used more actively to pursue basic housing 
programs more vigorously. They may also be updated to be more relevant 
to existing conditions. When revising old codes or formulating new ones, 
it might be useful to change their orientation from one of contrai to 
encouragement of positive developments in certain directions. Traditional 
code provisions on such aspects as minimum standards, single-purpose or 
multiple land uses, and segregation of production and residential areas, 
might require attention. The administrative machinery for code enforce-
ment must also be improved and more personnel trained to make the 
codes more effective. 
ln countries where private ownership of land is the rule, more land can 
be made available for basic housing through the use of land banking. This 
entails the purchase of land when it is still cheap, preservation of public 
land for future uses, exchange of some public lands for tracts that may be 
of more value later, or development of private lands so that development 
costs may be recouped for public use. Sorne countries, like Zambia, are 
fortunate in that large tracts of land belonging to the government are 
still available. Others, like Thailand, also have valuable lands belonging 
to the crown. ln most countries, however, uncontrolled urban development 
is fast depleting land resources, and governments have to intervene to 
make sure that enough land is available when it is needed. ln a number of 
instances, land banking might create artificial shortages in the land market 
as public ownership withdraws land from private use. ln general, however, 
if the government is serious about intervening in public housing, land 
banking is a necessary move. lt not only assures that land is available but 
also makes the land available in sites where it will do the most good for 
the common welfare. 
Housing Institutions 
The housing agencies in charge of projects evaluated in IDRC - World 
Bank studies encompass the complete range of institutional arrangements 
required for basic housing. They include a nonprofit private foundation, 
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Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM); local 
government (Lusaka City Council); national line agency (National Housing 
Authority); and special housing authority, Office des Habitations à Loyer 
Modéré (OHLM). As evaluations of the programs indicated, there are 
advantages and disadvantages to specific institutional arrangements and 
not ail of these can be traced to cultural or historical factors. 
One common approach to basic housing was to set up a special authority 
to look after it. Thus, the Tondo Foreshore and Dagat-Dagatan Development 
Authority (TFDA) was organized to look after the planning and administration 
of the Tondo project. As set up, the TFDA had a specified areal jurisdiction, 
confined to the project site. lt also had specified functions - to be the 
main body given the ultimate responsibility for the project, with powers to 
coordinate other agencies working on the site. 
Although creating a particular agency to take charge of basic housing 
has the positive effect of clarifying lines of authority, it also has certain 
drawbacks. lt may antagonize old, established agencies that jealously 
guard their prerogatives. lt creates functional and geographical fragmenta-
tion and makes interagency coordination that much more difficult. When 
pushed to extremes, special authorities waste valuable resources because 
many organizational functions of a support and auxiliary nature have to be 
set up for each agency, resulting from the inability to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Fragmentation may also result in uncontrolled 
competition for the few trained civil servants in a country, thereby creating 
higher personnel costs. 
The fact must be recognized that basic housing is a complex activity that 
requires the contributions of many agencies of various types and different 
governmental levels. No one agency, no matter how richly endowed, can 
provide ail the inputs to basic housing. Nor is this desirable even when 
possible. 
Still, the known advantages of a special authority continue to make it an 
attractive approach. The very newness of the agency is a definite asset, 
creativity and innovativeness are not hampered by traditions, and future 
actions are not constrained by past mistakes or political scandais. The new 
agency might be able to attract dynamic and innovative leaders and 
personnel. lt might be able to obtain stronger political support from top 
executive and legislative quarters. lt might also succeed in getting more 
resources because of the novelty of the program and the enthusiasm of its 
proponents. 
As a basic housing program gains momentum, the dominant functions 
may shift from project planning and start-up operations to regular routine 
management and maintenance. lt is at this stage that the merits of regular 
line agencies are appreciated. ln many countries, special agencies eventually 
become line agencies under more senior ministries and offices. Thus, in 
the Philippines, the TFDA became one of the units of the National Housing 
Authority. ln Jamaica, the Sites and Services Division was absorbed as a regular 
unit in the Ministry of Construction and Housing. 
Because basic housing programs require inputs from many agencies, 
there have been countries where they have been placed in large ministries 
such as ministries of construction, local governments, finance, housing, or 
even human settlements. One advantage of such an arrangement is the 
possibility of top political support for basic housing programs. ln cases 
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where the country's chief executive takes an interest in basic housing, 
greater resources can also be mobilized by the responsible ministry. 
A possible danger of the ministerial arrangement, of course, is the possi-
bility that basic housing might get lost in braad ministerial pragrams. There 
is also the added danger that aider agencies with traditional orientations 
might serve to drag down the housing function thraugh inertia and inactivity. 
Past mistakes and political prablems might taint new pragrams and make 
it that much more difficult to make them work. 
Since the 1972 Stockholm conference on the enviranment and the 1976 
Vancouver conference on human settlements, a number of countries have 
launched human settlements management pragrams that have also empha-
sized basic housing. ln Mexico and the Philippines, for example, ministries 
of human settlements have been created. However, the human settlements 
appraach has been extremely difficult to translate into concrete pragrams. 
The functions that are encompassed by human settlements development 
are vast and wide ranging (e.g., the Philippine pragram endeavour to 
respond to the people's 11 basic needs) and a full-blown pragram to serve 
all basic needs would require the creation of a "super ministry." ln addition 
to resource prablems, such a large body would most likely tax the human 
and other technical skills in a developing country to the point that it would 
leave precious litt le for other institutions to look after. 
If placing basic housing under a super ministry creates prablems, going 
to the other extreme of making it the responsibility of a private nonprafit 
foundation, such as FSDVM, also runs the risks of isolating it from the 
political pracess. To people who perceive housing primarily as a technical 
prablem, the creation of a private body might have its allure. As pointed 
out earlier, basic housing cannot help but be political because it is concerned 
with the utilization of public resources to achieve equity and justice and 
not just to deliver houses and services to people. As a major social issue, it 
cannot be divorced fram the political pracess without becoming a side 
issue of interest only to a few technicians and some civic-spirited citizens. 
There is tao much at stake in basic housing to allow that to happen. 
One final institutional concern about basic housing is continued praject 
operation and maintenance. Special authorities, line agencies, super 
ministries, or private foundations might initiate and launch basic housing 
prajects but, eventually, local government bodies with the cooperation of 
the praject residents themselves have to assume regular management and 
maintenance responsibilities. The prablem, however, is that local units 
often do not have the technical and managerial expertise, tax base, orga-
nizational capabilities, or other resources to assume responsibility over the 
prajects. Such resources cannot simply be pravided by transfers from 
senior to local governmental levels. lt takes personnel training, institution 
building, expansion of the tax base, and development of local resources 
to enhance the capabilities of local units. ln addition to the resource 
requirements of such efforts, time is also needed. 
Private Sector 
Although private developers and contractors play a dominant raie in 
economic housing, their raie in basic housing has not been adequately 
explored. To date, their most important raie has been in constructing basic 
infrastructures up to and including construction of sanitary cores, party 
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walls, and core houses. To carry out these functions, private contractors 
have used the methods they are most familiar with - maximum use of 
technology, conventional construction techniques, heavy reliance on 
equipment, and use of modern and permanent materials. 
Discussions with developers and contractors have revealed some of the 
uneasiness and problems with basic housing. Such problems may be traced 
to certain peculiarities of basic housing approaches. Most architects and 
engineers are used to designing finished housing units. The open-ended 
nature of projects, based on assumptions of progressive development, 
bother some of them. Like most creative people, professionals want to be 
able to visualize an aesthetically pleasing finished product. They find it 
difficult to point to a community of self-built houses in various stages of 
incompleteness and say "I designed that project." 
Business-minded or efficiency-oriented contractors also find difficulties 
with mutual-aid and self-help approaches. When they are forced to hire 
people from the project area (as in Jamaica), they feel they are losing 
contrai over the management of the project. They complain about the lack 
of skills and insubordination of workers. They are unhappy with conflicts 
and squabbles and costly delays. They are particularly resentful of political 
leaders who impose difficult conditions and then expect that contractors 
will perform satisfactorily and deliver finished projects on time. 
To hear private contractors talk, they would prefer not to touch basic 
housing projects because of the way the government goes about its business. 
A frequent complaint is that decision-making is politically diffused, i.e., it 
is extremely difficult to make sure who is really in charge. There is too 
much political interference. Funding, as a result, is often uncertain. A lot 
of time is wasted following up papers to make sure one is paid. ln 
some cases, bribery might be needed to get things approved and funds 
released. 
Corruption, of course, is constantly mentioned by private contractors. 
Government agencies institute a number of checks, audits, and postaudits, 
but these seem to be directly related to the amount of corruption. ln 
many cases, the more checks and investigations there are, the more people 
there are to bribe. The additional "costs" for such management practices 
are passed on to project participants by developers. Thus, it is the people 
who end up paying for these practices. 
From project experiences, the people in the private sector who seem to 
have benefited the most from basic housing projects have been small con-
tractors, tradesmen, and artisans who have found employment. These 
people have not only done an excellent job of meeting construction needs 
in projects but have also performed an admirable training function in the 
mutual-aid and self-help process. Their methods and techniques have 
been appropriate to the materials and designs demanded by the projects. 
Their profit margins have also been modest enough to make their services 
affordable to the people. 
Popular Sector 
lt was the spontaneous act1v1t1es of squatters and sium dwellers that 
first started the trends toward basic housing programs. From careful 
observations of mutual-aid and self-help approaches, the possibilities of 
making available affordable housing to the urban poor were raised. lt is 
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only natural, therefore, that the popular sector should continue to play an 
important raie in basic housing programs. Thanks to the community 
development efforts of project authorities, the people's energies and 
resources are being harnessed to provide sites, shelter, and services. 
There are some project designers who believe that the best managers 
are those who manage least, that what is really needed in basic housing 
projects is to take away all the artificial rules and impediments to popular 
action. ln so doing, people will salve housing problems themselves in the 
cheapest and most efficient way. They would use local organizations, 
traditional mutual-aid practices, appropriate technologies, and their own 
brawn and brains to provide shelter and services that meet their needs. 
Evaluation of basic housing projects has shown that community upgrading 
and sites and services would be extremely difficult to carry out if they were 
left to the people themselves. There are a number of highly technical and 
complex operations required in such projects. The scale of planning, 
programing, project management, and administration calls for skills that 
the people do not seem to have. Mutual aid and self-help are most useful 
at the individual home or family level but the problem of dealing with 
large nu mbers of homes and fa mil ies is a matter of a different scale 
altogether. 
By seeking to strike a balance between the primary group orientation of 
mutual aid and self-help and the more formai organizational approaches 
of project administration, current community-upgrading and sites-and-
services projects are seeking to reap the benefits of bath approaches. From 
the former, they are taking responsiveness, flexibility, creativity, and inno-
vativeness and from the latter they are borrowing efficiency, predictability, 
rationality, and effectiveness. Despite these noble aspirations, it is 
possible, of course, that basic housing approaches might reap instead the 
disadvantages of each of the approaches being used. Sorne of the negative 
reactions to basic housing projects already bear this out. 
Faced with a rapidly urbanizing world in which squatters and sium 
dwellers seem to be the fastest growing segments among urban populations, 
all that housing authorities can hope for is for basic housing projects to 
succeed somehow in distilling the benefits from bath popular and formai 
organizational approaches. The price of failure is tao high. Already, there 
are people living in cities today who might not have any hope of ever 
benefiting from urban services considered to be basic to human life in 
other countries. The number of such people will inevitably increase if 
lessons from basic housing approaches are not learned and people do not 
learn from their mistakes. 
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